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ABSTRACT 
This thesis theoretically and empirically analyzes the nature and consequences of inter-
act ions between family members. The first chapter tests whether children 's human capital 
accumulation was significantly affected by earnings shocks to their nonresident kin in the 
context of the 1997-8 fin ancial crisis in Indonesia. The crisis produced sudden , heteroge-
neous shocks that facilitate the construction of an exogenous measure of earnings changes . 
Results indicate that earnings shocks to nonresident kin - including extended family and 
rdativcs living in other districts- significant ly aflcctcd children's human capital accumula-
tion between 1997 and 2000, and ultimate educational attainment measured nearly a decade 
after the crisis hit. Supplementary results point to intra-family transfers, underpinned by 
ex post altruism , as an important channel of causation. 
The second chapter develops a theoretical model of private transfers underpinned by 
ex post altruism among members of a network. I use this model to analyze equilibrium 
transfer patterns and inequality under alternative income distributions and network struc-
tures. I demonstrate the general intuition that transfers obtain in equilibrium when the 
amount of altruism is sufficient ly strong relative to income inequali ty. Within t he networks 
that I analyze, every equilibrium involving transfers t akes the same form: unique income 
thresholds separate senders from receivers. Effective risk sharing takes place among senders 
and receivers, while those at intermediate incomes remain in autarky. Every equilibrium 
gives rise to the same set of allocations. I contrast these predictions with insurance-based 
theories of transfers in which risk sharing is operative for small income differences and may 
v 
fall apart at large income differences. 
The third chapter uses longitudinal data spanning nearly fifteen years to test whether 
transfers among family members within Indonesia are consistent with ex post altruism, 
against the alternative of insurance. I use the predicted effects of permanent versus transi-
tory income on transfers, as well as theoretical predictions from the second chapter regarding 
the shape of transfer functions , to carry out this test . The results provide some evidence 
that transfer motives are inconsistent with insurance but consistent with ex post altruism. 
Vl 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The family has long been recognized as cent ral to t he determination of individual outcomes . 
Yet much of the economics li terature is focused on t he roles of the household . local social 
networks . and migration. T he family is all and none of these things. The three substant ive 
chapters of this thesis theoretically and empirically analyze the nature and consequences of 
interactions between family members. 
Chapter 2 sheds light on the relevance of nonresident family members to individual 
wellbeing and the design of economic policy. It does so by testing the hypothesis that 
children 's human capital accumulat ion was significantly affected by earnings shocks to their 
nonresident kin in t he context of the 1997-8 financial crisis in Indonesia. The crisis generated 
relat ively sudden and extremely heterogeneous shocks to the earnings of workers throughout 
Indonesia. These shocks. combined with detailed panel data on school-aged children and 
their nonresident kin . facili tate est imat ion of the reduced-form impact of the nonresident 
family 's earnings shocks on children 's medium- and long-run human capital accumulation. 
The main results of the chapter indicate that changes in children 's enrollment status 
and achievement in school between 1997 and 2000 were significantly affected by changes in 
proxies for the earnings shocks of their relatives living elsewhere within Indonesia. Condi-
tional upon the earnings changes of co-resident family members. larger earnings declines 
of a child 's nonresident grandparents. uncles and aunts. and older siblings increased her 
probabili ty of dropping out of school and decreased the number of grades she completed. 
These resul ts a re all the more st riking given the fact that more than sixty percent of 
nonresident family members were living in a different village from the child at the time of 
the crisis. lVIoreover. the effects were apparent ly persistent. Resul ts from 2007. nearly a 
decade after t he crisis hi t. indicate that shocks to nonresident kin produced differences in 
children 's ult imate educat ional attainment . A one standard deviat ion increase in a proxy 
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for the earnings changes of nonresident family members caused a child to complete about 
0.14 more grades by 2007. This effect is similar in magnitude to t he est imated effect of 
Indonesia 's Sekolah Dasar INPRES program . which has been called '· ... t he la rgest school 
building program in the history of the world. " 1 
It is important to understaud the channels through which such effects could have been 
mediated. The channel that immediately come. to mind is in t ra-fami ly money t ransfers. 
But what mot ivates such transfers? Recently. the economics li teratnre has focused on 
insurance as a motive. But in the context of family networks. it is reasonable to expect 
that transfers may arise from alt ruism. T he two motives have potentia lly differing policy 
implications. Hence. the remainder of the disser tation explores the implications for t ransfers 
of alt ruism in different contexts . aud empirically assesses t he comparat ive roles of insurance 
and alt ruism. 
Chapter 3 analyzes a t heoretical model of transfers within alt ruistic networks. The 
objectives are to explore the implications of network st ructure and income dist ribu tion 
for patterns of altruistic t ransfers. and to highlight testable distinctions between altruist ic 
and insurance-based t ransfers. The main insights are that all equili bria involving t ransfers 
take a particular form: unique income thresholds separate senders from receivers. effective 
risk-sharing takes place among agents with relatively low and high incomes. and agents at 
intermediate incomes remain in autarky. The presence and amount of altruist ic t ransfers 
hinges upon the extent of income inequality. given t he level of altruism . 
The shape of the transfer function is a key distinction between altruism and insurance. 
Altruism predicts t hat transfers are inoperative among agents with relatively equal incomes. 
and are operat ive among those with unequa l incomes. \ iVhile this pattem could be consistent 
with insurance with fixed costs . the presence of commit ment constraints to insurance gives 
rise to another distinction between the predicted shapes of the transfer functions associated 
wit h t he two motives. 
This chapter a lso highlights a different distinction between insurance a nd alt ruism. stem-
1See Duflo (2001 ). The quote is from Rosenzweig (20 12). 
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ming from the ex ante versus ex post natures of t he two motives . \ iVhile insm ance-based 
t ransfers arise from differences between forecastable and realized income. no such distinction 
exists in the context of alt ruistic transfers. Instead . alt ruistic t ransfers arise from diffe rences 
between the realized dist ribu t ion of income and the equilibrium allocations achievable by 
means of ex post t ransfers. Therefore. forecastable and un- fo recastable income differences 
are predicted to have the same effect on alt ruist ic t ransfers. An implication is tha t altruistic 
transfers may persist in one direct ion to the extent that forecastable income differences are 
themselves persistent. Insurance. by contrast . is cont racted ex ante over possible realizat ions 
of un-forecastable income. Hence. forecastable income d ifferences should not directly affect 
the amount of insurance-based transfers. and insurance-based t ransfers should frequently 
reverse in direction . 
\ iVhat are the comparat ive roles of t he insurance and altruist ic motives 111 the data? 
Chapter 4 uses longitudinal data spanning nearly fifteen years to test these predict ions. and 
hence shed light on whether t ransfers among family members vvithin Indonesia are consistent 
wit h the pure insurance motive. T he descript ive statist ics presented in t his chapter indicate 
t hat t ransfer flows exhibi t persistence in di rect ion. contrary to what would be expected if 
transfers were based purely on insurance . A more rigorous test. based on decomposing 
household earnings into fo recastable and un-forecastable components. provides addit ional 
evidence against the pure insurance motive . Net t ransfers sent by households to their 
nonresident family members are strongly. posit ively associated with households ' fo recastable 
incomes. T his associa tion is robust across a wide variety of specifications. including ones 
that attempt to di rectly cont rol for the potent ially confounding role of aggregate risk. Hence. 
t he results of Chapter 4 indicate that int ra-family t ransfers in Indonesia are not motivated 
purely by insurance. It is more likely that a mixture of motives is at work. 
T here are several important implications for policy and future research. As count ries 
develop and households become more fragmented. the economic importance of nom esident 
family members is poised to increase. Economists increasingly recognize that households 
are "mobile and permeable. ·' but t he family clearly deserves greater attention in future 
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research as a unit of analysis and determinant of household outcomes .2 \ iVhile nonresident 
family members can be an asset. connections between family members - coupled with 
spatial and income mobility - can also be a source of vulnerability. especially during a 
crisis. Policies designed to guard against t his vulnerabili ty may be particularly helpful in 
promoting development. 
To the extent t hat transfers between family members arc motiva ted by altruism . de-
tailed data on altruist ic networks is needed in order to understand t he patterns and extent 
of spill-overs between connected individuals. Such data. combined with models that explore 
mixtures of motives for exchanging t ransfers. may help to further explain the wide variety in 
households' responses to risk and income shocks.3 l\Ioreover. future effort s to collec t infor-
mation on fami ly net'vvorks may prove cost-effect ive. For example. cost-benefit evaluations 
of social safety nets and intervent ions to prornote financial inclusion could be improved by 
accounting for welfare effects on local and non-local family members of targeted individuals. 
It may be possible to enhance the targeting of these programs by ut ilizing information on 
individuals' nonresident kin . Convent ional wisdom suggests that market-based targeting 
schemes should st rive to maximize participation among the poor. But how do the poor par-
ticipate? Accounting in the design of such programs for indirect benefits . which accrue to 
individuals connected to program participants . consti tutes a challenging mechanism design 
problem and a fruitful path for future research. 
2 Udry and Conley (2005). 
3 See Townsend ( 1995). 
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Chapter 2 
Consequences of Interactions between 
R esident and Nonresident Kin 
Evidence from Human Capital Accumulat ion during t he 
1997-8 Indonesian Financial Crisis 
2.1 Introduction 
T he family has long bee11 recognized as central to the determinat ion of individ ual outcomes . 
Yet much of the economics li terature has focused on models of household-level decision 
making (e.g. Bourguignon. eta!.. 2009) . and empirical studies typically employ household-
level da ta and have households as their uni t of analysis. 4 The United Nations defines a 
household " ... based on the arrangements made by persons. individually or in groups . for 
providing themselves with food and other essent ials for living ... <) By contrast. the family 
defies categorizat ion by physical boundaries. l'v'Iost individuals have family members who 
reside in different households - i.e. "nonresident" family members.6 
Of what relevance are nonresident family members to individual wellbeing and t he design 
of economic policy? T his paper sheds light on this quest ion by test ing t he hypothesis that 
the earnings changes of a child's nonresident kin a ffect her human capital accumulat ion. The 
199 7-8 fin ancial crisis in Indonesia produced relatively sudden and extremely heterogeneous 
changes in the earnings of workers throughout the country. The wide dispersion of these 
changes . combined wit h detailed panel data on school-aged children . t heir households . and 
their nonresident kin . enables me to estimate the impact of t he nonresident family's earnings 
4 Bergstrom (1997) surveys this li terature. 
5 Uni ted Nations, 2008. Beaman and Dillon (201 2) prov ide fasci nating ev idence from l\ la li on t he haza rds 
of differing household defin it ions across data sources. T he definition of a household in the Indonesia Family 
Li fe Survey (the ma in data source for this study) is " ... a group of people whose members reside in the same 
dwelling and share food from the same cooking pot." (Strauss . eta!. (2009) , p . 4). 
6 
"Family' ' is conceptua lly neit her broader nor narrower than '·household. " In t he US Census , for example, 
households often contain mul t iple families since "family" means immed iate kin . See IPUl\ !S USA (2011 ). 
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shocks on children 's human capita l accumula t ion. 
The crisis is central to my ability interpret the association between nonresident fami ly 
members ' earnings shocks and children 's human capital accumulat ion as causal. Adequate 
treatment of t he relevant endogeneity concerns is. in other circnmstances. likely to leave litt le 
remainiug variation wit h which to ident ify t his effect. T he crisis produced wide dispersion 
in workers' earnings changes that was correlated with t heir pre-crisis characteristics. This 
enables me to construct a proxy for the earnings changes of children 's nonresident kin. 
The main part of my analysis provides evideuce on the medium-ruu effects of nonresi-
dent family members· earnings shocks on children 's human capita l accumulat iou. I regress 
changes in children 's enrollmeut status and number of grades completed between 1997 aud 
2000 on proxies for the earnings shocks of their relatives liviug elsewhere within Indonesia. 
Conditional upon t he earnings changes of co-resident fami ly members. larger earnings de-
clines of a child 's nonresident grandparents . uncles and aunts. aud older siblings increased 
her probabili ty of dropping out of school and decreased the number of grades she com-
pleted. T he effects seem to have been larger fo r children who were close to or had recent ly 
completed t he transition from primary to junior secondary school when the crisis hit. Sup-
plementary results demonstrate that these effects arise from the earnings shocks of fam ily 
members living in other districts. in addition to those living within the child 's own dist rict. 
Conditional on the earnings changes of other nonresident kin. shocks to nonresident uncles 
and aunts significantly affected children 's human capital accumulat ion. suggest ing that t he 
earnings of both nuclear and extended family members are important. F inally. nonresident 
family members were a source of vulnerabili ty: the human capi ta l accunmlat ion of some 
children actually appears to have been disrupted by below-average shocks to nonresident 
family members ' earnings. 
These effects were persistent. Resul ts from 2007. nearly a decade after the crisis hi t. 
indicate that shocks to nonresident kin produced differences in children 's ult imate educa-
tional attainment . A one standard deviation increase in my measure of nonresident fami ly 
members ' earnings changes caused a child to complete about 0.14 more grades by 2007. T he 
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magnitude of t his effect is apparently of similar magni tude to t hat of Indonesia's Sekolah 
Dasar IN PRES program. vvhich has been called '· ... t he largest school building program in 
the history of the world ." 7 
Vl hat mechanisms produced these results? The evidence points to a link between non-
resident family members' earnings and parental resources . Changes in nonresident family 
members ' earnings are positively associated with changes in household expenditures . F i-
nancial t ransfers exchanged between resident and nonresident kin appear to have been im-
portant. Changes in nonresident family earnings are significantly associated with changes 
in transfers between resident and nonresident kin whose incomes were relat ively unequal 
ex-ante. For children in th is same group of households. nonresident kin 's earnings shocks 
generated gaps in school achievement . This form of heterogeneity in transfer fun ctions is 
consistent with a sim ple model of transfers between altruist ically-linked family members. 
as opposed to transfers underpinned by ex-ante insurance contracts. 8 I also invest igate the 
extent to which changes in patterns of family co-residence a.nd peer effects between family 
members may have played a role, but find no robust evidence that these channels were 
important. 
My results contribute to our understanding of the role that family networks play in 
determini ng individual outcomes. Udry and Conley (2005) argue that the boundaries of 
African households are often "mobile and permeable. ·' emphasizing the importance of social 
networks in which individuals are embedded. i\!Iy results suggest that household boundaries 
are permeable in non-African contexts as well. Complementing evidence from the emerging 
literature on social networks within one 's vi llage . my findings highlight the importance of 
nonlocal network members .9 Indeed. more than sixty percent of the nonresident family 
members examined in this st udy live in a different village than t he sample household. 
Moreover. the economic significan ce of nonresident family members seems likely to increase 
7See DuAo (2001). T he quote is from Rosenzweig (20 12) . 
8 Previous studies t hat examine a ltru ism as a. possible moti ve for private t ransfers ignore the possibility 
that such t ransfers may be inoperat ive at low levels of inequa li ty. See, e.g ., Altonji , et a l. (1997) and Park 
(2003) . 
9 See, for example, Conley a nd Udry (2010) and Angelucc i, et a l. (2010). 
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over time as countries develop and households spli t apart. often across distant locations. 
Ignoring links to these family members misses an economically significant and increasingly 
important determinant of individual wellbeing. 
Recent studies of migration and remittances also suggest that nonlocalnetwork members 
are important .10 However. such studies are incapable of fully capt uring the importance of 
family networks for three reasons. First . the "migrants" tha t are typically the subj ect of 
such studies consist of any individuals who previously lived in the household under st udy. 11 
Hence. looking across households. "migrants" can be comprised of a variety of different 
kinds of family and non-family members. Second. since international migrants are typically 
positively selected from the population (see Grogger and Hanson. 2011). households vvith 
such migrants are not representa tive. Finally. since migrants (as typically defined ) a re 
current or former household members. studies of these migrant s do not capture the role of 
family members who are not . and perhaps never were. part of the household roster. 12 
T he results of this study. by contrast. are primarily based upon a fixed set of rela-
t ionships: those between children and their nonresident grandparents. uncles/ aunts. and 
siblings. Studying these relationships does not require me to impose particularly restrictive 
selection criteria since most children in my sample had at least one employed nonresident 
family member. And the significance of nonresident. extended family members' earmngs 
shocks demonstrates the importance of family members who are not migrants. 13 
My results also shed light on the role of "t raditional" inst itutions in the development pro-
cess . particularly during periods of rapid st ructural change. Theoretical research highlights 
the potential for networks to give rise to community effects that accentuate restrict ions 
on income mobili ty. 14 Recent empirical studies provide some support for this pessimistic 
10 1-Ianson a nd Woodruff (2003), Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) , and Ashraf, et a l. (2009) . See 
Rapoport and Docquier (2005) for a recent survey. 
11 See, for example, Adams, et a l. (2008) , Amuedo-Dora ntes (2010) , and Yang (2008). 
12 The foc us on migrants rather than family networks may exp la in why a la rge fract ion of households 
ap parently receive remi ttances from non-migrants. See, e.g ., Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010). 
13T his study also sheds light on rura l-rural migration by demonst rat ing t he economic importa nce of cross-
village lin kages between ind ividuals . Rura l-rura l migra tion . which is neglected by the li terature, is more 
common in low-income cou nt ries than rura l-urban migration (Lucas. 2007). 
14 Greif (1994), Kranton (1996) 
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view .15 Such restrict ions on mobili ty can reduce economic growth.16 By contrast . other 
studies view social networks as an asset. highlighting their role in learning and resource-
sharing that can lead to greater effici ency in t he use of technology. sharing of risk. and 
financing of investments in the face of incomplete markets and indivisibilities Y F inally. 
t here is much speculat ion on the implications of the development process for traditional 
insti tutions. 18 
My results show that the famil y. irrespective of physical boundaries . was an important 
institut ion during the Indonesian financia l crisis despite three preceding decades of rapid 
industrializat ion. Consistent with both optimistic and pessimistic views of social networks. 
the nonresident family in Indonesia seems to be both an asse t and a liabili ty. Before the 
crisis. some households may have been reliant on t ransfers from nom esident family members 
to help finance the education of young children : households· t ransfer receipts in 1997 are 
posit ively associated with the presence of school-aged children. 19 However. adverse earnings 
shocks to nonresident family members negatively and persistent ly affected children 's human 
capital accumulat ion. 
This study also cont ributes to the literature on risk-sharing. 20 Alt ruistically-motivated 
transfers may be an important ex-post risk coping mechanism for households. much like 
assets or buffer stocks. 21 The evidence presented here suggests that such transfers have 
important consequences for individual wellbeing. In addi t ion. the importance of both local 
and nonlocal family members documented in this study may help explain the wide variety 
of responses to risk and income shocks across households observed by Townsend ( 1995). 
15 1\ lunshi and Rosenzweig (2006). 1\,[unshi and Wilson (201 1) 
16 lvlookherj ee and Ray (2003) 
17 Conley and Udry (2010) and Angelucci, et a l. (2010), l\ lunshi (2011 ). 
18 Polanyi (1944), Pu t nam (1993) . 1\ liguel, et a l. (2006) prov ides ev idence of interactions between migration 
patterns associa ted wit h the development process in Indonesia before t he 1997 financia l crisis , and measures 
of '·socia l capita l' ' such as co-residence patterns and di vorce rates. 
19 Angelucci, et a l. (2010) argue that some households used their PROG RESA cash t ransfers to lwlp finance 
the secondary schooling of children of family members residing in the same village. 
20 See, e.g., Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), Townsend (1994). Pau lson (2000) , Ligon. et a l. (2002), and 
Bourguignon , et a l. (2009). Fafchamps a nd Lund (2003) a nd W itoelar (2005) reject t he hypothesis of full 
risk-sharing between family members. T he latter is based on the same survey data used in this stud y. 
21 See Kazianga and Ud ry (2006). Yang and C hoi (2007) provide evidence that international remittances 
may provide households wit h insurance. 
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Finally. this paper cont ri butes to the growing literatm e document ing the longer- term 
effects of individuals ' early- li fe environments .22 A number of these st udies measure variat ion 
m early-life condit ions t hat may have also had direct health consequences. in addit ion 
to economic consequences . or measure efi'ects on out comes such as wages and mortali ty. 
T his study connects economic disruptions to changes in medium- and long-term human 
capi ta l accumulation. providing di rect evidence on human capita l as a possible mechanism 
through which other out come.· may have been afi'ectecl. It also provides insight into how 
the long-te rm effects of shocks d isrupting human capital accumulat ion may vary by the age 
of exposure to the shock. 
There are several policy implications. First. just as connections between financial insti-
t ut ions can increase the hazard of default and give rise to systemic risk. connections between 
family members - coupled with spat ial and income mobili ty - can be a source of vulnerabil-
ity and may impede the development process. especially during a crisis. Policies designed 
to guard against this vulnerabili ty may be part icularly helpful in promoting development . 
tvfore generally. t he resul ts of this study suggest that policies designed to promote fi-
nancial inclusion and enhance social safety nets can have spillovers to locations far away 
from targeted households. 23 Failure to account for these spillovers will cause the est imated 
benefi ts of such policies to be understated . Account ing for links to nonresident kin may en-
hance policymakers' ability to target and evaluate policies designed to smoot h fluctuations 
in in eli vid uals ' well being. 
2.2 The 1997-8 financial crisis 
In July 1997. the devaluat ion of Thailand 's currency marked the beginning of the East 
Asian Financial Crisis. In Indonesia . the second half of 1997 saw increases in exchange and 
interest rate volatili ty and major strain on the financial sector in connection with the pullout 
of foreign capital. Yet most Indonesians were relatively unaffected by the crisis unt il t he 
22 See, e.g., Gould. Lavy, and Paserm an (2004 and 2011 ), Almond (2006), Van den Berg. et a l. (2006) , and 
Oreopolous, et a l. (2008) , !'v laccini and Yang (2009). 
23 Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) present ev idence of consumption spillovers to fa mily members wit hin 
the same vill age. 
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beginning of 1998.24 In J anu ary. President Suharto released a budget that appeared to be 
incompatible with terms previously agreed upon with t he INIF. and the crisis became much 
more severe. The Indonesian rupiah lost more t han half of its value relative to the major 
world currencies within a few· clays . The government made drastic cut s in subsidies and in 
large public projects. The price of food staples overall increased by more than 80 percent . 
and in a span of less than two years. rice prices more than doubled in 10 of Indonesia's 27 
·r provinces. -" Tha t t he crisis hit during the worst drought Indonesia had experienced in 50 
years added insult to injury.26 T he interaction between the drought. which lowered crop 
yields from the 1997 harvest. cuts in food and fuel subsidies. and t he massive exchange 
rate depreciation in J anuary. which made food imports prohibi tively expensive. produced 
widespread shortages. These shor tages , coupled with increasing urbau unemployment and 
the government's perceived ineffectiveness . resulted in rioting. Ult imately. the political 
regime itself vvas compromised. In the two years following the onset of the crisis. t he 
Indonesian economy fared much worse than most others in the region. Large changes in 
prices . interest rates. and real wages were associated with a severe decline in economic 
growth and increases in poverty. 27 Figure 2.1 present s a t imeline of the crisis. 28 
Heterogen eous effects 
The effects of the crisis throughout Indonesia were extremely heterogeneous. There was 
2
"
1Se t iawan (2000) , p. 43 , Frankenberg , et al. 2003, p. 284 . T here were some public protests in Indonesia 
dur ing the second ha lf of 1997 (see Sanger , 1997). T he "pre-crisis·· data used for t his study comes eit her 
direct ly from 1996 or from survey questions adm inistered during 1997 but in reference to the previous year. 
Perha ps more troublesome on a clay- to-day basis for many was the eO"ects of the forest fires on Sumatra and 
Ka li ma ntan (Borneo) between August and November 1997, and again in Sout heastern Ka limanta n between 
March and July 1998 . T he fires , which burned out of control clue to t he extreme drought brought on by t he 
El Niiio weather phenomenon , spread haze throughou t large pa rts of Indonesia and d isrupted agri culture 
and tourism (J ayachandran (2009) a nd Smi t h, et a l. (2002)). Southern Sumatra and Ka limanta n. where the 
fires were concent ra ted , were most a ffected by the haze . Northern Sumatra was a lso hea\·i ly a ffected , while 
Java was relat ively unaffected. J ayachand ran (2009) and references t herein analyze the hea lth consequences 
of the fires . 
25 PBS (2011 ), Levinsohn , et a l. (2003) 
26 J\ Iuch of Indonesia was abnorma.lly dry dur ing 1997 and 1998 . but it was t he eastern province of Iria n 
J aya that bore t he brunt of E l Ni1io. The drought there lasted past t he 1998 monsoon season, causing 
widespread hunger a nd fatali t ies clue to dehydration. See ReliefWeb ( 1998). Irian J ay a was not covered by 
the household survey used for t his study. 
27 Worlcl Bank (2011) 
28 T he recovery of Indonesia 's eco nomy was relatively protracted. \-\' hile the per capita incomes of most 
other count ries in the region had recovered by 2000, Indonesia's did not reach it s p re-crisis high un t il 2004 
(World Bank , 2011 ). 
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Figure 2.1: T imeline of the crisis and IFLS survey work 
a spectacula r collapse in the spat ial arbitrage of prices and wages. att ributable in part to 
the count ry's geographic fr agmentation. Levinsohn. et a l. (2003) document t remendous 
geographic and product-level dispersion in the price changes of consumer goods. There 
was also substant ial heterogeneity across regions and industries in real wages and employ-
ment changes . Figure 2.2 depicts substantial dispersion in aggregate earnings changes both 
aero ·s industries and across provinces . wi thin a given industry. between 1996 and 1998. 29 
Tremendous heterogeneity existed along other dimensions as well. Fallon and Lucas ( 2002). 
Smith. et al. (2002) . and Frankenberg, et al. (2003) document increases in self- and informal-
employment along with an increase in the number of unpaid family workers. Naturally. this 
was associated wi t h gender differences. \ i\Thi le overall employment rates fell between 1997 
and 1998. they actually increased among rural females .30 \ iVage and employment changes 
also varied by education and pre-crisis wage levels. 
29 Data tabu lated from Indonesia 's Nat ional Labor Force Survey (SA I<SH NAS) and t he Indonesia Family 
Life Survey (IFLS), t he two main da ta sources used in th is study. 
30Smi t h , et al. (2002) , Table 2 
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Figure 2.2 : Change in aggregate earnmgs . 1996-8 (l'l'lin . max. and average change across 
provinces. by industry) 
These patterns of heterogeneity marked . to a large extent. a reversal in an ongoing trend 
before the crisis in which employment was shifting from the agricul tura l to the modern . 
higher-wage sector. As one study of the crisis notes. ·· ... t here was li tt le connection between 
the regional dist ribut ion of the impact of the shock and the regional distribution of pre-
shock poverty." 31 T here was good reason for t his . T he modern . import-intensive industries 
such as textiles and electronics manufacturing. and industries dependent upon short-term 
debt such as construction and real estate . were hardest-hit by the currency devaluat ion. 
invest ment flight. and credi t constraints due to bank closures and high lending interest 
rates. The close linkages of t hese industries to (mostly non- t radeable) fin ancial services and 
t ransportation resulted in declines in those industries as well. Ivieanwhile. the export and 
agricul t ural sectors benefi ted to some extent from terms-of-trade improvements.32 
3 1 P ri tchett , et a l. (2002) , p . 6. 
32 Set iawan (2000). Fa llon and Lucas (2002) , Levinsohn . et a l. (2003) 
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H omehold responses 
Households responded to the crisis by selling assets (primarily gold jewelery) and by cut-
ting expenditures on dura ble and semi-durable goods and invest ment in education. There 
were big cuts in ed ucational expenditures among most households. and the poorest house-
holds may have cut expendi tures on education proport ionally more than other types of 
expendi tures . The difFerential effects for poor households were probably due in part to a 
lack of assets with which to smooth expenditures . combined with a tightening of liquidi ty 
constraints for all households . To the extent t hat credit and insurance markets were ever 
functioning. the crisis rendered them much less effect ive. Credit became unaffordable as in-
terest rates skyrocketed. reflecting high risk premia . inflat ion . and tight monetary policy. 33 
Insurance . borrowing. and intra-communi ty redistribut ion were likely to function less well 
as smoothing mechanisms. forcing households to resort to more cost ly ones and to make 
deeper budget cuts. These cuts are reflected in existing evidence of declines in chool en-
rollments. which are particula rly striking in light of the rapid increase in enrollment rates 
in the years before the crisis. National data reveal outright declines in enrollment rates 
among children of almost all ages between 7 and 15 years .34 
The employment effects of t he crisis induced massive net migrat ion back to rural areas 
(although there were high absolute levels in the opposite direction as well ). as well as re-
turn migration from rvialaysia. 35 Complementing this migration were changes in household 
st ructure and co-residence patterns.36 
Government response 
The Indonesian government responded to the crisis by making large cuts in overall expen-
ditures (including public education) and launching a new social safety net known as t he 
33 Fallon and Lucas (2002). Frankenberg, et a l. (2003) a lso present survey ev idence, fi elded during t he 
second half of 1998 from a 25 percent sub-sample of lFLS households, that t here were steep declines relat ive 
to 1997 in both t he incidence of borrowing and am ounts borrowed by households from the formal cred it 
sector. 
34 T hornas , et a l. 2004 , Table 2a 
35 Fallon and Lucas (2002) . 
36 Frankenberg, et a l. (2003) 
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J PS. 37 l\!Iost programs wit hin the JPS had not previously existed in Indonesia . Although 
launched in 1998. regiona l budget politics prevented many of the programs from becoming 
act ive until the second half of the year. The JPS programs provided rice subsidies. managed 
public \vorks and other employment-creating projects. subsidized education and health. and 
gave block grants to villages . The subsidized rice (OPK) program was by far the largest 
in terms of the fract ion of t he populat ion covered.:38 T he "scholarships" (SBG) program 
targeted individual st udents and gave block grants to schools. The block grants were tar-
geted at the "poorest" schools (i.e . those serving poorest students). aud school commit tees 
allocated the grants to individual students on the basis of numerous criteria related to their 
poverty status and subj ective likelihood of dropping ou t. T he schola rships. which ranged 
between RplO .OOO and Rp30.000 per mont h depending upon t he student's ·chooling level. 
were intended to exceed recipients· school fees .39 Yet coverage of the eligible popu lat ion 
was relat ively low.40 Although expenditures on the JPS programs constituted a relatively 
large share of the government 's (declining) budget . the heterogeneous impact of the crisis 
made targeting very difficult. -ll and there is evidence that the programs were fraught with 
corrupt ion.42 
2.3 Empirical Strategy and Data 
2.3.1 Conceptual framework 
Human capital investment 
A model of optimal human capital investment (e.g. t hat of Balancl and Robinson. 2000) 
is a natural starting point for thinking about t he expected effects of nonresident family 
3 7 P ri tchett , et a!. (2002) , and Sumarto and Sur,va ha.di (2001) summa rize and evalua te t he various JPS 
programs . 
38 Sum a.r to and Suryaha.di (2001) es t imates tha t th e coverage ra tio for eligible rec ipients with below-medi an 
income was 40 percent . 
39 P ri tchett , et a l. (2002) 
'
10 Sumarto and Surya had i (2001) est imates t hat t he schola rs hips reached only 5.4 percent of poor students 
and 3 .3 percent of non-poor students , a lthough coverage among poor s tudents in junior second a ry school 
may have been somew hat higher. 
4 1 P ri tchett , et a!. (2002) 
'
12 0 lken (2006) documents a substant ia l sha re of "missing rice .. in the OPI< progra m. 
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members' eamings on children 's human capital accumulation . In snch models. changes in 
parents' current resources can give rise to changes in their utility- maximizing levels of in-
vestment in their children·s human capit al in a number of ways. For example. parents may 
face binding liquidity constraints which prevent t hem from interna lizing the consequences 
of under-investing in their children 's human capital by breaking t he link between current 
parental resources and children 's future income. It seems likely that many households ex-
periencec.l a tightening of such constraints during the crisis . Education may also be viewed 
by parents as a con.- umpt ion good. In both cases . a decrease in their resources reduces 
parents ' expendi tures on t heir children 's human capital. 
Linkages to nonresident kin 
There is some evidence suggest ing that intra-family t ransfers may have been important to 
households' ability to cope with the crisis .43 Changes in transfers exchanged vvith nonresi-
dent kin are linked direct ly to parental resources.44 Among households ini t ially dependent 
upon t ransfers. a decline in transfer receipts t hat is not replaced by increased income from 
other sources will reduce available parental resources. 
Ot her possible links between nonresident kin 's earnings and children 's human capital in-
elude changing cohabitation patterns and peer effects between family members. Changes in 
household size and composit ion were common during the crisis. and constituted an impor-
tant coping mechanisms for households.45 In addi t ion. peer effects between family members 
could arise from interdependencies between households ' human capital investment functions 
or imperfect information about the possible effects of the crisis. I discuss possible forms 
and implicat ions of these links in greater detail in Section 2.5 . 
43 Frankenberg, et a!. (1999) 
44 Parental resources, in turn , may be linked to the shadow va lue of a child"s t ime via pa renta l labor supply. 
45 Thomas, et a !. (2004 ). 
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2.3.2 Description of data 
The database used for this st udy combines child- and household-level information from 
successive waves of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) . a nationally-representative 
longitudinal household survey. with data on changes in the earnings of workers obtained 
from the 1996 and 1998 round · of Indonesia 's national labor force survey (SAKERNAS ). 
The IFLS was first fi elded in 1993 in 13 of the 27 provinces Indonesia had at the time. The 
population of these provinces constituted over 80 percent of Indonesia 's total population in 
1993 . T hree subsequent waves were fielded in 1997. 2000. and 2007.46 The data used in this 
study come primarily from the latter 3 waves. although I use the 1993 -vvave to a limi ted 
extent to fill in missing data as discussed below. 
T he focus of my main analysis is on changes in children 's human capi ta l accumulat ion 
between 1997 and 2000. for which I primarily rely on the second and third main waves of 
the IFLS. In Section 2.6. I study the longer-run impact on children's educational attainment 
by analyzing outcomes in 2007. for which I rely on the fourth wave of the IFLS. The t iming 
of the 1997 IFLS survey wave is important to this and other studies that use the IFLS to 
analyze the effects of the Indonesian crisis. Ninety-five percent of the household interviews 
were completed by the end of December 1997, before t he crisis intensified (see Figure 2. 1).47 
This study also uses data from the 1996 and 1998 rounds of the SAKERNAS. adminis-
tered to more than 65.000 Indonesian households in A11gust of each year. The data is used 
to construct proxies for the init ial wages and changes in earnings of households ' nonresident 
kin. as discussed in greater detai l below. 
2.3.3 Estimation samples 
The child-level sample used for my main analysis tracks children 's progress through school 
from 1997. immediately before the crisis. to 2000. The sample consists of children ages 4- 19 
years in 1997. The main household-level sample is based on the households in which these 
46 A follow-u p survey based on a 25 percent sub-sample of t he 1993 survey fra me was administered in t he 
initia l wa ke of t he crisis in 1998. T he data. from t hat survey were not publicly ava ilable as of t his writing. 
47 Fra.nkenberg a nd T homas (2000) , p . 19. 
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children were living in 1997. A distinguishing feature of t he IFLS is that it attempted to 
track individuals who moved between survey rounds. This enables me to fo llow households 
across survey rounds as they move or spli t apart . Household-level information from 1997 
and subsequent waves. including information on nonresident kin . was obtained by ma tching 
data to the identifiers of the heads of these households . I adopted this strategy. as opposed 
to matching data to the same household identifiers across rounds. to ensure t hat household-
level data were pertinent to the household in which the parents of children in my sample 
were living in subsequent waves . even when their household identifier changes due to a move 
or household spli t. 48 Tables 2.1 and2.2 present basic descriptive stat istics of the households 
and children in my sample. The Appendix contains more detai ls on sample construction. 
Attrition from my sample is relatively lovv. primarily because data on individual children 
continues to be available in the IFLS as these children move through school and into the 
labor force. \Vere I not able to follow these children. my sample would have been smaller 
and more selective. In the Appendix. I test whether attrition is a significant source of bias 
in my results and find no evidence that it is. 
The IFLS contains detailed data on nonresident grandparents. uncles/ aunts . and older 
siblings of the sample children. who I henceforth refer to as the child 's nonresident family 
members or kin .49 Table 2.3 presents characterist ics of the nonresident kin of households in 
my sample. Each household has an average of about 10 nom esident family members. and all 
households had at least one nonresident family member. The vast majority of nonresident 
kin were located within Indonesia. The fo cus of t his paper is on households ' interactions 
with these nonresident family members. l\!Iost commonly. t he household head and / or spouse 
indicated that they had siblings who lived elsewhere. On average. the head and spouse had 
about 7 nonresident siblings between them. Just over forty percent of children in my sample 
48 About 8 percent of children in my sample lived in households t hat moved loca.lions between 1997 and 
2000. 
49 The data. in the IFLS techni ca.lly refer to t he nonresident pa rents , siblings . and children of the household 
head and spouse. These correspond to nonresident gra ndpa rents. uncles or aunts. and siblings for t he vast 
majori ty of children in my sample. Roughly 8 percent of children in my sample a re grandchildren of t he 
household head and spouse (see Table 2.2). i\-ly main resul ts a re not sensit ive to t he presence of t hese 
children in the sample. 
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Table 2.1: Characterist ics of sample households . 1997 & 2000 
1997 2000 
M ean sd lVIean sd 
Urban 0.-!G 0.48 
Moved between survey rounds 0.09 
Household size 5.8 2.0 5.5 2.0 
Number of children 
Ages 4-19 2.8 1.4 2.5 1.4 
Ages 4- 11 1.-! 1.1 1.1 1.0 
Ages 12-1 9 1.-! 1.1 1.4 1.0 
Household expenditures 
Per capita 325 282 309 252 
Food share 0.57 0.17 0.59 0.16 
Schooling share 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 
Characteristics of head 
Age 44.9 11.7 
Years of schooling 5.7 4.5 
1viarriecl 0.91 0.90 
Spouse co-resident 0.97 0.97 
Industry of employment 
Agriculture 0.31 0.33 
Construct ion 0.07 0.05 
l\'Ianufacturing 0.11 0.08 
Other 0.37 0.36 
t\ot working 0.14 0.18 
Change in earnings 
Actual, 1997-2000 -0.15 0.86 
Proxy, 1996-8 -0 .16 0.15 
Note : 
i\' =3,908. Stat ist ics weighted by numbt• r of sa mpl e children in each 
household . Ex pendi t ures in tens of thousands of 2000 rupiah. 
Source: IFLS a nd SAKERNAS 
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Table 2.2 : Basic characteristics of sample children 
Female 
Mean age 111 1997 [sd] 
Enrolled in school 
1997 
2000 
Relationship to household head 111 1997 
Biological child 
Adopted child 
Grandchild 
Niece or nephew 
Other 
Note : N=8. l 91 
Source: IFLS 
0.49 
11.0 [4.4] 
0.71 
0.70 
0.87 
0.01 
0.09 
0.01 
0.02 
have at least one nonresident sibling. and about three-quarters of children in my sample 
have a t least one nonresident grandparent . Nonresident family members are roughly evenly 
divided in their locations between the same kecamaten (i.e. district. t he administrative 
division two levels below the province and akin to a county in the United States) as the 
household and a different kecamaten within Indonesia.'50 Nonresident siblings are on average 
somewhat more spread out geographically than nonresident uncles/ aunts and grandparents. 
Nonresident kin were distribu ted across a variety of industries in 1997. Among the 
roughly half of nonresident grandparents who were working. a majority (64 percent) were 
employed in agricult ure. Trade and tourism was t heir next most popular industry. By 
contrast. the roughly two-thirds of nonresident uncles/ au nts and siblings who were employed 
in 1997 were somewhat less concent rated in agriculture. Working nonresident uncles/aunts 
were divided between social and community services. trade and tourism. and manufacturing. 
while working nonresident siblings were employed in sizeable shares in all industries. 
50T he treatment of nonresident family members for whom there were missing data. is discussed in the 
Appendix. T he locations of nonresident grandparents were un ava il able in t he data. for the 1997 survey wave , 
so I report (a nd make use of) t heir location relative to t he household in 1993 , which I obta ined from t he 
first IFLS survey wave . 
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Table 2.3: Characteristics of nonresident kin of sample children. 1997 
Gra nd- U ncles/ 
p a r e nts a unts 
N umbe r 
?\ h·c\11 l. li 7. ~ 
Slwn· wit il Zt'l'l' 11 . 2~ 11.111 
Location 
Sanu· dllag;t• 11. -111 11.:1:1 
Auot lH'r Yilla~t·. :-;c.uJH ' di:-;tricr 11. 1'1 11.12 
A not lwr di~t rict·. ~i:li!H' prt~\" i lln ' ll.l I) IU2 
An<>t.ll<·r prm·iJH"<' ll.l I 11.211 
lJJtt•m at i< >lla l 0. 00 11.111 
Unkll<>II' Jl 11. 1'1 11.111 
Indus try 
Not \\·orkin~ o.:,:l lUll 
Al!;ri('liltttn· IUD 0.2-1 
Cc ii i:-itTIJ('t'i!m 0.02 0.02 
l\ L:lllll fHt ' tl iriii ~ 11.11 1 ll.l ll 
Tntdt •. tnur i:-;111. bu:-;i ll (':-\:-i :-\\T:-i 11.11 1-1 0.12 
PnUi ic st·n·in•:-; 11.1 1~ ll . l li 
(J tllt ·r / llnkll<>ll'll 11.11 1 ll .ll'> 
Proxies for earnings ch a n ges, 1996-8 
Pn 1X _\" I (Ea rnings () ll l_Y. d l <>~) -0 . 12 -1 1.1 7 
·"' 
11.1 J, 11.1 J, 
P r<>x,· 2 (Enlpl<>nll<'JII <>n l,·. 'lr) IJ.Il(i ll. llli 
sd lUll 11.0'1 
P mx,· :1 (Eam ill ~>' a nd <'lllploY Jll< 'll t.. 'Yo ) -11.114 -ll .lll i 
sd II . I lj 11./ :1 
!\ott•: 
Stm i ~t i c:, Wt>ig ht( •d hy IIU JII IHT dlildn ·u in <'aC'h S<l ll iplc· honsPIJOid . Location is 
rc•h1tin• t t l sa111pl<' IHIHS<•hnld . 0:o11n•sidcut Jlili"I'Jlls· lontl it i!IS hasl'd ou l!I!H data. 
Snnt-cc·: A lllhtn·\ n d("ulatiun :-: fro111 lF LS and SA I\E 11 NAS 
2.3.4 Empirical model and variables 
O ld e r 
s iblings O verall 
1. 1 lll.2 
[)_.', ( 11 .1111 
0.2X IU-1 
11.11'1 11.1:! 
11.:1:\ 11.~! 1 
0.2'> IJ.21l 
11.111 11.112 
11.111 11.0:1 
o.:v, o.:v. 
0 . 1'> 0 . 2~ 
IUD 0.11:1 
11.117 11.1 11-1 
II.!() II. II 
0.20 II. I '> 
ll.IJ:l 011-1 
-0 . 17 -0. 17 
11./li 11./J 
11.117 ll.ll li 
11.1 -'i 11.118 
-11.11'> -ll. ll li 
11.1.1 11.1.'1 
T he goal of the empirical analysis is to measure the effect of nonresident family members ' 
earnings shocks on changes in children 's human capi tal. 'Norking with changes in . as op-
posed to levels of. earnings and human capi tal has the advantage of eliminat ing many of t he 
confounding effects of time-invariant child characteristics . Ideally. one \vmild want earnings 
shocks randomly dist ribu ted across households ' nonresident family members. T he effect of 
the earnings shocks on children 's human capital accumulat ion could then be measured by 
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estimat ing the following specification: 
" (3 " NRF uyiht = I u eht + E iht (2. 1) 
The variable D:..yiht is the change between times t - 1 and t in a rneasure of the human 
capita l outcomes (such as enrollment status or the number of grades completed) of child 
i living in household h. The variable D:.. cf:.t RF measures the change in nonresident family 
members ' earnings over the same period . If nonresident family members· earnings directly 
affected available parental resources as suggested above. then (3 1 should be posit ive. 
In order to obtain an unbiased estimate of (3 1. it must be the case that. in the absence of 
a change in their nonresident family members ' earnings between 1997 and 2000. children's 
levels of human capital would have continued to follow their pre-crisis trends. This seems 
unlikely since the earnings changes of resident family members are correlated with both 
children 's human capi tal accumulation and the earnings shocks of their nonresident fami ly 
members. I address this issue by controlling for a measure of the resident family 's earnings 
changes . D:.. e~{. 
The relationship of family members ' earnings changes to ongoing t rends in human capital 
accumulation is also important to identifying f3 J. The est ima ted effect of earnings on human 
capital accumulation would be biased upwards if the crisis produced earnings changes that 
were positively correlated wi th ongoing trends in human capital accumulation. However. 
there is good reason to believe that there was no systematic positive relat ionship between 
the earnings changes produced by the crisis and ongoing trends in human capital accumula-
tion . The reason is that the crisis had a disproportionately adverse impact on higher-wage 
industries. Absent the crisis. children whose family members were employed in these indus-
tries would have likely obtained a greater-than-average amount of human capital between 
1997 and 2000. The earnings changes generated by the crisis were. if anything. negatively 
related to ongoing trends in human capital accumulation. potentially biasing the est imate 
of f3 t (and 82) downwards. 
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I do not observe the actual earnings of nonresident kin for the vast majority of children 
in my sample. Instead. I const ruct proxies for 6. ej~ RF based on the experience of workers 
with characterist ics simila r to those of children 's nonresident kin . I did t his by combining 
information on the pre-crisis characteristics (industry of employment. province. educational 
attainment . and gender) of nonresident kin . reported in the IFLS data . with est imates of t he 
average earnings and aggregate employment changes of all Indonesian workers with those 
characteristics . I derived t hese est imates from two rounds of Indonesia 's National Labor 
Force Survey (SAKERN AS ) . which st raddle t he onset of the crisis. by dividing surveyed 
workers into cells defined by their gender and one of eight industries. twenty-seven provinces . 
two education levels (primary school or less. more than primary school). and by computing 
the average earnings and employment levels within those cells .5 1 
The earnings shocks actually experienced by nonresident kin likely consisted of disrup-
tions to their employment. as well as earnings changes arising from wage and price changes 
condi t ional upon employment .52 Hence. employment and earnings changes of Indonesian 
vvorkers with similar characteristics may convey non-overlapping information about the 
earnings shocks experienced by nonresident kin. I therefore construct three proxies for non-
resident kin 's earnings shocks: one based on t he change in average earnings of Indonesian 
workers ( "Proxy 1"). a second based on the change in aggregate employment of Indonesian 
workers ("Proxy 2"). and a t hird that combines changes in earnings and employment of 
Indonesian workers wi th characteristics similar to each nonresident family member into a 
composite proxy ("Proxy 3"). This composite proxy summarizes the change in aggregate 
earnings of all Indonesian workers with characteristics similar to a child 's nonresident kin . 
In t he empirical analysis. I fir st establish that the earnings- and employment-based prox-
ies both summarize relevant information about nonresident family members ' earnings shocks 
5 1 In cases where t hese cells contained fewer t han I 00 workers , I estimated earnings a nd employment levels 
from more broadly-defined cells defin ed by industry and prov ince only. The Append ix contains more deta ils 
on t his procedure. T he average number of observat ions underlying the est imates I use is 293. and t he 
minimum is 91. 
52 Employment. and real wage changes during t his period a re negatively correlated in the Sakernas dat a . 
On average. real wages declined by a bout 7 percent while aggregate employment increased by about 13 
percent . 
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(and that my main results are qualitatively unchanged when using proxies constructed by 
different methods). I then turn to the composite Proxy 3 and use it throughout the res t of 
t he paper. Proxy 1 is equal to the change. between 1996 and 1998. in the log tota l earnings 
of all 1997 nonresident kin. where each nonresident kin 's earnings 111 a g1ven year equals 
the average earnings of all workers with similar characteristics in that year. Proxy 2 is 
equ al to the simple average (across all nonresident kin) of the percentage change in aggre-
gate employment of all workers with similar characteristics to each 1997 nonresident family 
member. The construction of these proxies is described in greater detail in the Appendix. 
Proxy 3. the composite proxy used throughout most of the paper. is equal to the simple 
average of the percentage change in aggregate earnings of Indonesian workers with similar 
characteristics to each nomesident family member. It is defined as follows: 
1\-----;v-;F = _1_ "' [ 7\ T N RF A E ... C'l . l 
u eht - JVNRF L 1 ' h. ,geil.t - I 99 CL7 n ?.ge!l 
h.L-1 ge·il 
(2.2) 
AggEarnChgeil denotes the percentage change. between 1996 and 1998. in the aggregate 
earnings of Indonesian workers (including t he self-employed) of gender 9 and educat ion level 
e. employed in industry i and province l . I construct the proxy from the period 1996-1998 
rather than 1997-2000 in order to limit the scope for bias arising from reverse-causality 
that might be induced by anticipation of the crisis . and to measure the initial impact of 
the crisis rather than the subsequent recovery underway by 2000. 53 Table 2.3 contains 
summary statistics of the proxy variables. The Appendix contains further details on their 
construction. 
In contrast to nonresident kin. I do observe the (self-reported ) earnings of the household 
head and other employed household members. I use this measure of the head 's earnings in 
my benchmark specification to ensure that my resul ts are not driven by a failme to capture 
the effects of the resident family 's earnings changes. A drawback of this approach is that 
·
53 An added ad vantage of using t he proxies is t hat t hey a re uncorrelatecl wit h indi vidua l workers ' labor 
s upply responses. so tha t measured earnings changes refl ect only the initia l impact of the cris is . Hence, the 
proxy can be thought of as capturing prospective changes - i.e . what would have happened Loan indi vidua l's 
earnings if there had been no labor supply adjustment. 
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introducing an endogenous regressor could bias the coefficient estimates of the other regres-
sors . Moreover. there is an argument to be made for treating the resident and nonresident 
family earnings symmetrically by usiug proxies for both. I address t his issue by gauging 
the robustness of my results to replacing the household head 's actual earnings change with 
a proxy. constructed in the same way as the proxy for nonresideut kin ·s earnings chauges. 
But it is wor th emphasizing t hat the interpretation of the coefficient on the actual change 
in the head's earnings in my main specifications is not intended to be causal. 
Ivfy estimating equatiou takes t he following form: 
....----..__..-
" _ (3 " N RF (3 " RF 8 X u yiht - tu e ht. + . 2u e ht + . 3 iht + fi ht (2.3) 
The dependent variable used in my main analysis is the change in the child 's enrollment 
status (defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if t he child is enrolled in school at time 
t). between 1997 and 2000. Supplementary specifications adopt an alternative measure of 
human capital based on achievement: the change in t he highest number of grades competed 
by the child between 1997 and 2000. In order to limit the extent of downward bias in 
P1 and P2 that may arise from t he tendency for the crisis to have a disproportionately 
adverse impact upon industries that paid higher wages ex-ante. I introduce controls for t he 
average pre-crisis earnings level of nonresident family members and the pre-crisis earnings 
level of the household head. I also int roduce severa l additional controls: ( 1) indicators 
for the presence of nonresident fami ly members who were living outside of Indonesia or 
were employed in "other" industries for which an earnings proxy could not be computed . 
or whose industry in 1997 is unknown (I exclude such individuals in t he calculation of the 
proxy variables for nonresident family members ' init ial wages and earn ings changes) : (2) a 
full set of indicators for t he ages of t he child and of the household head in 1997; (3) the 
employment status of the household head in 1997 and 2000 (the head 's initial wage and 
earnings changes are set to zero for heads who were unemployed ); and ( 4) t he child 's school 
enrollment status in 1997. The vector X iht denotes these controls in ( 4.8). Tables 2.4 and 
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Table 2.4: Enrollment transitions. by cohort 
Age in 1997 Enrollme nt s tatus in 1997 
4-6 L' lwll rc>il<·d 
Emoll.-d 
7-9 U !wlt roll<·d 
Emoll.-d 
10- 12 Ll ll<' ll l"lllil·d 
Em oll t•d 
13-15 Uw•ll rc >i !..d 
Em oll<·d 
16-19 Li ll< 'll l'<> li<·d 
Em ollnl 
4-19 Uw ·ll roll<·d 
Ellroli<·d 
Snnn v: IFLS 
Enrollm ent s tatus in 2000 
Ull-<"m oll.-d Ellrc>li<"d 
71 !.lX I 
·I :l'll 
22 '.:l 
-I!J I.',:F, 
:,r !J 
21il l .:l:lli 
2r,1; (i 
4!10 'J:l7 
721i 2~ 
.'d ~ 2'>!J 
J.l :l2 1.27:1 
J.:l22 ~. -I ii ~ 
Cha nge, 1997-2000 
13~· init ial l 'll l't ,lJ nwut stat l iS 
0.!!4 
-lUll 
0. 7 1 
-O.Il:l 
IJ.I ~ 
IJ.l~ 
IJ. OO 
-l l. lli -ll.ll:l 
0.02 
-IU-1 -O .Oii 
O.IJ:l 
-ll.li 7 -O .I II i 
0.,-.:l 
-0 .2:l -0.01 
2.5 present descript ive statistics of the dependent variables hy cohort . 
2.4 Results, 1997- 2000 
Overall effects on enrollment 
Table 2.6 presents my main est imates of the medium-run relationship between t he earn-
ings shocks of nonresident kin and chi ldren 's human capital accumulation. The dependent 
variable is the change in an indicator of the child 's enrollment status between 1997 and 
2000. Standard errors permit heteroscedast icity of unknown form and are clustered at the 
community level. 54 
In Column 1. t he change in enrollment status is regressed on the change in the head of 
household 's earnings between 1997 and 2000. The point estimate for the change in head 's 
earnings is positive but very small and insignificantly different from zero. Colunm 2 adds 
the head 's initial earnings as a cont rol. Children whose father is employed in higher-wage 
industries in 1997 are more likely to be enrolled in school in 2000. pointing to a pattern of 
54 Communit ies, which conta in a pproximately 20-30 households . a re t he enumera tion area of the IFLS 
sur vey. 
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Table 2.5: Grades completions. by cohort 
Change, Change, 
Age in 1997 1997 2000 2007 1997-2000 1997-2007 
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd !VIe an sd Mean sd 
.j ().() I !.II 0.4 II. fi 7.1 I 4 0. -1 IJ.Ii 7.1 I 4 
r, (I.() 1!./J 1.1 IJ..'J 7.!1 I. (i 1.1 II.'! 7.!1 I. fi 
(j fl. I 0. '! 2 0 1.11 <".r) J. /1 1.'1 0 . .'! 1"1.-1 1. '! 
7 o.:. IJ.Ii 2.1"1 1.-d K.~ J.7 2 -1 10 1-i. :l ).j 
K 1.2 0 . .'! :l. K 1. '! IJ.(j J.8 2. (i II.'! 1'. -1 J r, 
!I 2.0 1. 0 -17 I 4 ~) . ;-.: !. II 2.7 (J..'} 7.K .Ui 
10 2.!1 u : .. 7 1. 'I 10.1 .1.0 2.X 11. 8 7.:. )..(i 
II :u; 1. ). (j;l J.fi 10.11 14 2(j II.' I (j;l :~ . .'! 
12 .!7 I 4 7.-1 1. 7 10.-1 '!. '! :2.!i 1.11 :).7 L'l 
];l :).(j 1 4 .~.2 :u IO .J J .C, 2. (i 1.1 -l.K L 'l 
1-l (j c, /.!, !1.1 ;!. /) 10.1"1 u 2.(i 1. ). .J.:l J. (i 
IG 7.(i 1. 7 IJ.(j ;! .. '! 10.1"1 :u ]. I) I .. ! :l.2 J.4 
l(j 1"1. 1 J. 'l 'l .K ;! . .tJ )().(j .'I. li ](j I. I 2.:. ;! ). 
17 x .q J .4 l().;l .'I. /I 10.'1 :u; u u 2 (I J. /1 
I S D. I ;! . .'! 10.0 .'!. ;! ](J. .J .Ui ()') 1. ;! l.:l 1. 'l 
1!1 !J.2 ! 4 !l.!J '! .. '! 10. 1 .'I..' I 0 .7 1.1 0 11 1. 4 
On·rall :l.'J .Ui :..<) .!.8 !1.7 .u 2 0 1 . . ! ;-). ,-.: .!.4 
S o l i!T f' : IFLS 
divergence in human capital accumulation among children with parents of different incomes: 
children from initially higher-income households are. at the end of the 3 year period. more 
likely to be enrolled in school. This is consistent with exist ing evidence from Indonesia and 
1\'Iexico that children with higher socioeconomic status at baseline have lower chances of 
dropping out of school in a subsequent period (see Gert ler. et al. . 2004). 
As anticipated . the addition of t he head's initial earnings as a control causes t he coeffi-
cient on the head 's earnings change to become much larger in magnitude and statistically 
significant. The point estimate indicates that a ten percentage point larger earnings change 
for the household head between 1997 and 2000 is associated with a 0.2 percentage point 
higher probability of enrollment in 2000 (i.e. lower probability of dropout) for a child en-
rolled in school in 1997.55 
Column 3 adds the proxy for initial earnings of nonresident kin. along with the earnings-
55 T his result does not have a causal interpretati on. However. replacing the head 's ac tual earnings change 
wit h a proxy constructed analogously to Proxy 1 a lso yields a positi ve and signifi ca nt coeffi cient. T hese 
positi ve effects a re consistent with studies from the developed count ry literature on t he efrect of pa renta l 
income on child educational outcomes (e.g. Sacerdote (2002) and Akec. et a l. (2010)) as well as \vith ex isting 
evidence of disruptions to children 's human ca pita.! accumu lation among households hit ha rdest by the 
Indonesian crisis (e.g. T homas. et a!. . 2004). 
28 
Table 2.6: l'vlain results on change enrollment stat us. 1997-2000 
C hange in nonresident kin 's earn ings 
Prox_Y 1 ( Earuiugs only. ding ) 
Othe r cont rols 
[-!Pad',; i>litial t•aming,; (!11g) 
Initi al r·mnlllll<'llt ,;tat'"' (= I if <·mn!!t•d in 111!17) 
!-!t-ad l'lltpln\WI ill 1!1'17 
Hc·ad <'111pln\ ·t ·d ill 2111111 
()IJst ·tYa t i(lllS 
n" 
Dependent variahle m ea n: 
OV<'rall 
Emolhl ill 1!1'17 (11 = ·'>.71'\ li) 
Ullt'lll'llll< ·d i11 1!1'17 (11 = 2.411!i ) 
i\ol(·~ : 
1. S;,llllplc• c·ou:-;ist:-> of l'o!.orts n f childrl' ll <1 ~1':-. -l·l !I ~-c ·ars in 1 !)!)/. 
1 
0.00-1 
(0.1)117) 
-O.(i(i!l*** 
(11.01 -1) 
0.111!i 
(11.111 -1) 
0.02:l* * 
(!Lill i ) 
ll.'J() I*** 
(O.o:lO) 
i'\,1 !)] 
IUiK 
-II.OOii 
-0.22t-i 
ll .!i211 
2 3 4 
C hange in e nrollme nt status , 1997-2000 
0.112-1*** 11.(122 *** 11.1121 *** 
(IUJI17 ) (IIOU7 ) (II.IHI7) 
11 .0.'>0*** 
(o.oo:. ) 
-IJ .(iXK*** 
(11 .11 t:l ) 
-0.7:lK*** 
(11.07!1 ) 
0.022** 
(0.010 ) 
0.1'\7-'i *** 
(11.02!1 ) 
K.l!ll 
ll.liK 
ll.l I HI ** 
(11047) 
llll-17*** 
(11011'• ) 
o.tn 1 *** 
(ll.ll!ll) 
-ll .(i!J:l* ** 
(tl.()J:l) 
- ll.li!l~ ··· 
(ll.lli'\1) 
11.0 tx * 
(0.010) 
0.0111 
(O.OOi-1 ) 
O.OOii 
(0.012 ) 
IU72*** 
(IU:l'i ) 
t-1 .1 111 
O.lii-1 
110!1!",** 
(1 1.0-17) 
ll.!Ti** 
(ll.IV•" ) 
11.11-lli*** 
(ll .llW> ) 
II.IJ:lO*** 
(0.010 ) 
-ll .li! l:l*** 
(llllt:l ) 
-llliXO*** 
(ll.IJi-11 ) 
0.011<* 
(11.010) 
0.001 
(O.OIJK) 
0.007 
(11.011 ) 
11. -1/li*** 
(lU:l~ ) 
K.l 'll 
o.tix 
2. E:-.t inwH •d l 1y O L S. Hul HT- \\'hit~· :-ot atuliml 1'1T11r:-. in pan'tlfhc•:-.c•s. dustc·n·d at tlw c·owtlltlllit y lt· \·Pl. 
:L All rf'grcssions iod!tdc• duunnit •s for th(• <l;.!,t'S r1f tlw child <uHI tlu·lw<td of IHlliSc•lttJ!d in 1!1!17 . 
5 
11 .021 *** 
(IUHII) 
II. I :l !"•*** 
(ll.l i:l 11) 
ll .ll-17*** 
(O.IIW> ) 
ll.IJ:ll*** 
( 0.1)! II ) 
-O.Ii!IY ** 
( 0.0 t:l ) 
-O. IiK!I*** 
(II.OKI) 
IJ.O I 11* 
(11.010) 
-IJ.IIIIO 
(ll.lliJK) 
0.1111~ 
(0.011 ) 
0 . -lii ~**' 
(II. !:Hi) 
1-1.1!11 
O.liK 
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only proxy (Proxy 1) for t he change in the nonresident family 's earnings between 1996 and 
1998. The coefficient est imates on these variables display a similar pattern to those of the 
resident family. Children whose nonresident family members were employed in higher-wage 
industries before the crisis are . ceteris paribus, more likely to be enrolled in school in 2000. 
In addition. children whose nonresident kin experienced a more positive earnings change 
overall are more likely to be enrolled in school in 2000. conditiona l upon the earnings of 
their parents. T he point estimate suggests that a ten percentage point increase in the 
nonresident family's earnings results in approximately a one percentage point increase in 
the probabili ty that the child is enrolled in school in 2000 (about 4 percent of the mean 
probability of disenrollment for a child enrolled in 1997). 
vVhy is the estimated effect of nonresident family earnings on enrollment much larger 
than the association between head's earnings and enrollment? vVith a standard deviation of 
86 percentage points. the measured change in head 's earnings is much more disperse than 
that of the proxy for nonresident family earnings. which has a standard deviation of 12 
percentage points (see Tables 2.1 and 2.3). This is exact ly what one would expect from a 
proxy derived from an average of many workers in the National Labor Force Survey. versus 
the head 's self-reported earnings. This difference in dispersion implies that the change 
in enrollment probability resulting from a one standard deviation increase in t he proxy 
for nonresident kin 's earnings is about 65 percent of the change in enrollment probabili ty 
associated with a one standard deviation increase in the change in head 's earnings. 56 
Column 4 adds the employment-based proxy (Proxy 2) for nonresident kin 's earnings 
change. Its coefficient is positive and significant. and t he coefficient on the earnings-only 
proxy is only slight ly reduced . It seems that the proxy for nonresident kin 's earnings shocks 
based on employment changes adds independent explanatory power to the enrollment re-
gression. This is reflected in Column 5. where the earnings- and employment-based proxies 
are replaced by t he proxy for nonresident kin 's earnings changes that combines earnings and 
employment . T he coefficient estimate on Proxy 3 is positive and highly significant. The 
56 In add it ion , the change in head 's ea rnings is measured over t he period 1997-2000. while the proxy for 
the cha nge in nonresident kin 's earnings corresponds to t he period Hl96-1998. 
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point estimate implies that a one standard deviat ion increase in the proxy for nonresident 
kin 's earnings changes resul ts in a 1.8 percentage point increase in enrollment probabili ty 
(nearly 8 percent of the mean probabili ty of disenrollment by 2000 for children enrolled in 
1997). Since t he composite earnings-employment proxy captures the effect of nonresident 
family earnings changes more parsimoniously than the two separate proxies . I use the spec-
ification in Column 5 as my benchmark. 
Effects by gender, household location, and cohort 
Table 2.7 spli ts the sample of children by gender and household location. For purposes of 
comparison. Column 1 reproduces my benchmark specifica tion. Columns 2 and 3 demon-
strate that enrollment effects are present for both boys and girls. Alt hough t he estimated 
effect of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks on changes in the enrollment status of boys is 
larger than that for girls. the two estimates are statistically indistinguishable. The ··ame is 
true for t he est imated impacts on children living in urban vs. rural households. reported in 
Columns 4 and 5. 
Figure 2.3 plots the coefficient estimates (and 95 percent confidence intervals) of t he 
vector of interact ions between the proxy for nonresident kin ·s earnings shocks and t he 
child 's age in 1997. Understanding how t he effects of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks vary 
by the child 's age can potent ially shed light on the process that gives rise to these effects. as 
well as on their welfare implications. Caution must be used in drawing inferences from the 
coefficient estimates in Figure 2.3 since most are not significantly different from one another. 
Yet the figure points to some potentially interesting patterns. First. note that while only 
two of the coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. all but two of the point est imates 
are positive . Next, the effects of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks on enrollment seem to 
have been largest for children who were age 11 in 1997 (the coefficient on the 11 year-old 
interact ion term is significantly different from both the 10 and 12 year-old interaction terms 
at the 10 and 5 percent levels. respectively) . 
\Vhat could account for t his phenomenon? The standard school curriculum in Indonesia 
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Table 2.7: Effects by gender and location of household (urban/rural) 
2 3 
Change in enrollment status , 
Full samp le Boys 
C ii n H~c · in IH·mL.; t•arniug:-; ( dlug) 11.1121 *** 11 .1127*** 
(II.(JIJ7 ) (ll.llii!J ) 
Cili:tJJ gt• ill IIO!ll'I'Sitll'lll kin's t•a rnings (Prox_Y :L (X.) IJ.J:lC,*** (I.[C,[ *** 
(O.IJ:I'J ) (ILW>II ) 
Other controls 
1--l<"ad's ini tial t'<Hllings (lug) 0.11-17*** II.IJ'>l *** 
(IIIlO:> ) (11.1)117 ) 
Prox.\· f,Jr !Hllln·sidt·ut kin's illi t inJ,·nruings (log) o.o:ll *** 11.112:1* 
(II. 01 0) (11.012 ) 
Ini tial !' llrolluH'IIt stat11s ( = 1 jf C'lil'<>llc-d ill l'J!Ji' ) -IJ.(i!J-1*** -0 .7011*** 
(II.OJ:l ) (IJ.IIl7 ) 
Hmd <'lliplmwl ill l'J!J7 -1Uii'\1J*** -0.7-!7*** 
(11.01'\l) (11.1111'\) 
Hc•nd <'llljliowd in 2000 0.01 !J* 0.1117 
(0.1110) (ll.lln ) 
HaYc' iutl'rlla t. imwl IHllliTsidt•nt fmuil,\· -11.1100 -lUll II 
(0.001'1) (11.010 ) 
Han· IllJlln·sid<'lll faitlil_\· t'lllpltl_n·d in ··,Jr.lwr·· iiiJnstT~- 000-l ll.III IJ 
(0.011 ) (ll.lll l) 
Con:..; tant 0.4(i-!*** (). :)71** * 
(0. J:Hi) (0.170 ) 
()iJSf'lYl:l t.jcJllS X.! 'Jl -!.171 
[1 2 O.Gi'\ O.liK 
l. Santp!t • nm.-;ist s of cohort s of dtildn•ll ng1':- -l - l!l .wctr.' in l!l!J7 . 
2. E.-;tintatl•d b_v O L:::i. Hnh<·r-\\"ltit t· :-> Tandard t'TTor.-; in pan·ntlw.-;<•s . c-luskn·d at tlw cnnlltlltllit _v !t'\Tl. 
: ~ . A II n •gr('s.-;ino.-; iudud(' duutlltit ·.-; fpr lilt ' agt•s uf lilt' dtild awl lilt' h<'ad of househnld in 1 q!J7. 
Girls 
II. II Hi * 
(ILOO'J ) 
O.l2t>** 
(0.0'>1 ) 
(J.(J-l:l*** 
(ll.lll17 ) 
11.11·111*** 
(0.1110 ) 
-O . Ii ~ 'J* ** 
( ll.lll 1'\) 
-ll.fi:Hi*** 
(11.102 ) 
11.01') 
(II.IW> ) 
()()[] 
(11.1112 ) 
-0.110 -l 
(0.01-! ) 
IU-lll** 
(0. J:li'\) 
-! .020 
(l.(j') 
4 
1997- 2000 
Urban 
11 .11 l'J ** 
(ll.llil'l ) 
0.12-l** 
(11.0">1 ) 
IJ.i);,ll*** 
(11.00')) 
0.11211* 
( 0.0 Ill ) 
-O.Ii'JII*** 
(0.022) 
-0.7G:l* ** 
(O. I:V> ) 
1!.007 
(IIIW>) 
0.00-1 
(11.012) 
O.Ol t>** 
(O.Ilii!J ) 
IJ.GX2*** 
(ll.l-!:1) 
:l.l:l() 
0.70 
5 
Rura l 
ll.l) I c, 
( 0.010 ) 
IJ. HiO*** 
(ILil'>-1) 
IJ.I):Ic,*** 
(ILIJII7 ) 
II.IJ:I:l** 
(II.Olfi ) 
-0.7Hi*** 
(11 .1117 ) 
-ll .c,oo••• 
(IIIII ) 
ll.ll:lc,* * 
( 0.01 -1) 
-II.IJIJ:I 
(0.010 ) 
-0.001'\ 
(II.OHi ) 
(J.:\71'\* 
(0.217) 
-!4(i] 
IJ.fi'J 
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Figure 2.3: Enrollment effects by cohort. 1997-2000 
consists of 6 years of primary school. followed by t hree years each of junior and senior sec-
ondary school. A relat ively large fract ion of 11 year olds were on track to complete primary 
school during 1998. just as t he crisis in Indonesia reached its peak intensity. Roughly one-
fifth of 11 year olds who were enrolled in school in 1997 were already attending their last 
year of primary school before the most severe impact of the crisis hi t Indonesia. The same 
was true for less than 5 percent of 10 year olds. lVIeanwhile. nearly 30 percent of enro lled 
12 year olds had completed primary school and were already attending junior secondary 
school when t he crisis hi t . It seems that t he most severe effects of nonresident kin 's earnings 
shocks may have been concent rated in the cohor t with a relatively large fract ion of children 
making the transit ion from primary to secondary school during the height of the crisis. and 
with relat ively few children who had already completed that transit ion. 
T he pattern in Figure 2.3 raises the possibility that households may have sought to 
shield children who were near completion of primary school. while holding back children 
from enrolling in secondary school. Before the crisis hi t. primary school was nearly univer-
sal. but t here still existed significant gaps in secondary school enrollment. As can be seen 
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in Table 2.4. the dropout rate is large for children in this age range . relative to younger 
children. A pTioTi it seems possible that children who dis-enrolled from school during the 
crisis due to their nonresident kin 's adverse earnings shocks may not have continued onto 
secondary school anyway. If this were the case. however. then the effects in Figure 2.3 would 
be zero. Rather . children whose nonresident kin experienced more adverse earnings shocks 
dis-enrolled from school at a higher rate than their peers whose nonresident kin fared better 
during the crisis. suggesting that nonresident kin 's earnings shocks may have substantially 
impeded these children 's progress through school. 
Effects by dis tance from and Telation to child 
Another important quest ion is whether the effects of nonresident kin·s earnmgs shocks 
varied by their distance from t he household. and by their relat ionship to the child. Table 
2.8 provides evidence on these questions.57 Just over half of overall nonresident family 
members reside outside of the household 's district (see Table 2.3). Therefore. I break out 
the effect by constructing separate proxies for nonresident family members living within 
and outside of the child 's dist rict in 1997. Column 1 reports the resul ts of this specification. 
Both coefficient estimates are positive and significant. Alt hough the point estimate for the 
effect of earnings shocks to nonresident kin living in the same dist rict as the household is 
slightly larger than that for nonresident kin living in another district. the two effects are 
stat istically indistinguishable. It seems that the effect of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks 
on children 's human capital accumulation is not an ent irely loca l phenomenon. 
Do nonresident. extended family members play a role in determining children 's outcomes? 
Column 2 of Table 2.8 reports separate estimates of the effect of earnings shocks to uncles 
and aunts versus the other types of nonresident kin. categories that correspond roughly to 
extended and nuclear family members. Perhaps surprisingly. the point estimate of the effect 
of earnings shocks to extended family members is larger in magni tude than that of nuclear 
57 Sample sizes in Table 2.8 a re slight ly smaller due to t he need to t rim the 1 percent ta ils of two proxy 
va ri ables rather than just one. Restricting the sample in Column 5 of Table 2.6 to be each of t hese samples 
does not materia lly affect the magni t ude or significance of t he estimated effect of nonresident family members ' 
earn ings. 
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Table 2.8: Enrollment effects by NRF location and relationship to child 
Shock variah les 
ChHll~t· ill IH·ad\ t'iLI"Ilill~:-: (dlog) 
Cllangt· in nrmn·:-\idt•nt kin':-; t•nrniug:-; 
( Prox\· :l. 'lr) 
Snm f' di:;lrif'f ns hnu ..... t'holrl 
DifTI' /"1' 111 dislril'/ lhnn lui//.< I' IIIJld 
Nur-lrn1 · fornily 
E.rlr•nrlr ·rl .fn111ily 
Other controls 
Ht•nd':-; initial t•arniug:-; (111).!.") 
Prox~· for lltJII!'I':->idvn t kin':-; ini t ial <'ctl'llillg:-> (lug) 
DifTrTI' nl rli.<lril'/ 1/rnn /wus ,.}w/!1 
N ru·lm.1· fn.nuly 
E.rl l' llil<'rl .fn111ily 
OLst·rnt t. icHlS 
nz 
2 
Change in enrollment status, 
1997-2000 
11.111')*** 
(11.1107) 
11.11!1.'>** 
(II.O:lK ) 
11.117-1** 
(ll.li:l2 ) 
11.11-!2*** 
(II.IHHi ) 
().(117*** 
(O.IIIlii) 
11.11:n*** 
(ll.llOii ) 
II.K2:l*** 
(II.O:l2 ) 
7. 11'1:l 
IUiK 
11.112:l ** * 
(11.1)(17) 
0.1171 * 
(O.ll:l'l ) 
0.111>*** 
(O.II:lK) 
11.11-!7*** 
(11.1111'>) 
11.021 *** 
(li.007) 
ll.ll22*** 
(11.00-l) 
11.77:l** * 
(ll.ll'i!J) 
7. 1171i 
IUiK 
1. Satllph• ("Oil;o;i:-:t:-; of coltorh of dtildr!'ll ag-t•:-; -l-ID _\'t'i.\1":-< in 1!1~1/ 
2. HuhcT- \Vhitc• :-:tandard I'JT(Ir;-; in pan•nthvsC':-;, dust<•rt'd at tiH • c·oJllllllllli t y ll'n•l. 
:L Colnlllll I includc•s dHlllllli<'S fpr tlu• Jll"t'St' llt't' nf t:tuph•_n·d unnr,•:-:idc•Ht kin in 
tit<' ~Hill<' nud ditf<'H'Ilt di~trict s t!tnH thP !tou~('hold. Coilllllll 2 iududt•s dtnlltllit·~ 
for tilt• pn ·srllt"( ' 11f ~·Htplu_\"('d !llH"IPtu· and I'XI<•Jldl•d falllily l!H'illlii'I"S . Both 
rq~n ·~~ion~ iuclndl' <.uldit ional t·out wb lbt<'d in Tahl<' 2.{). 
4. Nw·Jpar fa ntily nm~i~t~ of g;raudpari'Ilh and old<·r ~ihling~ : t'XI t•Jldt•d fallli l.\· 
n ntsists of ttlldl•:-. and <llllll .... . 
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family members. alt hough the two are not statist ically different from one another. Earnings 
shocks to nonresident uncles and aunts appear to be just as important as earniugs shocks 
to nonresident grandparents and older children as drivers of changes in childreu 's school 
enrollment status. 
This result complements those of previous studie. in the migration li te rat ure. The op-
erative defini t ion of a migrant in this literature typically captures only ind ividuals vvho at 
some point were members of the household under study. and often focuses on individuals 
who are still listed in the household roster but are away on a temporary basis. T he fact that 
earnings shocks to children 's uncles and aunts - i.e. the siblings of the household head and 
spouse - play a role in determining household outcomes demonstrates that t his defini t ion 
does not fully capture the influence of nonresident family members. 
Achievemen t effects 
To wha t extent did the enrollment effects of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks translate 
into gaps in achievement? In Column 1 of Table 2.9. I report the same specification as 
in Column 5 of Table 2.6. but where the dependent variable is the change in t he number 
of grades the child has completed between 1997 and 2000. The average number of grades 
completed during this p riod is 2.0. The coefficients on all variables display a very similar 
pattern to t heir counterparts in Table 2. 6. T he effect of nonresident kin 's earnings changes 
on achievement is posit ive. though only marginally significant. The point est imate implies 
that a one standard deviat ion larger earnings change of nonresident kin caused children to 
complete approximately 0.03 more grad es between 1997 and 2000. or about 1.4 percent of 
t he mean . 
It seems that nonresident kin 's earnings shocks resulted in variation in children 's achieve-
ment levels that remained after t he worst of the crisis had subsided. 'While these medium-run 
achievement gaps raise the possibility t hat nonresident kin 's earnings shocks had long-term 
effects. they were not necessarily permanent . These achievement gaps can be made up fo r 
over t ime. possibly with affected children re-enrolling and remaining in school unt il a later 
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Table 2.9: l'vledium- and long-run achievement effects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Change in grades completed 
1997-2000 1997-2007 
All ages All ages All ages Ages 4-6 Ages 7-11 Ages 12-19 
C hange in head 's earn ings (d log) 0.055** * 0.0;)3*** 0.2<J7** * 0.225*** 0.333*** 0.285** * 
(0.019 ) (0.019 ) (0.053) (0.062 ) (O.OR4) (0.069 ) 
C ha nge in nonres ident kin' s eamings 
(Proxy 3. %) 
Othe r controls 
Head's init. ia l earnings (log) 
Proxy for NRF ini ti a l ea rni ngs (log) 
Ch ild em olled in 1997 
Head employed in 1997 
0.215* 
(0 .118) 
0.075** * 
(0.0 15) 
0 .079*** 
(0.022 ) 
1. 536*** 
(0.043 ) 
-1.111 ** * 
(0.227 ) 
Head employed in 2000 0.036 
(0.034 ) 
Have intern at iona l NR F -0.010 
(0.026) 
Have NRF employed in '' ot her" industry -0 .028 
(0.031 ) 
Cons tant -0.661 ** 
(0.312 ) 
Observat ions 8 .191 
R2 0.54 
Dependent variable mean 2.0 
Notes: 
0.210* 
(0.122 ) 
0.07 1 *** 
(0.0 15) 
0 .073*** 
(0.021 ) 
1.552*** 
(0.04 4) 
-1.044 *** 
(0.227) 
0.033 
(0.033 ) 
-0.009 
(0.026 ) 
-0.028 
(0.032 ) 
-0.600** 
(0.302) 
7,779 
0.55 
2.0 
1.09cl ** * 
(0.380) 
0. 555*** 
(0.0-1-1) 
0.2-17*** 
(0.082) 
2. 394*** 
(0. 104 ) 
-8 .234 *** 
(0.654) 
0.198** 
(0.087) 
0.021 
(0.072 ) 
0.060 
(0.069 ) 
3.515*** 
(1.1 51) 
7.779 
0.60 
5.8 
0.424 
(0.:1 56) 
O . .J 18*** 
(0.061 ) 
0.162* * 
(0.071 ) 
1.414*** 
(0.171) 
-6.120*** 
(0.927 ) 
0.0·:11 
(0.136 ) 
0.138 
(0.094 ) 
0.023 
(0.06.1 ) 
4.815*** 
(1.006) 
1.596 
0.26 
7.8 
1.280** 
(0. 584) 
0.635*** 
(0.069) 
o.:338** 
(0. 1:31 ) 
4 .216*** 
(0.367) 
-9.405*** 
(1.051) 
0. 482*** 
(0. 151) 
-0.0-18 
(0. 105 ) 
0. 111 
(0.09 1) 
- 1.597 
(1.R74) 
2.667 
0.29 
7.7 
1. Sample in columns 1-3 consists of cohorts of children ages 4- 19 years in 1997: samples in rolnmns ~ . . ) . a nd 6 
cons ist of cohorts of children ages -l-6. 7-11. and 12-19 years in 1997, respecth·e l\'. 
2. Huber-\Yhite standard errors in parentheses. clustered at t he communi t~· le,·e l. 
3. All regressions include add it iona l cont rols listed in Table 2. 11. 
1. 083*** 
(0.378) 
0.526*** 
(0.05 1) 
0. 215*** 
(0.077 ) 
2.463*** 
(0.107) 
-7.830*** 
(0. 75 1) 
0.0 19 
(0.096 ) 
0 .019 
(0.089) 
O.Q.J 5 
(0.098) 
-2.927*** 
(1.089) 
3.5 16 
048 
3.5 
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age than they would have othervvise. Of course. t he welfare effects of disruptions to human 
capital accumulat ion hinge cri t ically upon the persistence of any effects. Later in the paper. 
I provide evidence from t he 2007 roucln of the IFLS indicating that the effects were indeed 
long- last ing. 
Robustness checks 
T he estimated effect of nonresident kin 's earnings changes on enrollment in Column 5 of 
Table 2.6 is robust to alternative specifications. In particular. the point estima te is virtually 
unchanged in magni tude and significance across regressions in which the head's actual 
earnings change is replaced by a proxy constructed analogously to the nonresident kin 
proxy and t he initial earnings level and change in total earnings of all employed household 
members other- than t he head are included as addit ional regressors. \ i\Then dist rict-by-
rural/ urban fixed effects are added to the specification in Column 5 of Table 2.6. the effect 
of nonresident kin 's earnings changes on enrollment becomes smaller in magni t ude. but 
remains significant. See Table 2.15. In addi t ion. t he coefficient on t he proxy for nonresident 
kin 's earnings shocks remains positive and highly significant when I restrict the sample to 
children whose nonresident kin experienced (proxy) earnings changes below t he median 
(about -6 percent). This suggests that particularly adverse earnings shocks to nonresident 
kin actually caused some children to dis-enroll from school. 58 
The results of my benchmark specification do not appear to be driven by bias an smg 
from measurement error in the proxy variable for nonresident kin 's earnings. T he results are 
nearly unchanged when I include as a regressor a variable measuring. for each household. t he 
average number of observations from the Sakernas data that were involved in constructing 
the proxies for nonresident kin 's earnings changes. and this variable itself was statistically 
insignificant. In addit ion. the resul ts are not driven by children in households for which the 
58 The samples difl"er slightly across specifications in Table 2. 15 due to vary ing data ava ilab ility for t he 
different regressors. Restr icting the sample of spec ification in Column 5 of Table 2.6 to each of the smaller 
samples yields nea rly ident ica l estimates. a nd hence (the lack of) differences in t he coefficient estimates on 
nonresident kin 's ea rnings in Tab le 2. 15 can be att ri buted to differences in specification ralher than sample. 
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head is not their own parent. 59 ·when I introduce dummies for the relat ionship of the child 
to the household head into the specificat ion in Column 5 of Table 2.6. and when I restrict 
the sample to children whose parents are the household head and spouse. the magnitude 
and significance of the proxy for nonresident kin 's earnings shocks is virtua lly unchanged. 
Finally. my causal interpretation of the relationship between nonresident kin 's earnings 
shocks and children 's human capi ta l accumulat ion depends critically on the identification 
assumption for PI in Equation ( 4.8). That is. conditional upon the other included regres-
sors. earnings shocks were effectively randomly distributed across children's nonresident 
kin. One indication that this condi t ion is violated would be if pr-e-cr-isis t rends in chil-
dren ·s human capital accumulation were correlated with earnings shocks experienced by 
their nonresident kin during the crisis. T he 1993 wave of the IFLS enables me to conduct 
a false experiment that tests for such correlation . Specifically. I re-est imated the specifica-
tions in Columns 3-5. using as t he dependent variables t he change in t he child 's enrollment 
status and grades completed. respectively. between 1993 and 1997. In all of t hese speci-
fications. the estimated coefficient on the measures of nonresident kin 's earnings changes 
were insignificant. Hence. there is no indication t hat the association between nonresident 
kin 's earnings shocks and children 's human capital accumulation is driven by correlation 
between nonresident kin 's earnings shocks generated by the crisis and pre-crisis t rends in 
human capital accumulat ion .60 
I now analyze possible channels through which nonresident kin 's earnings shocks may 
have disrupted children 's human capital accumulation. 
59 In pa rticula r , the school enrollment status of children whose ow n par-ents a re nonresident might be 
pa rt icula rly sensit ive to these pa rents ' ea rnings shocks. As d isc ussed above, abou t 8 percent of children 
in my sample live with their grandparents . Since nonresident kin in th e IFLS data a re class ified on the 
basis of t heir rela tionship to t he head of t he household in which t he child li ves , t hese child ren 's parents 
(if nonresident) would be included in my proxy for nonresident kin 's earnings shocks s ince they a re the 
nonresident children of the household head and spouse. 
60 A different intra-household sampling scheme was used in the 1993 IF LS wave. and hence data for the 
fa lse ex periment were available for a sub-sample of on ly about 60 percent of the children in my main samp le. 
Estimates of my benchmark spec ifi cat ion of changes in enrollment obta ined from t his restricted sub-sample 
were very simila r to t hose from the full sample. 
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2.5 Links between the resident and nonresident family 
2.5.1 Transfers 
Transfers in theory 
Financia l t ransfers constitute o11e possible link betwee11 households and their nonresident 
kin tha t could have mediated the enrollment and achievement effects reported above. The 
motivations underpinning transfers are crucial to detecting their presence in the data and 
assessing their importance as a channel of causation . To the extent that financial transfers 
are underpinned by incentive-compatible contracts. as envisioned by Stark and Lucas (1988) 
among ot hers. binding commitment constraints may limi t the extent to which household 
members are wi lling to provide support to each other during times crisis. On the other 
hand . t ransfers may be underpinned by alt ruism. I show below that such transfers in effect 
provide partial insurance. However. they may be operat ive in circumstances when binding 
commitment const raints would preclude or limit transfers underpinned by ex-ante insurance 
arrangements . In addit io11 . unlike ex-ante insurance-based transfers. altruistic transfers 
are not operative unless the amount of autarky inequality between would-be senders and 
recipients exceeds a cert ain threshold . 
I now sketch a simple model of t ransfers between two isolated family members based 
on altruism. Consider a parent P and a child C who have interdependent utility functions 
given as follows: 
T he parameter 1 E (0, 1) governs t he level of alt ruism (which I assume to be symmetric) 
between parent and child. Suppose that the two parties engage in a game. the t iming of 
which is as follows. Parent and child receive endowments yp and YC· respect ively. which 
are common knowledge. Upon observing the endowments. each player i chooses an amount 
of her endowment ti E [0 , yi] to transfer to the other player. and then consumes what is left 
over: Ci = Yi - ti i = {P, C}. 
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I now describe sorne features of a Nash equilibrium of t his game. T he level of the 
transfer t i is chosen optimally by i taking as given the t ransfers made by the other player. 
T he optimal value of t i is charac terized by the following inequali ty : 
(2.4) 
If the non-negativity constraint on t i is slack. t hen (2.4) holds with equali ty. and with 
st rict inequali ty otherwise. Hence. for any (yp . yc ) such t hat u; (( yp )) <f. the parent makes 
U .IJC 
a t ransfer to her child . Similarly. C would like to choose tc such t hat 1< ((cc)) = 1 · and U Cp 
hence fo r any (y p . .IJC) such that ~;f~~~ > *- · the child makes a t ransfer to the pa rent. 
Assume that yp > YC · If relat ive endowments arc such tha t 1 :S ~;it~~ :S *' then P 
prefers to receive a t ransfer from C while C prefers to receive a t ransfer from P . but t he 
non-negat ivity const raint on t ransfers binds for both players. Hence. in equilibrium . st rict ly 
posit ive transfers between players occur when the level of ex-ante inequali ty is sufficient ly 
large relative to the level of alt ru ism tha t t he richer player has a st rict incent ive to send a 
t ransfer to t he poorer player . Since the players care about each other less than they care 
abou t themselves (1 < 1). both would prefer to receive t ransfers from the other (and hence 
there are no t ransfers betvveen them) for rela t ively small amounts of inequali ty. vVhen t he 
inequali ty between two players is sufficient ly large to give rise to a t ransfer from rich to poor . 
the size of t he transfer is j ust sufficient to equa te t he marginal ut ili ty t hat the sender derives 
from her own consumpt ion to the marginal ut ili ty that she derives from t he consumption 
of the receiver . 
T his model dict ates that an individual's aggregate net transfers are a convex funct ion 
of their wealt h level relative to the average wealt h level of t heir family. T he function is 
horizontal at levels of low inequali ty. and then increasing at high levels of inequali ty. In 
contrast to the altruistic model. t heories of ex-ante risk sharing between among fam ily mem-
bers (such as t he one tested by Townsend , 1994). dictate t hat parties exchange t ransfers in 
order to maintain a ratio of marginal ut ili t ies agreed upon ex-ante. In models of insurance 
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with limited commitment such as that of Coate and Ravallion (1993). transfers are sub-
ject to an additional incentive-compatibility constraint which may bind. and consequently 
cause parties to deviate from this ratio. in instances of relat ively extreme inequality. The 
equilibrium transfer functions stemming from such models are thus concave - increasing in 
an individual 's income at low levels of inequali ty. and horizontal at high levels of inequality 
where commitment constraints bind . 
Empir·ical results on transfers 
Using data from the 1997 and 2000 IFLS survey waves on the t ransfers that households 
exchanged with their nonresident family members over the 12 months preceding the survey. 
I explore the effect of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks on net transfers that households re-
ceive from their nonresident kin. Table 2.10 provides descriptive statistics on these transfers . 
One interesting feature of transfers during the crisis is that on average. gross remittance 
flows declined in magnitude. This can be seen in a decline in net remittances received by 
households that were net receivers of transfers from nonresident kin in 1997. and in a decline 
in net remittances sent by households that were net senders of transfers to nonresident kin 
ll1 1997. 
Table 2.11 presents the results of my analysis . The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 
2 of Table 2.11 is the increase between 1997 and 2000 in the sum of net transfers received 
by the household from nonresident grandparents. uncles/aunts. and older siblings of the 
sample children. normalized by 1997 household expenditures. 6 1 All regressions include the 
same household-level controls used in the previous child-level specifications. 
In Column 1 of Table 2.11. I test the effect of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks on 
transfers using a specification dictated by a model of complete ex-ante insurance in which 
transfers increase in the relative inequality between sender and receiver. In Column 2. I 
specify a transfer function that is non-monotonic in the initial inequality between sender 
61 Normalizing tra nsfers by household expenditures is common in t he li terature on remittances (see , e.g. , 
Yang (2008)) , fun ctioning like the log transformation in its smoothing the data wh ile still allowing for non-
positive values. Results without the normali zation are qualitatively similar a lthough less precisely estimated. 
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Table 2.10: Transfers exchanged with nonresident family. 1997-2000 
1997 
Net receivers in 1997 
Share of all households 0.36 
Net received 
Ivlean 77 .0 
sd 156.7 
% of 1997 household expenditures 
lVlean 5.6 
sd 9. 3 
Net senders in 1997 
Share of a ll households 0.51 
Net sent 
Mean 83.5 
sd 155.7 
% of 1997 household expendi t ures 
Mean 5.0 
sd 8.7 
All households 
Share with zero net sent 0.13 
Net sent 
Mean 15 .3 
sd 163.6 
% of 1997 household expenditures 
J\ilean 0.6 
sd 9.7 
Note: 
Sum of t ransfers exchanged by household 
head and spouse over the past 12 months with 
child 's nonresident grandparents , older siblings. and 
uncles/aunts . Transfers in tens of t housands of 
2000 rupiah. 
Source: !FLS 
2000 Change 
25 .6 -5 1.5 
142.7 176.8 
2.3 -3.3 
10.9 11. 8 
60. 1 -23.4 
211.6 193.2 
3.2 -1.8 
10.9 11.7 
0.10 0.04 
23.1 7.9 
184.0 183.2 
0.9 0.3 
10.9 11.6 
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Table 2.11: Resul ts on in tra-family t ransfers. 1997-2000 
1 2 3 4 
Household-level Child-le ve l 
Change in ne t 
transfers 
received 
C hange in 
e nrollme nt 
status 
Change in 
g rades 
completed 
Cha nge in head 's earnings (d log) -0.007** 
(0.003) 
*Low inequa li ty 
*High inequality 
C ha nge in nonres ident kin 's 
earn ings (Proxy 3, %) 
*Lo"' inequa li ty 
*High inequality 
-0.00 1 
(0.012 ) 
-0 006*"' 
(0.003 ) 
-0.01 -1* 
(0.008 ) 
-0.0 11 
(0 .013) 
0.085** 
(0.037) 
0.0 17** 0.049 ** 
(0. 007) (0 .01 9) 
0.014 0.015 
(0.019 ) (O.OGO ) 
0. 142*** 0. 133 
(0 040) (0.119 ) 
-0 024 0.843** 
(0. 104) (0.370 ) 
Consta nt -0.049 -0.088* 0 02.5 - 1.342** * 
Observat ions 
R2 
).iotc•s: 
(0.036) 
3,908 
0.03 
(0.053) (0. 171 ) 
3,908 8, 191 
0.04 0.69 
l Sa111pl< · in Coill lll!IS 1 a nd 2 n ii JSists of hoiJS<· ilo lds wit.b dlildn·u ag:t'S ~l-l~J .n •ars iu 
1!1!) 7: :-ia.Illpli • iu Coht ll lllS :~and .~ <"o !Jsists of childn •u ag<·s 4-l !J .n·ars in l!)!Ji 
2. HuiH'r-\Vhitc• standard c•rrors iu p a r('ntiH 'S<'s. clust.('n•d at t. hP et)JIJillllllit .\· l('\"<•L 
:~ . DC'JH'tH it'lll Ya ri a hh · iu C o!JJIIIIIS l aud 2 b t hc• d !i:Ulgt' iu ll l't lrans ft•rs n ·c·c•i\'{'d frotn 
IIOJ!r< •s id <· nt pan ·uts . sihliu~s. a ud dlildn•u of thP housPhold lu·ad a nd spoil~< ·. 
uonualizc·d " ·'· l!J!)7 ht HIS<'ho ld <'X IH'IIdi t un ·s . 
-L Hig h illl'fJIHtiity rd<'rS to ll oust•holds in the • lowc •s t (hi gll<'sf ) qua rt il<· of } q~J7 pc·r capi ta 
c•::qH'nditun•s \\'i t. h uonn•sidc•ut kin in rli<' h ig iH'st. (lowest) qlla rtil<' c ,f t he • proxy fo r uonn·sidc•ut 
ki n ·s l !J!J7 aYc'rag<' <'a ruings. All ot·hc·r llousc•htllds d a . ...;sific·d a . ...; low in<'qualit .\·. 
:). All n •gn •ss io n:-. inclti<l<' C<Hltrols for 1!)!)7 ho nsc•ho ld JH'r capi ta <'XJH '!Hiitllr< 'S (P C E ). 
ind in tttJrS for hig:h aud low iuc•qmdity caH·gor i<·:-. a nd t.lu,ir iuwract ions w i r h l!J!17 PCE. a nd 1 he · 
addi t ional controls lisrP<i in T ahh• 2.ll. 
(0.442) 
8,191 
0.54 
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and receiver. Using measures of each party 's income (the household 's 1997 per capita 
expendi t m es and the proxy for the average wage of the nonresident kin in 1997). I categorize 
households into one of two groups - "low" or "high" inequality - based on the amount of 
inequality between the household and its nonresident kin. I construct the inequality groups 
by breaking the income measures into quartiles. "High'' inequality households are those in 
either the first or fomth quartile of 1997 per capita expenditures and whose nonresident 
family has an average proxy wage in either the fourth or first quartile. respectively. All 
other households are categorized as "lmv" inequality. 62 I then interact the shock variables 
with these inequali ty categories .63 
The resul ts in Column 1 of Table 2.11 do not reveal any effect of nonresident family 
earnings on net transfers. In Column 2. nonresident family eamings declines significantly 
decrease net transfers received from the nonresident family for high-inequality households. 
but have no significant effect on net transfers among low-inequality households. A one 
standard deviation decrease in the change in the proxy for nonresident kin 's earnings results 
in an approximately 1.1 percentage point decrease in the change in net remitt ance receipts 
as a share of 1997 household expenditures. Table 2.10 shows that net remittance receipts 
from nonresident kin declined between 1997 and 2000 by an average of about 3 percent of 
pre-crisis household expenditures among households that were net receivers in 1997. Hence. 
this effect amounts to nearly 40 percent of the mean for initial receivers of transfers. 5-1 
Results from the corresponding child-level regressions are reported in Columns 3 and 4. 
Recall that nonresident family earnings changes affected both enrollment and achievement. 
Column 4 of Table 2.11 shows that nonresident family earnings changes affected the number 
62 T he results are similar if households a re instead categorized as ·'high" inequality if t hey are on ly two or 
more quar t iles apart from their nonresident kin. 
63 Column 2 also includes controls for the log of household per capita. expenditures (P CE) . the main effects 
of the inequality categories, and interactions between the two. 
6~ I attempted explore whether the effect of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks on transfer receipts depends 
upon whether the household is sending or receiving remittances . I did th is by restricting the sample in Col-
umn 2 of Table 2.11 to households that were, in turn , net receivers or net senders of t ransfers in 1997. In both 
regressions , the coeffici ent on nonresident kin 's earnings shocks for households in the high- inequality group 
was positive but imprecisely estima ted. Hence, I do not find evidence that households' initia l sender/ receiver 
status is a significant source of heterogeneity in t he effect of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks on net t ransfers 
among households in the high-inequality group. 
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of grades completed by children in high-inequality households. It seems that differential 
changes in children 's school achievement between 1997 and 2000. caused by nonresident 
family members ' earnings shocks. occurred in the same set of households for which those 
earnings shocks were significantly associated with changes in t ransfer receipts. 1\iloreover. t he 
effect is in t he direction that one would expect if decreases in t ransfer receipts were straining 
household budgets. forcing cuts in ex pen eli tures on children 's eel ucation . Curiously. there is 
no evidence among high-inequali ty households of declines in school enrollments. 
Column 2 of Table 2.11 shows that it was children in low-inequality households whose en-
rollment status was affected by shocks to their nonresident family members ' earnings. The 
corresponding achievement effect is statistically insignificant. Since the enrollment effects 
seem to have been concentrated in low-inequali ty households. while t he association between 
nonresident family members' earnings shocks and changes in transfers was concentrated 
in high-inequality households. it seems unlikely t hat changes in transfers were t he channel 
t hrough which these enrollment effects operated. 
Additional results and discussion 
The results above suggest t hat transfers may have been an important channel through which 
the effects of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks on children 's human capital accumulation 
were mediated . This suggests that household budgets may have been st rained by reduced 
t ransfer receipts. I investigated this hypothesis by estimating specifications with measures 
of household expenditures as the dependent variable. The result of this invest igation is 
reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.12. In Column 1. t he change in the log of total 
household expenditures is regressed on the change in the household head 's earnings. t he 
proxy for the change in nonresident kin 's ea rnings . and the additiona l controls listed in 
Table 2.6. 65 Unsurprisingly. there is a significant positive association between the change 
in household expenditures and the change in the head of household 's earnings . More in-
terestingly, the change in household expenditures is also positively related to the change 
65 T he sample size is slightly smaller t han in Table 2. 11 after tr imming the 1 percent ta ils of t he change 
in total household expenditures . 
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Table 2.12: Co-resident children and household expenditures 
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m nonresident kin 's earnings. although the coefficient est imate is only significant at the 10 
percent level. 
In Column 2. I use as the dependent variable the change in the share of schooling 
expenditures in total current household expenditures. The IFLS contains a detailed module 
on household expenditures. Schooling expenditures cLSked about in the survey include costs 
for tuition. fees. uniforms and other supplies. transportation. and room and board. 66 If 
households were cutting all expenditures uniformly in response to their nonresident kin 's 
earnings declines. then the share of schooling expenditures in total expenditures would not 
be affected by nonresident kin 's earnings shocks. This seems to have been the case. as the 
coefficient est imate on the proxy for nonresident kin 's earnings change in Column 2 is small 
66 1 use the budget s ha re on schooling as the dependent variable rather than the change in log schooling 
expenditures because some households report zero schooling expenditures , and beuwse this specification 
facilitates a direct comparison of the rates of change in total expend itures versus schooling expenditures. 
The sample size is smaller in Column 2 due to missing data on school ex penditures . T he res ults from Column 
1 are essentia lly unchanged when the sample is rest ricted to that of Column 2. 
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in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
T he positive relationship between nonresident kin 's earnings changes and total household 
expenditures in Column 1. paired with evidence in Column 2 of Table 2.12 t hat schooling 
and total expendi t ures are equally sensit ive to nonresident kin 's earnings shocks. is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that a reduction in nonresident kin 's earnings decreased transfer 
receipts and consequently the size of households ' budgets . forcing cuts in human capi tal 
investment . One interesting possibility t his ra ises is that disruptions to children 's hum an 
capi tal accumula tion from nonresident kin 's earnings shocks may. to an extent . have been 
concent rated among children ·whose schooling was being par t ly fin anced by transfers from 
their nonresident kin before the crisis hit . I investigated t his possibility by first testing 
whether t here is a ny evidence in the data that remittance receipts are associated wit h 
the presence of school-aged children. It seems likely that if households rely on remitt ance 
receipts to help fin ance schooling expendi t ures. then households wit h more school-aged 
children would ceteris paribus tend to receive more remit tances. 67 
In Column 1 of Table 2.13. I report the results of a regression of net transfers received 
m 1997 on t he number of co-resident children ages 4- 19. controlling for household size. 
using the 1997 cross-section of t he IFLS data for households in my sample. The es timates 
indicate that one additional co-resident child was positively and significant ly associated 
with net remittance receipts in 1997 (the magni tude of t he effect is about 7 percent of mean 
remit tance receipts for net remittance receivers in 1997) .68 \iVhile this result itself does not 
have a causal interpretation , it is consistent with t he possibility that households with more 
children in 1997 relied to a greater extent on remittances from nonresident kin to finance 
t he schooling of t hese children. 
Next. I tested whether t he sensit ivity of changes in household expenditures to changes 
m nonresident kin 's earnings. reported in the first two columns of Table 2.12. depends 
67 One coukl imagine ex ploring t he assoc iat ion between schooling expendi t ures a nd transfer receipts di-
rectly. The draw back of this approach is that the costs of foregone earnings and family labor are likely to 
be at least as important as direct schooling costs . 
68 The specification a lso includes dummies for t he head of household 's age and communi ty fix ed effects. 
Remittance receipts are normalized by total household expenditures . Results were qualitatively simil ar bu t 
less precisely estimated with remi tta nce levels as t he dependent va riab le. 
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Table 2. 13: Co-resident chi ldren. initial transfer receipts, and schooling outcomes 
1 2 3 
House hold-level C hild- level 
Net transfers Change in 
received in enrollm e nt 
1997 status 
Number of co- resident children 0.004** -0.011 ** 
in 1997 (ages 4- 19) (0 .002) (0.006 ) 
Household size in 1991 -0.003 ** 0.001 
(0.00 1) (0.00-1) 
Shock variables 
Chan ge in lwacl" s earnings ( dlog) 0.031 ** 
(0.013 ) 
* number of co-resident -0.003 
chi ldren in 1997 (ages 4-19 ) (0.004) 
Change in nonresident kin "s 0.010 
ea rnings (P roxy 3. o/c) (0.067) 
* number of co- resid(•nt 0.0-11 * 
children in 1997 (ages 4-19 ) (0.022) 
Constant -0.036*** 0.~9Y* * 
(0.010) (0. 1-10) 
0 bserva tions 3,908 8.191 
R2 0.08 0.68 
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upon the number of co- resident children. In Column 3 of Table 2.12. I interact the proxy 
for nonresident kin 's earnings shocks with the number of ro-resident children ages 4-19 in 
1997. By construction . all households in my sample have at least one such child. The 
results indicate that expendi t ure changes between 1997 and 2000 of households with more 
co-resident children were more sensit ive to nonresideut kin 's earnings shocks69 The results 
in Column 4 indicate that the sensitivity of the change in schooling expenditures relat ive 
to total expendi tures does not depend upon the number of co-resident children in 1997. 
Finally. I tes t whether the enrollment effect of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks depends 
upon the number of co-resident children. lu Column 2 of Table 2.13. I regress t he change 
in a child 's enrollment status between 1997 and 2000 on the proxy for nonresident kin 's 
earnings shocks and the interaction between t hat variable and t he tota l number of children 
co-resident in the child 's household in 1997. T he coeffi cient on the interaction term is 
positive and statist ically significant . The sum of the main effect and t he interact ion term 
of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks is not stat istically different from zero. indicating that 
nonresident kin 's earnings shocks have no enrollment effects on children in households with 
only one child in 1997. The hypothesis that the sum of the main effect and the interaction 
term equals zero for children in households with two children is rejected at the 5 percent 
significance level. It seems that enrollment effects of nonresident kin 's earnings shocks 
were concentrated in households with at least two children. and were larger for children in 
households with a larger number of children co-resident in 1997. 
Collectively. th is evidence suggests t hat households with more children may have relied 
disproportionately on transfers from nonresident kin in order to fin ance schooling expendi-
tures . that the earnings shocks of nonresident kin reduced transfers sent to these households. 
and that their expendi tures consequently decreased. resulting in disruptions to the human 
capital accumulation of their children. 70 
69 T he median number of child ren per household is 2. T he sum of the main effect and t he interac tion 
term for nonresident kin 's earnings shocks is not significant ly different from zero for households wit h eit her 
one or two chi ldren , indicating that t he ex pendi t ures of t hese households are not sensiti ve to nonresident 
kin 's earnings shocks. T he hypothesis t hat the sum of the main effect and interaction term equ als zero for 
households with t hree co-resident children is rejected at t he 5 percent level of significance. 
70 T he results of Table 2.11 demonstrate that changes in t ransfer receipts among households in the high-
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To the extent that transfers help households fin ance investments in their children 's human 
capital. t hey could constitute an important (and possibly effi ciency-enh ancing) mechanism 
promoting intergenerat ional mobi li ty. part icularly in t he presence of lumpy schooling costs 
and incomplete credit markets. 71 However. reliance on transfers from nonresident kin to 
finance such investments may be a double-edged sword . since continued investment could 
be par t icularly fragile to adverse earnings shocks to nonresident kin. 
2.5.2 Alternative channels 
Co-res·idence patterns 
Another way in which the effects reported above may have been channeled from nonresident 
to resident family members is t hrough changing patterns of family cohabitation. Existing 
evidence suggests t hat such changes may have been qui te frequent during the crisis . 72 Pos-
sible motives for doing so included the desire to exploit scale economies in consumption. 
locate unemployed family members and dependents in relatively low-cost rural areas . and 
take advantage of the shift in relative employment opport unities toward the rural sector. 
Changes in household size and composit ion that occurred as family members responded to 
the crisis could conceivably have disrupted or enhanced children 's human capi tal accumu-
lation by reducing or increasing per capita resources . changing t he supply of inputs into 
human capital accumulation (e.g. privacy) . or changing the shadow value of children 's time. 
To investigate whether changes in co-residence patterns caused nonresident kin 's earnings 
shocks to disrupt children 's human capital accumulation. I tested the significance of non-
resident family earnings shocks in a variety of specificat ions involving changes in household 
size and composit ion. along with the additional controls listed in Table 2.6. The results 
inequa li ty group a re sensiti ve to nonresident kin 's earnings shocks . I found no evidence of heterogeneity 
in this effect by the number of co-resident children in the household in 1997. If t ransfers received from 
nonresident kin declined for a ll households regard less of the number of co-resident children, then why do 
such declines disproport ionately impact ex pendi tures and enrollment in households with more co-resident 
children? One ex plana tion could be that households wit h more co-resident children devote a la rger share of 
total expenditures to schooling. Indeed , there is a strong associat ion between t he schooling budget sha re 
and t he number of co-resident children in the 1997 cross-sect ion of t he IFLS data. 
7 1 Angelucci, et al. (2010) report eYidence from Nlexico suggesting that family members in t he same village 
helped one another fin ance the education of their children . 
72 T homas, ct al. (2004) , Fa llon and Lucas (2002) 
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of three of these specifications are reported in the first three columns of Table 2.14. In 
Column 1. t he change in household size between 1997 and 2000 is regressed on the earnings 
shocks of the household head and nonresident kin. In Column 2. the dependent variable 
is the change in the number of co-resident children. The proxy for nom esident kin's earn-
ings shocks is not significant in either regression. Introducing additional controls for initi al 
household size and the number of co-resident children does not alter this result. In Column 
3. I test whether the number of co-resident uncles. aunts. and cousins of sample children 
was affected by earnings shocks to uncles and aunts who were nonresident in 1997. 73 Again. 
the proxy for the earnings shocks of these nonresident kin is insignificant. and remain so 
even after including controls for initial household size and composit ion. 
Table 2.14: Tests of alternat ive channels 
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73 T he sample size is slightly smaller in th is specifica t ion after t rimming the one percent ta ils of the proxy 
for both nonresident uncles/aunts ' and grandparents/older siblings ' ea rnings shocks. 
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I found no robust patterns of statistical significance in t he proxy for nonresident family 
earnings across numerous specifications. including ones classified households into the low-
and high-inequali ty groups used in Table 2.11 and nonresident kin by their proximity to 
the sample household as in Table 2. 8. T his is puzzling given the large migration flows that 
occurred within Indonesia during the crisis and exist ing evidence that changes in household 
structure constituted an important coping mechanism during the crisis. It seems unlikely 
that changing co-residence patterns played no role in mediat ing these effects. One possibil-
ity is that measurement error in the proxy variables for nonresident kin 's earnings shocks 
precludes the detection of the t rue relat ionship between family co-residence patterns and 
nonresident kin 's earnings shocks. 
Peer effects 
Finally. I explore the possibili ty that the results reported above may be caused by peer 
effects between family members. Suppose. for example. that a nonresident uncle of one of 
my sample children received an adverse earnings shock during the crisis. and responded by 
removing his own daughter (i.e. the cousin of the child in my sample) from school. It is con-
ceivable that the parents of the child in my sample. upon observing this. respond by pulling 
their own child (i. e. the child in my sample) out of school. A less extreme response by par-
ents could involve reducing their investment levels more moderately. Alternatively. children 
in my sample could experience a reduction in their motivation to learn after observing their 
cousins being pulled out of school. Such interdependencies could arise from non-standard 
preferences (e.g. of the ·'keeping-up-with-the-Jones" form). Alterna tively. observations by 
one family member of unexpectedly severe effects of the crisis on another family member 
- such as t he disenrollment of a child from school - could induce a response intended to 
mitigate expected consequences of t he crisis. 
The IFLS data do not contain information on whether nonresident uncles and aunts of 
my sample children have children of their own. They do. however. contain the marital sta tus 
of these nonresident kin. Nonresident uncles and aunts who a re single should be much less 
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likely to have children of their own. This assumption forms the basis of a possible test for 
the role of peer effects in explaining my main findings. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly. all of the nonresident uncles and aunts for nearly sixty percent 
of children in my sample are married. and the share of nonresident uncles and aunts who 
are married is over 50 percent for less t han fi ve percent of sample children. I implement 
the test for peer effects by restricting the sample used in Column 2 of Table 2.8 to children 
with at least one unmarried nonresident uncles or aunt. The results of t his regression are 
reported in Column 4 of Table 2.14. 74 If the effect of nonresident uncles and aunts ' earnings 
shocks were much smaller than t he corresponding estimates in Column 2 of Table 2.8. then 
peer effects of the form described above could be an important link between resident and 
nonresident family members. However. the effect of nonresident uncles and aunts ' earnings 
shocks on enrollment is only slightly smaller in magnitude (0.094 versus 0.116) and . as one 
would expect with the smaller sample, less precisely estimated . The hypothesis t hat the 
two are equal cannot be rejected. I conclude tha t this test reveals no significant evidence 
that peer effects are an important link between resident and nonresident kin that could 
explain the enrollment effects in my main results. 
2.6 Long-term evidence 
Important to the welfare implications of the resul ts reported above is the quest ion of whether 
any disruptions to children 's human capital had persistent effects. The fourth main wave 
of the IFLS enables me to assess whether any variation in children's human capital accu-
mulation caused by t heir nonresident family members ' earnings shocks was still present in 
2007. nearly ten years after the crisis hitJ5 
In Column 2 of Table 2.9. I verify that my findings on the medium-run effects of nonres-
ident kin 's earnings shocks on achievement remain when the sample is restricted to the set 
of children for whom 2007 data is available. In the last four columns of Table 2.9. I regress 
7~This specification includes a full set of dummies for the head of household 's age in 1997. 
75 As wit h the main part of my analysis. att rition between 1997 and 2000 was relat ively low. In an a nalysis 
described in the Appendix, I find no ev idence t hat at tr it ion is a significant source of bias in the resul ts 
reported in t his sect ion . 
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t he change in the number of grades completed between 1997 and 2007 on t he same set of 
covaria tes as Column 1. Column 3 repor ts t he results for a ll cohorts of children ages 4- 19 
in 1997 (i.e . ages 14- 29 in 2007). In Columns 4. 5. and 6. I spli t the sample into 3 different 
age groups: children ages 4- 6 years. 7- 11 years. and 12- 19 years in 1997. respect ively. I\'Iost 
4- 6 year-olds in 1997 had not yet begun school when t he crisis intensified in early 1998 (see 
Table 2.4). By contrast . 7- 11 year-olds were genera lly in or just complet ing primary school 
when t he crisis hi t. Em ollment rat es in t he next levels of schooling - junior and senior 
secondary - were lower t han primary school even before t he crisis hi t . suggesting t hat a ny 
long-term effects on 12- 19 year-olds may be different. 
In Column 3. t he sam ple of a ll cohorts. t he estimated effect of nonresident family mem-
bers· earnings shocks on t he cha nge in t he number of grades completed over t he 10-year 
period is stat ist ically significant. T he point estimate implies t hat a one standard deviat ioll 
increase in t he composite proxy fo r nonresident family members' earnings shocks caused 
children to complete abou t 0 .14 additional grades of schooling by 2007 (about 2.4 percent 
of t he mean). Turning to Columns 4- 6. children who were very young when t he crisis hi t 
seem to have been less affected in t he long term by t he earnings of t heir nonresident kin . 
alt hough t he effect is imprecisely est imated . By cont rast . t he effects on children who were 
older when the crisis hi t were relatively worse . A one standard deviat ion decline in t he 
proxy for nonresident kin 's earnings shock reduced t he ultimate educational attainment of 
children ages 12-19 in 1997 by abou t 4 percent on average. 
T he fact t hat approximately 65 percent of t hese children were over age 18 by 2007 
suggests t hat. for most children in t he sample, t his achievement gap reflects a permanent 
difference in human capital. I t seems that t he achievement effects detected in 2000. which 
were somewhat smaller by comparison. propagated into larger differences among children in 
their ult imate educational attainment. These effects are sizeable in terms of wages foregone 
by t hose whose nonresident family members did not fa re well during t he crisis. Using 
Dufl.o's (2001 ) midpoint estimate of an 8. 7 percent increase in wages for each addi t ional 
year of schooling in Indonesia . t he estimate in Column 3 of Table 2.9 implies t hat children 
55 
whose nonresident family members experienced an earnings increase one standard deviation 
larger than their peers will see an increase in their ammal wages of about 1.1 percent. 
The inverted U-shaped pattern in the size of the effect wit h children 's age at t he time that 
the crisis hi t is noteworthy. A possible explanation is that because many of the youngest 
group of children were likely in school for the entire 10-year period between 1997 and 
2007. they had more s ·hool-aged years in which to catch up than did children in the older 
groups. Because those years likely saw better economic conditions as Indonesia 's economy 
continued to recover from the crisis. their parents may have been bet ter-positioned to invest 
in their education. Alternatively. they may have stayed in school longer than they would 
otherwise have (although it is not clear why this explanation would apply differentially to 
young children). I attempt to distinguish between these two explanations by regressing a 
measure of the child 's '·grade-for-age" - the number of grades completed by the child. less 
her age in 2007 - on the same set of covariates listed in Table 2.9. Nonresident family 
members' earnings shocks were statistically insignificant. suggesting that there were no 
significant differences between the ages. given grades completed . among very young children 
whose nonresident fami ly members experienced different earnings shocks. A more plausible 
explanation seems to be that the human capital accumulation of these young children was. 
on average. less affected by the crisis to begin with. and that they were better-situated than 
older children to catch up during the years they were in school. 
Finally. children who were older when the crisis hit may have experienced relatively less 
disruption to their human capital accumulation. eit her because their parents took (possibly 
costly) steps to shield them . or because many of them had finished school before the crisis 
hi t. 76 Analysis from earlier IFLS survey waves suggests that households may have sought 
to shield older children 's human capital accumulation of from disruption at t he expense 
of younger children. 77 possibly because there may be high returns to secondary relative to 
primary schooling in IndonesiaJ8 The pattern of effects reported in Table 2.9 suggest that 
76 Nearly a third of children ages 12 and older, and nearly ha lf of children ages 16 and older in 1997, were 
not enrolled in school in 1997 - i.e. before t he crisis hi t. See Table 2.4 . 
77 Thomas. et a l. ( 2004) 
78 Behrman and Deolalikar (1995) 
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part of the impact from which parents sought to shield their older children. possibly at the 
expense of their younger children. may have come from nonresident family members hi t 
hard by the crisis. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
The results of this study indicate that shocks to the earnings of their nonresident kiu had 
a significant and persistent impact upon children 's human capital accumulat ion during the 
1997-8 Indonesian crisis. Shocks to both local and noulocal nonresident kin vvere important. 
as were shocks to both nuclear and extended nonresident family. The effects seem to 
have been larger for children near the t ransition point between primary and secondary 
school. Altruistically-motivated transfers may have been important in channeling these 
effects. Since households with a larger number of children may have relied disproport ionately 
on such transfers to finance schooling investments. children in these households may have 
been particularly vulnerable. 
The sensitivity of household investment levels to changes in t he economic fortunes of 
nonresident kin suggests that the family - regardless of household membership status -
deserves greater attent ion in future research. The economic importance of nonresident 
family members is poised to increase over time as countries develop and hous holds become 
more fragmented. Future effort s to collect information on family networks. in even greater 
detail than was done in the IFLS. may prove co.-t-effective. 
Finally. cost-benefit evaluations of social safety nets and interventions to promote finan-
cia! inclusion should account for welfare effects on the nonresident kin of targeted individu-
als.79 It may be possible to enhance the targeting of these programs by utilizing information 
on individuals ' nonresident kin. Conventional wisdom suggests that market-based targeting 
schemes should strive to maximize participa tion among the poor. 80 But how do the poor 
part icipate? Accounting in the design of such programs for indirect benefit . which accrue to 
79 This point relates to ex isting evidence suggest ing that policies targeted at the elderly can benefit future 
generations. See Edmonds, et a l. (2004). 
80 See, e.g. , van de \iVa lle (1998) 
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individuals connected to program part icipants . constitutes a challenging mechanism design 
problem and a frui tful path for future research . 
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2.8 Appendix 
2.8.1 Sample construction and attrition 
The two individual-level samples used in this study are used to analyze children 's human 
capital accumulat ion over the periods 1997-2000 and 1997-2007 . The 1997-2000 sample 
was constructed by start ing wit h a list of all individuals ages 4-19 years in 1997 who were 
household members in 1997. These individuals were matched to the household-level data 
corresponding to t he households in which they resided in 1997. A small number of these 
individuals who were heads or spouses of their 1997 households. or who lived in households 
whose head and spouse did not report having any nonresident kin. were then excluded. 
This left a potential sample of 9.018 individuals whose eurollment status and educational 
attainment I attempted to locate in the data from the IFLS3 (i.e. 2000) survey wave. In 
order to facilitate t he household-level analysis on transfers and cohabitat ion patterns. I also 
attempted to locate household-level data in the IFLS3 survey data for t he Y households 
(regardless of whether the child continued to live in that household in 2000). After matching 
these individuals to the IFLS3 data. a small number of individuals who reportedly experi-
enced a decrease in years of schooling completed or skipped an implausibly large number 
of grades between 1997 and 2000 were excluded. The first- and 99th-percentile tails of the 
proxies for the earnings changes of the household head and overall nonresident family. and 
of the changes in overall intra-family t ransfers and household size. were also trimmed. This 
resulted in a benchmark sample. after t rimming of the shock data. of 8, 191 individuals and 
3.908 households. 
The 2007 sample was constructed by attempt ing to locate educational attainment data 
for all individuals in the 1997-2000 sample. l\!Iost of these individuals had been re-interviewed 
by the IFLS4 survey teams in 2007 and hence provided their educational attainment di-
rectly. but in roughly 15 percent of cases t he highest grade completed by an individual in 
2007 was calculated from data contained in the household roster of the individual 's last 
known place of residence. After excluding a small number of individuals who reportedly 
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experienced a decrease in years of schooling completed between 1997 and 2007 . this yielded 
a fin al sample of 7.779 individuals. 
Att ri t ion from the sample raises potent ial concerns about bias if the pa t terus of att ri t ion 
are afFected by nonresident fam ily members ' earnings shocks. For tunately. the IFLS design 
explicit ly tracked individuals vvho left households between survey rounds. resul ting in re-
contact rates that are astoundingly high for a longit udinal survey in a developing count ry. 
T he IFLS data are packaged with sample weights adjusted for attri t ion. based on flexible 
logit models of observable individual- and household-level determinants of att ri t ion.8 1 T here 
are at least two reasons why these pre-packaged attri t ion adj ustments may not adequately 
address concerns about bias. First. the analyt ical samples used in this study are based on 
individua ls who. at ages 4-1 9 in 1997. may be part icula rly mobile relative to the average 
individual in t he full IFLS survey frame. Indeed the coefficients on individua ls in this 
age range are often negative and significant in the logit regressions for t he probability of 
being found in t he next survey wave.82 Furthermore. to the extent that nonresident family 
members' earnings shocks influence att ri t ion patterns conditional upon other obs rvables. 
the att ri t ion adjustments of the pre-packaged sample weights will not adequately address 
concerns about bias. 
In order to assess the extent to which the results of this study may be biased by att ri tion. 
I two indicator variables for att ri tion: one for att rition between 1997 and 2000. and another 
for attri t ion between 2000 and 2007. I regressed the att ri t ion indicators on the same set of 
1997 individual- and household- level characteristics used as controls in Table 2. 6. along with 
the composite proxy fo r nonresident kin 's earnings shocks. The coefficient on nonresident 
kin 's earnings shocks was insignificant in both regressions . suggest ing that the potent ial for 
bias in the results of this study arising from correlation between at t ri t ion and nonresident 
kin 's earnings shocks is limi ted . 
8 1 Stra uss, et a l. (2009) contains fur t her details. 
82 Stra uss, et a l. (2009) , Table 3.2 . 
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2.8.2 Construction of variables 
Proxy variables 
The proxy variables for initi al earnings levels and earnings changes used in this paper were 
constructed by combining information on the gender. ducation . industry of employment. 
and province of residence of t he head of household and each nom esident parent. sibling. 
and child of the household head and spouse, with data on earnings changes experienced 
by workers in the SAKERNAS data . in the "cells" defined by those characteristics. Cells 
were constructed by defining 2 levels of education (completed 6 grades or less vs. completed 
more than 6 grades) . and combining these categories vvith data on the 9 industries and 27 
provinces in t he SAKERNAS sm vey. for a total of 972 cells. Let i index these cells. I 
also constructed a set of more broadly-defined cells defined by industry and locat ion only. 
Let x index t hese cells. In cases where either round of the SAKERNAS contained fewer 
than 100 workers in cell i:. I used information from cell x to construct t he proxy variables. 
Let x index elements in the composite set of cells in which each cell .i that contaius fewer 
than the minimum number of observations in either SAKERNAS round is replaced by 
the corresponding cell x. Let n index the nonresident kin of the children in household h 
(notation suppressed) . Xn denote the cell defined by the characteristics of n. and Nu denote 
the total number of nonresident kin of child ·i. The value of Proxy 1 (earnings-only) for the 
nonresident kin of children in household h is defined as follows: 
(
Ni96 ) 
PTOxyl h = t. (t ) ln L Earn[t" 
n=l 
where Earnt" = N;,t 2:.;;:1' Earnj"t . Earnj''t is the earnings of worker j in cell Xn rep~rted 
in the t ime t round of the SAKERNAS. and N.r.,t is total the number of such workers. 
The value of Proxy 2 (employment-only) for the nonresident kin of children in household h 
is defined as follows: 
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1 N;oG . 
Pmxy2 h = -- L EmpChx" 
Ni96 
n=l 
vvhere EmpChx, equals the percentage change in aggregate employment. 1996-8. of all work-
ers in cell :l:n· 
Proxy 3 (the composite employment-earnings proxy). defined in the mam text. is based 
on the variable AggEarnChx" which equals the percentage change in aggregate earnings . 
1996-8. of all workers in cell X 11 • Aggregate earnings are defined as the product of real wages 
and employment . vvhere wages are total monthly earnings divided by hours ' '.rorked over the 
same period. 
Real wages and earnings were calculated by applying province-specific pnce defl ators 
to the nominal values reported in the SAKERNAS. Price deflators were tabulated from 
price indices in capital cities obtained from BPS (1998. 1999. and 2000). Heads of IFLS 
households were matched to cells based on their characteristics in 1997. T he one-digit indus-
t ry classification for household heads reported in the IFLS data matched st raight forwardly 
with the two-digit classification in t he SAKERN AS. However. only (one-digit) occupational 
codes were available for nonresident family members . I was able to develop a concordance 
matching occupations to industries since the occupat ions of household heads were also re-
ported in the IFLS. The overlap between industries and occupations was not perfect. Using 
data on the occupations and industries of household heads in IFLS2. I matched occupa-
t ions to industries using the cri terion t hat t he given assignment ought to maximize the 
frac tion of workers whose industry and occupation reported in the IFLS match exactly. 
The employment-weighted average match share across occupations was 86 percent. and t he 
occupation wit h the minimum match share ( 40 percent) contained fewer than 13 percent of 
workers.83 
83 T his 1-digit occupation co nsisted mostly of "brick layers , carpenters and other construct ion worke rs"' and 
"t ransport equ ipment operators'·. All were assigned to the construction industry. P re-crisis wage levels a nd 
the wage change during t he crisis were relat ively simila r for these two occupat ions. 
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Nonresident family members' actual provmces of residence were not reported in t he 
IFLS2 data release as of this writing. Instead. their locations relative to the household 
are reported. allowing one to observe only whether or not t he nonresident family member 
lived in the same provmce as the household (the data do contain the actual province of 
IFLS households) in 1997. The IFLS data from 2000 contain nonresident family mem-
bers ' actual locations in 2000. but use of a proxy based on this information would risk 
introducing endogeneity caused by the select ive movement of nonresident family members 
across provinces during the crisis. Instead. for nonresident kin whose 1997 location I do not 
observe. I adopted a strategy of est imating the required information the from Indonesian 
workers with similar characterist ics to these nonresident kin. but who lived in 1996 in any 
province other than that of the household . Specifically. let l11 denote the 1997 province of 
household h. \iVhen constructing the proxies. I derive average earnings . changes in aggre-
gate employment. and changes in aggregate earnings from the single cell Xn corresponding 
to province lh. for nonresident family members in the same proYince as the household in 
1997. For nonresident family members not living in the same province as the household in 
1997. I calculated these variables for each element in the union of cells x defined by the 
characteristics of n but with locations other than lh· and took the simple average. 
Other variables 
Household-specific price defl ators were calculated by the staff at RAND for use with 
the IFLS survey data. These deflators. which are based on households' locations (province 
and rural/urban) and month of interview. were used to convert IFLS data on household 
expenditures and t ransfers into real terms. Consumption shares for the price defl ators 
were derived from the 1996 and 1999 waves of Indonesia 's National Socioeconomic Survey 
(SUSENAS). Witoelar (1999) describes the calculations in greater detail. 
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Table 2. 15: Robustness checks 
1 2 3 
Change in enrollment status , 
1997- 2000 
Change in heacl·s earn ings (cllog) 
Proxy for change in hcil cl·~ e11 rnings (%) 
C ha nge in ea rnings or other householders 
(cl log) 
Change in nonres ident kin ·s earnings 
(Proxy 3, Yc) 
Othe r controls 
Head 's initial earn ings (log) 
Other househo lders · inil i<1 1 ea rnings ( log) 
Proxy for nonres ident kin·s initia l ea rnings 
(log) 
Enrolled in 1997 
Beitel employed in 1997 
Head employed in 2000 
Consta nt 
Observat ions 
R2 
District x rural/urban fixed effects? 
Notl's: 
0.0-1 9 
(0.032) 
0.117*** 
(0 .0-10) 
0 .04 2*** 
(0.00:3) 
0 .034 *** 
(0.010 ) 
-0.693*** 
(0.01 4) 
-0 .615*** 
(0.07-1 ) 
0 .01-1 
(0 .011 ) 
0 .427** * 
(0.1 43) 
8,078 
0.68 
N 
1. Smnpl(• C<Hhists of cohtJrt:-> nf childn·H ag:C's 4-I D ~·t·a rs in l~)~JI . 
0.020*** 
(0.007) 
0 010 
(0.009 ) 
0.132* ** 
(0.0-10 ) 
0.0-13* ** 
(0.005 ) 
0.0 17*** 
(0.006) 
0.029* ** 
(0.010 ) 
-0.696*** 
(0.014 ) 
-0 .623*** 
(0. 082 ) 
0.020* 
(0 .010) 
0.474*** 
(0. 136 ) 
8,163 
0.68 
N 
2. HuiH'r-\·\"h itt· ;-;ta udard t•rrors iu J>an ·utli l'st•s. dust.('rcd at th(' <'O III IIIIIIlit _, . ,, .,·<'!. 
:t All rq!,rcssious iududt · add it imwl t·out.rols li st.('d in Table 2 .( i. 
0.020*** 
(0.007 ) 
0.097** 
(0 .04-1) 
0.0-12*** 
(0.006 ) 
0.0:32*** 
(0.009 ) 
-0. 71 2*** 
(0.0 1-1) 
-0. 620*** 
(0.086) 
0 .021 * 
(0.0 11 ) 
0. -l..t 1 *** 
(0 .11 5) 
8 ,191 
0 67 
y 
3.1 Introduction 
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Chapter 3 
A Theoretical Analysis of 
Private Transfers as Ex Post Altruism 
There now exists an abundance of evidence suggesting that non-reciprocal feelings such as 
senses of duty. justice. social pressure. and pure empathy play important roles in indivicl-
ual decision making. Moreover. a large fraction of private trausfers are exchanged within 
family networks.84 Thus. there is good reason to suspect that financial transfers among in-
dividuals are often provided in the context of altruism. possibly without the expectation of 
reciprocity. 83 In part clue empirical rejections of alt ruism as a motive for sending transfers 
(e .g. Altonji. et al.. 1997) . many subsequent studies of private trausfers take an insurance-
based approach. The empirical rejection of complete insurance has led to more complex 
models involving moral hazard (e.g. Rogerson . 1985; Phelan. 1998) . limi ted commitment 
(e.g. Coate and Ravallion. 1993; Ligon , et a l. , 2002). and hidden income (e.g. Townsend . 
1979; Kinnan. 2010). 
This paper develops a theory of private transfers motivated by ex post altruism among 
members of a network. The objective of the model is two-fold. First . the model analyzes 
the implications of altruistic t ransfers in different contexts. In par t icular. I explore how 
the structure of altruist ic networks and distributions of income within them may affect the 
pattern of altruistic transfers. Next . t he model draws contrasts between the implications of 
alt ruistic transfers and transfers based on insurance . 
I first analyze 'homogeneous ' networks. where all individuals are connected to one another 
84 For example, t he Reserve Bank of India estimates t hat remittances for family main tenance purposes 
constitute a pproximately half of a ll inward remittances (OIFC, 2009). 
85 Altruism is not entirely inconsistent with reciprocity-based exchange, pa rt icularly from evolu tionary or 
intergenera tiona l perspect ives (e .g . Alger and Wei bu ll , 2010). 
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and t he extent of altruism among all individuals is identical. I show how the pattern of 
transfers depends upon t he distribution of income over the entire network. and characterize 
net transfers and final allocations. The main insight is that every equilibrium involving 
transfers takes the same form : unique income thresholds separate senders from receivers. 
and effect ive risk-sharing takes place among individuals with relatively high and low incomes 
while those with intermediate incomes remain in autarky. Hence. every equilibrium gives 
rise to t he same set of allocations. and hence the same amount of net transfers. The level 
of transfers, including whether they are exchanged at all. hinges on the amount of income 
inequali ty relative to the extent of al t ruism. 
I then explore an extension of the model to networks characterized by two interdependent 
groups. e.g. two nuclear families belonging to the same extended family. Members of a given 
group feel equally altruistic toward one another. but feel less altruist ic toward members of 
the other group. I derive predictions for transfer patterns and fin al allocations analogous to 
the homogeneous case. and explore the interaction between cross-group and within-group 
transfers. In both cases , altruist ic t ransfers facili tate effect ive but partial risk-sharing. 
consistent with the reject ion of complete risk-sharing in the empirical li terature. The extent 
of risk-sharing is determined by the shape of the altruistic transfer function. which in turn 
is related to t he entire income distribution over the network. 
The shape of the altruistic transfer fun ction is a key distinction between altruism and 
insurance. Altruism predicts that transfers are inoperative among parties with relat ively 
equal incomes, and are operative among parties with unequal incomes. By contrast. pure 
insurance predicts t hat t ransfers move one-for-one with the income. vVhile the addition of 
fixed costs may prevent insurance-based transfers from responding to small income shocks. 
commitment constraints may also cause insurance-based transfers to respond less to large 
income shocks. Meanwhile. altruistic transfers are expected to be equally responsive to 
small and large income shocks. conditional upon t ransfers being operat ive . 
Another distinction between insurance and altruism highlighted by t he present model 
stems from the ex ante vs. ex post natures of the two motives. vVhile insurance-based 
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transfers arise from differences between forecastable and realized income. no such dist inction 
exists in the context of altruistic transfers. Instead. alt ruist ic transfers arise from differences 
between the realized dist ribu t ion of income and t he equilibrium allocations achievable by 
means of ex post t ransfers. 
l\Iany previous studies have explored altruism as a t ransfer motive.86 Some presume. 
when es timating transfer-income derivatives . that transfers are operative (i.e. nonnegativity 
constraints on t ransfers arc slack).87 The present paper shows that this assumption is not 
likely to hold in a wide variety of circumstances . depending on the income distribution and 
extent of altruism. Hence. previous rejections of alt ruism based on test ing the hypothesis 
that the transfer-income deriva tive equals uni ty are misleading. Cox (1987) acknowledges 
that alt ruist ic transfers may be inoperat ive. and reports some evidence that this is more 
likely to be the case when the income of the potent ial recipient is higher. Cox . et al. (2004) 
also takes the non-negativi ty constraints of altruism seriously. and provides evidence that 
doing so yields an estimated (nonlinear) transfer function consistent with alt ruism. The 
present paper can be viewed as complementary to t hese studies. It contributes by ana lyz-
ing the equilibrium implications of altruism for t ransfer patterns in networks of arbitrary 
size and alternative st ructures. thereby providing a theoretical grounding for t he empirical 
results of Cox (1987) in larger networks with more general structures. However. it also 
demonstrates how the pattern of transfers depends upon the income distribution over a 
given network. providing the underpinnings of more rigorous tests of a ltruism based on 
the shape of the t ransfer function. In particular. the theory developed here argues against 
est imat ing a single transfer funct ion (as in Cox. et al .. 2004) across networks wit h different 
income distributions and potent ially different structures and levels of altruism. 
The model presented here is formally identical to Bergstrom. Bloom. and Varian 's (1986) 
(henceforth BBV) model of private contributions to multiple public goods in which income 
redistributions can change t he set of contributors.88 In t heir widely-cited paper. BBV ana-
86 Lucas and Stark (1985) study a ltruism and reciprocity-based motives for migrants in Botswana to send 
remittances. 
87 See, for example, Altonji . et al. (1997). 
88 Cornes and Itaya (20 10) explore the efficiency impli('at ions of private contribu t ions in settings with more 
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lyze the effects of specific kinds of income redistributions on t he equilibrium level of public 
goods. 89 l\!Iost of t he literature stemming from BBV continues to explore the interaction 
between private and public provision of public goods. While many of BBV's fund ament al 
insights apply to the present application of the model. this paper contributes by analyzing 
the implications of income redist ributions for receivers and overall inequali ty. in addi t ion to 
those for 'contributors ' . A key cont ribu t ion is to demonstrate the uniqueness of net t rans-
fers and the set of equilibrium allocations in networks of arbitrary size (i. e. an arbi t rary 
number of public goods) in which t here exist mul t iple equilibria. as well as across different 
network st ructures. Foster and Rosenz-v eig (2001 ) also explore t he implications of altruism 
for risk-sharing . by incorporating a two-pa rty version of t he BBV model into a model of 
insurance with limited commitment. To my knowledge . the present paper is t he first to 
analyze the model's implications for risk-sharing and patterns of private transfers in large 
networks despite BBV's suggestion of this application more than twenty-five years ago . 
Transfers underpinned by different mot ives have differing implications for development 
and for public policy. For example. taken to the extreme in which everyone is altruistically 
linked and altruism levels are sufficiently high. theories of altruistically-motivated transfers 
lead to well-known "neut rali ty" results (e .g. Barro, 1974) in which public redistributions of 
income are completely undone by private transfers. Furthermore. credit and asset markets 
are likely to perform worse during times of aggregate distress. T hus t he safety net pro-
vided by family. friends . and neighbors - in the absence of a strong policy response - may 
be part icularly important in settings where other forms of risk diversification and coping 
mechanisms are relatively ineffective . 
tha n one public good. 
89 BBV had 459 citat ions listed in the Thomson Reuters Web of Science d ata base as of this writing . 
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3.2 Model 
3.2.1 Preferences 
In an economy with a single good. there is a set of n agents whose preferences are in terde-
pendent . I use the weighted graph N to describe the patterns of interdependence in th is 
network of agents. N = bij] is an n x n matrix where ~fi.J E [0, 1) measures the extent of 
alt ruism that 'i feels toward j. 90 It is assumed that 'Yii = 0. An agent i is linked to another 
agent j in t he network when 'Yij > 0. The preferences of a typical agent i are given as: 
ui = U i ( ci) + L 'Yij 11j(Cj) 
j 
(3 .1 ) 
where ci denotes 'i 's consumpt ion and ui(-) is st rictly increasing and concave on !R+ . \Vhen 
'Yij > 0 for all ( i, j). N is said to be dosed. When N is symmet ric. every agent feels mutually 
altruistic toward one another. A closed. symmetric network is said to be homogeneous when 
N = "(J n. where 'Y is a scalar and Jn is an n x n matrix of ones. 
3.2.2 Game 
Consider a one-shot game 111 which agents exchange t ransfers and t hen consume. First . 
endowments a re realized . Let the sequence y = {Yl , ... , Yn} denote the distribution of 
endowments over agents in N. There is no saving or borrowing. Next. each agent chooses 
(simultaneously wit h all ot her agents) a vector of cost less t ransfers t i = {til , .... tn} to 
make to any other agent in their network. Finally. agents consume their endowment net of 
transfers sent and received. Note also that in (3. 1) as n increases. the absolute weight that 
i places on her own consumption decreases. For this reason. equilibrium t ransfers will not 
go to zero as t he network gets very large . Hence this speci fi cation side-steps the free-rider 
problem common to similar environments considered in the public goods li terature.91 
90 The assumption that /ij < l is ma<ie throughout t he paper to restr ict attention to the non-degenera te 
case when , under some income dist ributions , it is optimal fo r the richest agent in the network to send zero 
transfers. 
91 See, for example, Andreoni ( 1987). 
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3.2.3 Transfer strategies 
The realized distribu t ion of income YN · characterized by the c.d .f. F (-) . is common knowl-
edge within N. A strategy for i is a (possibly multi-valued) function t i( FN) : £i -t IR~ 
defining the set of t ransfers that i sends to all other agents. t i. is feasible if L j tij ~ Yi and 
t iJ 2 0 for all j. T hat is. agents cannot compel others to make t ransfers to them. nor can 
they redirect to others the t ransfers that they receive. The latter assumpt ion is made to 
abst ract from the possibili ty t hat the set of st rategies available to an agent depend upon 
the actions of other agents in their network. 
T he informat ion set of i is fully characterized by p N . so the set of possible actions 
available to any agent i can be written as a fun ction of p N . Denote the set of feasible 
transfer st rategies for i by T i(F). the set of feasible transfer st rategies for all players by in 
N by T. t he set of feasible transfer strategies for all players other than i by T -i · a profi le 
of feasible transfer st rategies for all players in N by t . and a profile of feasible transfer 
strategies for all players in N other than i by L i · 
3.2.4 Equilibrium 
The problem of the typica l agent i involves choosing a vector of feasible transfers t i and her 
own consumption Ci to solve: 
(3. 2) 
s. t. 
Ci = Y·i - L t ij + L tji (3.3) 
j j 
(3.4) 
The equilibrium concept employed is Nash. An equilibrium is a profile t offeasible st rategies 
that dictates the transfers each player makes to every other player in her network. in which 
each player 's transfers collect ively represent her best response to t he t ransfers made by 
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all other players. Note that players' strategies are non-cont ingent. Equilibrium in essence 
involves a. set of mutually correct expectations of the transfers that other players will make. 
Definition 3.1. An eq·uilibrium of the game r= [N. T (F ), {Ui} ] is a profile of pur-e stmte-
gies t in which, joT ever-y i, the following conditions ar-e satisfied: 
1. t~ F) E T i(F) (i.e. t i( F) is f easible) 
Definition 3.2. An equ-ilibrium with transfers is an equilibrium in which ther-e exists at 
least one pair- ( i, j) with t ij > 0. 
3.3 Homogeneous Networks: Equilibrium Allocations and Transfer Patterns 
It is useful to first consider how the incentives of two players to make transfers vary with 
their relative endowments. and what the implicat ions are of interior t ransfers between two 
players. in order to build intuition for more general sett ings. 
3.3.1 Two agents 
Consider a homogeneous network consisting of two agents A and B wit h endowments YA 
and YB· respectively. A faces the problem of choosing a feasible transfer tAB to solve (3.2). 
If t he non-negativity constraint embodied in (3.4) is slack. then A's optimal choice of tAB 
is given by the first-order condition of (3.2) corresponding to tAB· Player A simply chooses 
u ' ( c 4 ) · ( ) u ' ( y 4 ) tAB such t hat ~( · ) = ry. Hence. for any YA· YB such that AAB = +--( · ) < I· t he 11 8 CB u.8 YB 
nonnega.t ivity constraint on t AB is slack (i.e . A has a strict incent ive to send a transfer to 
B ). Similarly. B would like to choose t BA such that ~p((cB)) =I· and hence for any (YA · YB) 
ttA CA 
such t hat AAB > *- · t he nonnegativity constraint on tBA is slack. But for (yA, YB) such that 
1::; AAB ::; *-· both nonnegativi ty constraints bind (A prefers to r-eceive a transfer from B 
while B prefers to receive a. transfer from A) and t ransfers are zero. 
Hence. in equilibrium. strict ly posit ive t ransfers between players occur when t he level 
of ex ante inequali ty is sufficiently large . relative to the extent of altruism . that the richer 
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player has a strict incentive to send a transfer to the poorer player. Since each player 
cares about the other less than about herself (1 < 1). each prefers to receive transfers from 
the other (and hence there are no transfers between them) for any amount of inequali ty. 
including when the other player is slight ly poorer. up until the point where it becomes 
utility-maximizing for the rich player to reallocate marginal income to the poor player. In 
that case. the size of the transfer that the rich player makes is just sufficient to eq11ate 
the marginal utility she derives from her own consumption to the marginal ut ili ty that she 
derives from the consumption of the poor player. 
In the two-player case. transfers and allocations m an equilibrium with transfers are 
readily obtained by solving the first-order condition of (3 .2) corresponding to the richer 
player 's optimal transfer. in combination with both players ' budget constraints. 
Before turning to more general cases, it is worth not ing that as either the amount of 
ex ante inequality or the level of altruism between two players increases . t he likelihood 
that an equilibrium involves transfers from the rich to the poor player increases. or the 
magnitude of any transfer already occurring increases. In the next subsection. I show that 
this relat ionship between inequality and altruism extends to networks of size N > 2. 
3.3.2 Three or more agents 
Consider a homogeneous network consisting of n agents. Let ui(-) = u for all i .92 As 
implied above. positive transfers between any two players in equilibrium implies that t he 
ratio of their marginal u t ilities equals ry. Now consider t he case where n > 2. ·what are t he 
circumstances under which an equilibrium involves positive transfers? 
The following claims give conditions on the initial income distribution under which equi-
librium involves transfers . Henceforth let '!!... = min {:y} and y = max{y} . Consider two 
exhaustive cases: (i) 1t'(y) 2 ryu'(]!_) ; and (ii) u'(y) < ryu'(]!_). 
92 Although as written the proofs of t he resul ts below depend upon t his assumpt ion , I conjecture that a ll 
results derived below would hold under heterogeneity in u(-). This is clearly true when such heterogeneity 
1 - 0 
is form ally equi valent to heterogeneity in / , as wou ld be the case if u;(c;) = a\c~o . 
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Claim 3.1. Given an initial income distribution, tiJ = 0 fo r all i , j is the unique equilibrium 
~f and only if u' (y) 2: ryu' (y_). 
Proof. Assume u' (Y) 2: ryu' (y_). F irst . tij = 0 for all i, j is an equilibrium since . when 
·u' (Y) 2: ryu' (y_) . t he amount of inequali ty is too low. relative to the level of altruism. for 
posit ive t ran sfers to be part of an equilibrium. To see t his. note t hat in t his case vve ha.ve 
u'(y2) > ryu'(yl) for a ll Y1 ::=; Y2· With tij = 0 for all i,_j . we also have u'(c2) > f'U' (cl) 
since Ci = Yi for all i . T hus . for any pair of players (i . j). each player has a st rict incentive 
to increase her own consumption relative to the consumption of t he other player. bnt is 
prevented from doing so by t he zero lower-bound on t ransfers . Hence tij = 0 for a ll i , j is 
an equilibrium. 
Next. tij i= 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium . Suppose tij > 0 for some ('i. j) . T hen 
Ci < Yi and Cj > YJ· T hen u'(cJ) < u'(yj) < ryu' (yi) < ryu'(ci)· Then there exist s some E > 0 
such t hat for t~j = t ij - E. Player i could have consumption ci = ci + E. leaving Player j 
wit h consumpt ion CJ = CJ - E. wit h u' (cj) < u'(cJ) · u'(ci) > n'(ci) · and u'(cJ) = ryu'(ci) · 
Hence t he deviation to t~j leaves Player i strictly better off. Since t he choice of ("i , j) was 
arbitrary. tij i= 0 for any (i,j) cannot be part of an equilibrium. 
Finally. since tij = 0 for all i, j is the unique equilibrium. ci = Yi for a ll i and hence t he 
set of allocations ar ising from t he equilibrium is unique. 
Now assume u' (y) < ryu' (y_) . tij = 0 for all i, j cannot be an equilibriurn since the player 
with income fj would be strict ly bett er off by making some posit ive transfer to t he player 
with income y_. D 
An immediate implication of Claim 3.1 is t hat an equilibrium with transfers can exist 
if and only if u' (Y) < ryu' (y_). The int uition behind these results is similar to t hat of t he 
two-player case. Equilibrium involves t ransfers when t he level of inequali ty between any 
sender and receiver is sufficiently large relative to the level of alt ruism. vVhen inequality 
between the richest and poorest players does not surpass t his threshold. then there a re no 
transfers in equilibrium. 
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Is an equilibrium with t ransfers guaranteed to exist if u'(y) < ru' (]!_) ? If so . what shapes 
can it take. and what does it tell us about t he patterns of transfers and risk-sharing among 
network members? T he following lemma describes the shape taken by an equilibrium with 
transfers. 
Lemma 3.3.1. Every equilibrium with transfers takes the same form: there exis t c·utoff 
incomes CR and cs , with CR ::; cs; players with initial incomes greater than cs send transfers 
to players within ·ini tial incomes less than CR- S enders and receivers get allocations cs and 
CR , and players with initial incomes in the interval [cR, cs] are in autarky. 
The proof of Lemma 3.3. 1 is contained in Section 3.7. T he intui t ion for t he proof is 
the following. Posit ive t ransfers imply that t he rat io of marginal u tilities between any 
sender-receiver pair equals I· \Vhen the incentive to send a transfer to a given receiver is 
satisfied for more than one sender . t he marginal ut ilities of all such senders must be ident ical. 
Similarly. for a given sender. when the incentive to send a transfer is satisfied for more than 
one receiver. t he marginal ut ili t ies of all such receivers must be identical. An implication of 
a homogeneous network is t hat the set of senders to a given receiver is ident ical to t he set of 
senders to any other receiver. and the set of receivers from a given sender is identical to the 
set of receivers from any other sender . The reason is. in equilibrium. t here cannot be two 
receivers of t ransfers from different sets of senders. This would imply that the allocations 
of t he two receivers are different . But wit h homogeneous alt ruism. the allocation of t he 
poorer receiver would viola te t he incentives of t he other set of senders not to send to him. 
Moreover. an agent cannot be both a sender and a receiver. Since all senders have the same 
marginal u tility and all receivers have the sam e marginal ut ility. being both a sender and a 
receiver would imply that the marginal ut ility of t hat player is identical to both his sender 
and his recipieut , rather t han t he fraction / ' < 1 of the marginal ut ili ty of receivers required 
to satisfy senders' incentives to send. Thus, in a closed network with homogeneous altruism. 
the marginal utili t ies of all senders are ident ical. the marginal ut ili t ies of all receivers are 
ident ical. and the set of senders does not overlap with the set of receivers. In equilibrium. 
players are eit her senders or receivers . or are in autarky. vVith sufficient ex ante inequality. 
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the equilibrium involves transfers. There exist two threshold levels of income. CR and cs. 
with CR ::; cs . Players with incomes above cs send transfers to players with incomes below 
CR. and players with incomes between these cutoffs remain in autarky. 
Subsection 3.7.3 of Section 3.7 provides an example of an equilibrium with t ransfers. 
There may. in general. be numerous equilibria such consistent with shape described by 
Lemma 3.3.1. As an illustra tion of this point.. take any equilibrium involving at least two 
senders s 1 and s2 each making t ransfers to at least two of the same receivers 1·1 and r 2 . It 
will generally be possible to reallocate from r1 to r2 some amount E > 0 of transfers being 
made by S J . and to reallocate from r2 to TJ an offsetting amount E > 0 of transfers being 
made by s2 . Note that this per turbation does not change anyone's allocations. It turns out 
that this principle is quite general. The following gives the main resul t of this subsection . 
dealing with the existence of an equi librium with t ransfers and the allocations that arise 
from any such equilibrium. 
Proposition 3.1. Consider a set of agents in a homogen eous network N . Let the ·utility 
function Ui ( u( ci ) , { u( Cj) }) describe agents ' preferences over their own consumption and the 
consumption of all other agents , with u(-) increasing and concave. Let F (y) : [1!_, y] --+ [0 , 1] 
denote the c. d.j. of the distribution of realized endowments Yi E y over all agents. An 
equilibrium of the tmnsfer game r = [N, T i( F) , {Ui}] exists. Moreover, the same set of 
allocations arises from every equilibrium. 
The proof of Proposition 3. 1 is contained in Section 3.7. The intui t ion for why the same 
set of allocations arises from every equilibrium with t ransfers relies heavily on Lemma 3.3.1. 
Because every equilibrium with transfers takes this particular form. it is possible to derive 
necessary and sufficient conditions on the set of allocations for senders and receivers. cs 
and CR. for an equilibrium with transfers: (i) a network resource constraint. and (ii) an 
incentive-compatibility constraint. These conditions. stated in the next section. implicitly 
define continuous. strictly monotonically decreasing and increasing functions. respectively. 
in (cR, cs )-space. The resource constraint is defined implicitly by the locus of points (cR, cs) 
that equate aggregate t ransfers received tR( cR) with aggregate transfers sent t s(cs ). Figure 
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3.1 depicts these aggregate t ransfer functions. The incentive compatibility constraint is 
implicitly defined by the locus of points ( CR , cs) t hat make senders just indifferent between 
their own marginal consumpt ion and that of any receiver. The resource constraint and 
incentive-compat ibili ty constraint are both st rictly monotone. so their point of intersection 
is unique (assuming it exists). Similar arguments place rest rictions on the domains of t hese 
functions. To prove existence . I show that the values of the two functions must overlap 
somewhere in their domains. Given this. continui ty requires the fun ctions to intersect . 
An illustration is depicted in Figure 3.2. In combinat ion with Claim 3.1. this implies an 
equilibrium exists for any ini t ial income distribution . An implication of t hese resul ts is that 
a model of ex post. altruist ically-motivated transfers leads to effective risk-sharing among 
senders and receivers. Since every equilibrium takes t he form described in Lemma 3.3.1. each 
sender t ransfers exactly t he amount of her initial income needed to equate her consumpt ion 
to the level common to all senders. Total t ransfers sent by each sender increase with ini t ial 
income. and total transfers received by each receiver deCl·ease with initi al income. One 
way to view this is t hat senders and receivers pool t heir income. and then each get a fixed 
share of t he pool. For a wide class of utili ty functions. one can show that. conditional upon 
membership of the pool. senders' and receivers' marginal propensities to consume f..J PC5 
and Af PC,. are st rict ly less than unity.93 That ]\If PC5 and M P C,. are generally much 
smaller t han 1 illust rates the insurance-like implications of ex post. altruistically-mot ivated 
transfers. This kind of pseudo-insurance only kicks in. however. for senders and receivers of 
transfers - i. e. players who are either sufficiently rich to send transfers or sufficient ly poor 
to receive transfers. At intermediate income levels , players consume their own endowments 
and have a marginal propensity to consume of unity. This central feature of the model 
cont rasts starkly with ex ante risk-sharing models derived from the condi t ions for Pareto 
effi ciency. as for example in the full-insurance model wri tten down in Townsend (1994) and 
the limited commitment models based on Coate and Rava.llion (1993) and Ligon . Thomas. 
93 A sufficient cond it ion for t his property is t hat senders and receivers have a common utility fun ction 
u(c) such that u'- 1 [/u'(c)] = f(k , c) , where k is constant with respect to c and/(-.·) is additi vely or 
multiplicatively separable in its a rguments. The commonly-used CRRA and CARA utility fun ctions sa tisfy 
this cond ition . 
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium in a homogeneous network 
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and Worrall (2001) in which risk-sharing is operative at intermediate levels of income and . 
if anything. falls apart at the extremes. 
3.4 Homogeneous Networks: Comparative statics 
3.4 .1 General properties 
T he following condit ions on the set of allocations for senders and receivers. cs and CR . are 
necessary and sufficient in order for t he strategy profile that gave rise to them to constitute 
an equilibrium wit h transfersY4 
u'( cs) = ru' (cR) 
NRcR - L YL = L YL- Nscs 
Ut<CR Ut>cs 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
Letting the functions y~c( cnJ and y~c ( cs) denote the per capita incomes of receivers and 
senders. given thei r respective consumpt ions, (:3.6) can be expressed as : 
(3.7) 
Conditions (3.5) and (3 .7) can be used to derive implications for to tal transfers and al-
locations in equilibrium of differences across networks in t he level of altruism and/or the 
distribution of income. Note first that the locus of points that solve the resource constraint 
(3. 7) is unaffected by the altruism parameter : equilibrium allocations and total t ransfers 
are affected by the altruism parameter entirely through (3.5). By Claim 3.1. at least some 
transfers will obtain in equilibrium whenever the level of altruism is greater t han 1 = ~:~;~. 
As the level of altruism increases beyond 1- the c~c- curve in Figure 3.2 shifts sout heast: 
condi t ion (3.5) dictates that CR and cs get closer together. leaving less overall inequali ty 
and fewer players at intermediate levels of income in autarky. In the limi t as 1 ---t 1. the 
equilibrium converges to a 'full-insurance' equilibrium in which CR = cs and all players are 
94 T his is demonstrated in Lemma. 3.7.1 in Section 3.7. 
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either senders or receivers.95 
What are the implications of differences across networks in the dist ribu tion of income? 
Note t hat the locus of points t hat solve the incentive constraint (3 .5) is invariant to t he 
income distribut ion: equilibrium allocations and total transfers are affected by income re-
distributions ent irely through (3. 7) . 
Consider t he effect of having an income distribu t ion with higher variance. Begin with a 
distribu t ion y1 t hat is symmetric abou t its mean. Take a second dist ribu t ion that is a sym-
metric. mean-preserving spread of the first income distribu t ion. The second distribut ion. 
y2 . has a larger vari ance. However. the equilibrium a llocations of senders and receivers 
are the same. To see this . let ck and c1 be the equilibrium allocations of receivers and 
senders arising from the first distribut ion . At these same allocations but under the second 
distribut ion. yj{(c }'i, y2 ) and y~c (c1 . y2 ) differ from their values under the first distribution 
by equal and opposite amounts. Similarly. N R(ck) and Ns(c}) are both larger - by equal 
amounts - than their values under the first distribu t ion. T hus the equali ty in (3. 7) holds 
under the second distribution for the same values of CR and cs. In equilibrium. there are 
more senders. more receivers. and the total level of t ransfers is higher. 
Now consider t he implications of a higher concent rat ion of income at the top of t he 
distribut ion. Begin with a dist ribution y1 giving rise to equilibrium allocations ck and 
c1 . Take a second dist ribution y2 such that y~c (cs, :Y 2 ) > y~c (cs, :Y 1 ) and/ or Ns(cs , y 2 ) > 
Ns(cs, y1 ) . Under the second distribution, t he concent ration of income at the top is greater 
- the richest players are richer . and/ or there are more "rich" players a t every threshold a bove 
c1. A larger amount of t ransfers arise for every given level of cs . In Figure 3. 1. t he ts -curve 
shifts northeast . as does the c~c -curve in Figure 3.2. Thus. we must have c~ > c1 and 
hence (by condition (3.5) ) c~ > ck: in order to achieve equality in (3 .7) . it must be the 
case that c~ > c1. resulting in higher transfers received and lower transfers sent by t he 
amount needed to achieve equilibrium. Total transfers a rising from any equilibrium under 
95 The resemblance of t ransfers underpinned by ex post altruism to insurance can be seen by d ividing 
(3.5) by u'(cR), resulting in the Arrow-Borch condi t ion t ha t 1vou ld obtain from t he formulati on of an ex 
an te cont ract between two part ies calling for them to exchange tra nsfers in ord er to ma inta in t heir marginal 
ut ili t ies of consumpt ion at t he rat io 'Y· 
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the second distribution are larger than under the first. 
Now consider the implications of a lower concent ration of income at the bottom of 
the distribution. Begin with a distribution y1 giving rise to equilibrium allocations ck 
and c1 . Take a new income distribution y2 such that y~c(cR , y2 ) > y~c(cR , y 1 ) and/or 
N R( CR, y2 ) < NR( CR , y1 ). Under this new distribution. there is less concentration of income 
at the bottom - the poorest players a re have higher income. and /or there are fewer "poor" 
players at every t hreshold belovv ck. A smaller amount of transfers received arise for every 
given level of CR. In Figure 3.1. t he twcurve shifts southeast . and the c~c-curve in Figure 
3.2 again shifts northeast. In order to balance the resource constraint . it must be the 
case that c~ > c1 and hence c~ > ck. resulting in higher transfers received and lower 
t ransfers sent by t he amount needed to achieve equilibrium. Total transfers arising from 
any equilibrium under t he second income distribution are smaller than under the fir st. 
Finally. consider the implications of having a distribution with lower incomes at all levels. 
but where incomes at the top of the distribution are disproportionately lower. Begin with a 
distribution y0 that gives rise to equilibrium allocations ck and c1 . Lower incomes overall 
imply both a lower concentration of income at the top of the distribution and a higher 
concentrat ion at the bottom. Suppose this new distribut ion has smaller values of both y~c 
and y~c. relat ive to the old distribution. In Figure 3.1. the ts and tR curves shift northeast 
and northwest . respectively. Transfers sent are lower for every given level of cs. given 
y~c(c~., y1 ). and transfers received are larger for every given level of CR . given yj{(c~ , y1 ). 
Both forces lead to lower equilibrium values of CR and cs (i.e. the c~c-curve in Figure 3.2 
shifts southwest). but the net effect on total transfers is ambiguous. If t he effect arising 
from a lower concentration of income at the top dominates. total equilibrium transfers are 
lower under the second distribution than t he first. But if the effect arising from a higher 
concentration of income at the bottom dominates. total transfers are higher . 
Clearly. a second distribution that is a non-monotonic transformation of the first distri-
bution could give rise to total transfers and equilibrium allocations that are either higher 
or lower t han those arising from the first distribution. 
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3.4.2 Parameterization 
Additional insight into the model can be gleaned by specifying a common utili ty fun ction 
and parameterizing an income distribu t ion. Let u(c) = eli~; and substitute (~3.5) into (3.6) : 
(3 .8) 
It is now easy to see that the effect of raising 1 is to raise t ransfers received. given cs . and 
hence to lower the level of cs that is required to balance the resource constraint given that 
the incentive condi tion is sa tisfied . That is. c~('"Y) < 0. However. CR must be larger with t he 
higher level of 1 since if it were the same (smaller). then the left-hand side of expression (3.8) 
would be the same (smaller) while t he right-hand side is st rictly larger. That is. c~(i) > 0. 
In Figure 3.2, the ci.C -curve shifts southeast as 1 increases. Since the equilibrium values of 
CR and cs are closer together. but the positions of the fR- and ts -curves in Figure 3.1 are 
unchanged. total transfers rise vvith 1, i.e . t *' ('"Y) > 0. 
\Vit h this utili ty function. "top-to-bottom" inequali ty measured by t he rat io cs. is con-
c R 
stant. given 1 and 8. 96 In particular. t he parameters of the income distribut ion have no 
effect on the ratio of senders' to receivers ' allocations. Of course. t he absolute level of 
t he allocations and the numbers of senders and receivers consistent with those allocations 
varies with the income distribu tion as previously described. Finally. it can be seen that risk 
aversion and alt ruism are complementary. The larger the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
8 (i.e. t he more risk-averse). ceteris paribus. the relatively smaller (larger) the equilibrium 
value of cs ( cR). 
Now assume fur ther that the realized distribution of income y follows the Pareto (a·, Ym in) 
distribut ion. The Pareto distribution. a cousin of the exponenti al. is skewed strongly to 
t he right and often used in empirical applications designed to capture the concent ration 
of wealth and income among a relatively small share of the populat ion at the top of the 
96 T h is can be seen by noting t ha t wit h t his ut ili ty function , t he incentive constra inl (3 .5) can be wri tten 
as cs == ! h 
C Jl I 
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dist ribu tion . The parameter a > 2 decreases both the mean and variance of the distribu t ion. 
while the parameter Ymin > 0 increases both moments. T he median is decreasing in a and 
increasing in Ymin. 
For a large number of players97 . the share with income lower than y 1s g1ven by the 
following function: 
and the aggregate income of agents with income between Ymin and Yma :r 1s gnren by the 
following function: 
Evaluating these expressions as appropriate and substituting for Nf?.. Ns. y~c· and y~c m 
(3. 7) yields: 
F( cR)[cR- L(Ym in: cR) ] = (N- F(cs))[L( cs, Ymax)- cs] 
which. after incorporating the incent ive constraint (3.5) and some manipulation . can be 
written as : 
1 
( 
_£.=....!_ ) - (o -1) (a - 1)1'8 _ , -(o- 1) _ -(o-1) 
"( 0 - 1 Cs - 0 cs - 0 [Ymin Yma x J Ymin 
(3. 10) 
It is straightforward to show that the left-hand side of (3. 10) is monotonically-decreasing in 
cs for parameter values appropriate for the Pareto dist ribu t ion. and hence the equilibrium 
values of cs and CR are uniquely determined. 
Equation (3 .10) can be used to extract additional insight into the comparative statics 
of the model. For example. Figure 3.3 depicts the effect of a mean-preserving spread to 
97 Strictly speaking, the deri vations t hat follow assume a cont inuous distribution of players and a re for 
illustrat ive purposes only. 
82 
a Pareto income distribution on the equilibrium allocation of senders. In this case. an 
increase in the cross-sectional variance of income leads to a lower equilibrium allocation for 
senders (and hence receivers). Note that this is cont rary to the effects of a mean-preserving 
spread of a symmetric income dist ribu t ion described in the previous subsection. in which 
total t ransfers increased but equilibrium allocations remained unchanged . T he reason is 
that the Pareto dist ribu t ion is highly skewed. so while (by design of this exercise) the mean 
remains constant. other moments of the distribution change with the variance. Starting 
from a relat ively low var iance . the concentration of income at the bottom and t he top 
of the distribu t ion tends to increase as the variance increases . The intuition out lined in 
the previous subsection suggests that both forces tend to raise the amount of t ransfers 
exchanged in equilibrium . but have opposing effects on the equilibrium allocations . One 
can anticipate which of the two forces prevails by recalling that the Pareto distribut ion is 
highly skewed to the right. vVith this parametrizat ion . it turns out that the effect of an 
increased concent ration of income at the bottom of the distribu t ion dominates. causing the 
c~C'- curve of Figure 3.2 to shift southwest and hence the equilibrium allocations of both 
senders and receivers to decrease . 
3.5 Heterogeneous Networks: The Case of Two Groups 
In this section. I extend the analysis above by assuming t hat t here are now two levels 
of altruism and two groups of players in t he network. Agents attach the same alt ruism 
parameter to members of their own group , but members of one group feel less a ltruistic 
toward members of the other group . This extension enables me to explore altruist ic transfer 
patterns in a more general setting. and gain particular insight into the interaction between 
within- and across-group t ransfers. Otherwise the model is the same. I continue to assume 
'Ui (-) = u(-) for all i. 
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Note: Equilibrium allocations of senders, cj, based on CRRA ut ility (0 = 0.5) , arising from Pare to income distributions with constant rrean of 
6.0 and different va riances. Alt ruism parameter y = 0.5. 
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Figure 3.3: Simulated effect of a mean-preserving spread on senders' allocation 
3.5.1 General properties 
Consider a network of agents where N is closed and symmetric but not homogeneous. In 
part icular. let 1 H and 1 L· where 0 :S '"Y L :S ~!H < 1. characterize the levels of alt ruism within 
and across two groups. respectively. Denote the sets of agents in each group by A and !3. 
respectively. Let '"Yij = '"YH for all (i,j) in the same group. and '"Yij = '"YL for all (i , j) in 
different groups. 
vVhat insights can this extension provide? The same intuition governing the relat ionship 
between t ransfer patterns . a lt ruism. and inequality in homogeneous networks applies to the 
two-group case. The main result of this section is that an equilibrium exists for any income 
distribution. and every equilibrium for a given income distribution gives rise to the same set 
of allocations. By deriving this resul t , one gains insight into equilibrium t ransfer patterns 
and a llocations associated with different income distributions. 
The following definitions will be useful : 
Definition 3.3. An equilibrium without cross-group transfers is an equilibTium in which 
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tij = 0 and tj i = 0 for all (i , j) with ·i E A and j E B . 
Definition 3.4. An equilibrium with cmss-group transfers is an equilibrium in which there 
exists at least one pair ( i, j) with i E A and j E B , for which t ij > 0 or tj i > 0. 
I now explore the circumstances that give rise to each type of equilibrium. It will be useful 
to consider a variant of a given two-group game in which the cross-group altruism parameter 
'YL is replaced by zero. In this hypothetical game, there is no connection between the two 
groups . and hence it may be viewed as two one-group games . Application of Proposition 
1 tells us that at least one equilibrium of th is hypothetical game exists. and that every 
equilibrium gives rise to the same set of allocations. 
D efinition 3.5. Take any two-group game r . A hypothetical single-group equilibrium is an 
equilibrium of the game f' consisting of the game r , in which the parameter 1 L is replaced 
with zero . 
Note that necessary and sufficient conditions on allocations arising from any strategy 
profile in order for that st rategy profile to constitute a. hypothetical single-group equilibrium 
are just the union of those condi t ions for equilibrium of the two groups separately. 98 The 
following result provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the allocations arising from 
any given st rategy profile in order for that strategy profi le to constitute an equilibrium 
without cross-group transfers: 
Claim 3.2. A candidate equilibr"ium without cross-group transfers t constittdes an equi-
librium without cross-group transfers if and only if the allocations c to which 'it gives rise 
satisfy the following conditions: 
1. Ci = Yi for all i E G ifu'CTF) 2 "(Hti'(]j_c), or u'(c~') = ~fHu'(c~) and t~(c~) = t~(c~) 
if u'('t;F) < "(Hu'(]j_c), for G = A , B (where t~'(-) and t~(-) are aggregate transfers 
sent and received with·in G as defined previously). 
98 Lemma 3.7.1 gives these conditions for an equi librium wit h transfers. The relevant condi tion for an 
equilibrium without tra nsfers is u' (y) :0:: / H u' (!j_). 
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2. u' (max{ cf }) ~ /'Lll'( min{ cic}) f or G = A , B , and ( cf, cic) E c , with u'( max{ cD) = 
/'Lu' (min{ cic}) only ifti.i = 0 f or all i E G, j E -G, tij E t . 
Pmof. Suppose t constitutes an equilibrium w·it hout cross-group t ransfers. T hen the first 
condi t ion must be satisfied since . if not . t would either not be feasible or there would be at 
least one player who could profi tably deviate from t in exactly t he same manner out lined 
in the proof to Lemma 3. 7.1. T his would cont radict t he assumption t hat t constit utes 
an equili brium . T he second condi t ion is satisfied by defi ni t ion of an equilibrium without 
cross-group t ransfers. 
Now take any candidate equilibrium t that satisfies the condi t ions above. and apply 
an argument analogous to that given in the proof of Lemma 3. 7.1: Given the t ransfers (if 
any) made by other players (and hence t he allocations t hat arise from t his equilibrium ). 
no player could have done better by changing her t ransfers: for any player. simply reallo-
cating transfers already being made does not change consumpt ion and may contradict the 
assumed satisfact ion of the first condit ion above; increasing or decreasing transfers reduces 
or increases consumpt ion. respectively. cont radict ing t he satisfaction of the fir st condit ion 
above. Moreover. the t ransfers made by all players in this equilibrium must have been feas i-
ble since. by t he form that any equilibrium involving t ransfers within the same group must 
take. all players make non-negative t ransfers (since only players wit h income greater t han 
cs make st rict ly posit ive transfers) and no player transfers more t han her income (since . by 
Claim 3.6 . all senders have strictly posit ive consumption). Hence. the first condi t ion above 
is sufficient for t to constitute an equilibrium. The satisfaction of the second condit ion 
means the equilibrium is an equilibrium without cross-group t ransfers. D 
Note t hat t he first condi t ion stipulated in Claim 3.2 is ident ical to the necessary and suf-
ficient condi t ions on allocations arising from any hypothetical single-group equilibrium. 
Hence Claim 3.2 implies a method for fi nding an equilibrium wit hout t ransfers. if one ex-
ists: (1) take any hypothetical single-group equilibrium t of t he two-group game at hand. 
and let c denote t he set of allocations arising from it: (2) now consider whether t constitutes 
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an equilibrium. If so. then t is an equilibrium without transfers. 
When will such an equilibrium exist? Inspection of t he condit ions in Claim 3.2 suggests 
that an equilibrium without t ransfers exists when either the amount of inequality between 
groups. or the cross-group altruism parameter I 'L· are rela t ively small. Furthermore. we 
know from the analysis of homogeneous networks that within-group inequality in a hy-
pothetical single-group equilibrium decreases with the level of within-group altruism 'YH· 
ceteris paribus. This points to an interaction between within- and across-group alt ruism in 
determining equilibrium transfer patterns in the two-group case . 
Claim 3.2 also implies that any equilibrium without cross-group transfers t can be con-
structed by combining any two single-group equilibria. tA and t 8 . one for each group. with 
the st rategies tij = tji = 0 for all i E A and j E B. Since Proposition 1 applies to tA and 
t 8 . it follows that the allocations arising from any equilibrium without cross-group transfers 
are umque. 
It turns out that the existence of an equilibrium without cross-group transfers rules out 
the existence of an equilibrium with cross-group transfers. Thus. if t he method outlined 
above produces an equilibrium. then every equilibrium of the two-group game is an equilib-
rium without transfers. In order to see this, it is first necessary to develop some intuition 
for an equilibrium with cross-group transfers: 
Lemma 3.5.1. Every equilibrium with cross-group transfers takes the same form: 
1. Cross-group transfers flow only in one direction. (Without loss of generality, let A 
and B denote the groups sending and receiving cross-group transfers , respectively.) 
2. There exist cutoff incomes ct and c~ , with c~ :S ct; players in A with in-itial incomes 
greater than ct send transfers to players in B with initial incomes less than c~. 
3. Senders in A and receivers in B get allocations ct and c~ , respectively. 
4- If there are within-A transfers, then there exists a cutoff income c~ with c~ :S c~ ; 
players in A with initial incomes greater than ct send transfers to players in A with 
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in'itial incomes less than c~ . All receivers in A get consumption c~ , and players in A 
with initial incomes in the interval [c~ , c~ J are in autarky. If there are not within-A 
transfers, then all players in A w'ith incomes at or below c~ are in autarky. 
5. If there are w'ithin-B transfers , then there e.ris ts a cutoff income c~ with c~ ::; c~; 
players in B with initial incomes greater than c~ send transfers to players in B with 
initial incomes less than c~. All senders in B get the same consam.ption c~ , and 
players in B with initial ·incomes in the interval [c~, c~J are in a·utarky. If there 
are not within-B transf ers, then all players in B with incomes at or above c~ are in 
autarky. 
T he proof of Lemma 3.5.1 is contained in Section 3.8 . T he intu ition is t he following. 
First. within t he same group. t he allocations of senders to any given receiver are all identical 
to one another. and to those of any other sender to any other receiver . This fo llows from 
the same logic as in the homogeneous case. Hence. if t here are any senders of within-group 
transfers. t hen all senders get the same allocation . Similarly. if t here are any receivers of 
wit hin-group transfers . t hen all receivers get t he same allocation . Hence. t he eqnilibrium 
allocations within each group take the same form as in the homogeneous case . Now turn 
to the implications of cross-group transfers. By the same logic. all senders of cross-group 
transfers get the same allocation . and all receivers of cross-group transfers get the same 
allocation. It also turns out t hat if. wi t hin a group . t he allocation of senders of within-
group t ransfers must equal that of cross-group senders. Consider otherwise. Cross-group 
senders cannot get larger allocations than within-group senders because then cross-group 
senders would have an incentive to start sending within-group transfers. Nor can cross-
group senders get smaller allocations than within-group senders. because t hen within-group 
senders would have an incentive to start sending cross-group transfers. T he same logic 
applies to receivers of within- and cross-group t ransfers within the same group. and hence 
all receivers within a group get t he same allocation in equilibrium regardless of the source of 
the transfers t hey receive. To see why cross-group transfers can only flow in one direction . 
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suppose transfers flovv from Group A to !3 in equilibrium. On the one hand. this implies 
proport ionality between the marginal utilities of senders in A and receivers in !3 . On 
the other hand . t ransfers within !3 imply proport ionality between the marginal uti lities of 
senders and receivers in !3. Since /L < / I-1· the constant of proportionali ty within !3 is larger 
than t he one across A and !3. implying senders in A get a larger allocation than senders in 
!3 . Cross-group t ransfers in the other direct ion yield t he opposite implicat ion . and hence 
there cannot simultaneously be cross-group transfers in both directions. 
Lemma 3.5. 1 can be used to show t he implications of the existence of an equilibrium 
without cross-group t ransfers for t he existence of an equilibrium with cross-group t ransfers: 
Lemma 3.5.2. An equilibrium without cross-gmup transfers exis ts if and only if an equi-
librium w'ith cms.s-group transfers does not exist. 
The proof of Lemma 3.5.2 is contained in Section 3.8. Before describing the intui t ion. 
note the immediate implication t hat . given an ini tial income distribution . if there exists an 
equilibrium without cross-group transfers. then every equilibrium is an equi librium wit hout 
cross-group t ransfers. vVhen the conditions for an equi li brium without cross-group t ransfers 
given in Claim 3.2 fail. t here exists no equilibrium without cross-group t ransfers. and every 
equilibrium involves cross-group t ransfers.99 Such an equilibrium will exist when t here is 
sufficient ex ante inequality between the two groups. 
T he intuition for Lemma 3.5.2 is the following. Incentive compatibility requires that 
senders of cross-group transfers get smaller allocations than in any equilibrium without 
cross-group transfers. Since cross-group t ransfers are not incentive-compatible in an equi-
librium without cross-group t ransfers. receivers of cross-group transfers must also get smaller 
allocations than in any equilibrium without cross-group transfers. The implication is that 
aggregate t ransfers sent by the group sending cross-group transfers are higher thau in any 
equilibrium without cross-group t ransfers. and aggregate transfers received by t he group 
receiving cross-group t ransfers are lower than in any equilibrium without cross-group t rans-
99 T his follows from the fact that by Proposition 1, t he set of a llocat ions that satisfy t he conditions of 
Cla im 3.2 is unique, and from the cont ra posit ive of Lemma 3.5.2. which sta tes that if an equi li brium wit h 
cross-group t ransfers does not ex ist , then an equ ili brium wi t hout cross-group t rans fers ex ists. 
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fers. This is impossible if within-group transfers in the group receiving cross-group t ransfers 
are incentive-compatible. 
The result that an equilibrium without cross-group transfers exists if an equilibrium 'vvith 
cross-group transfers does not exist is proven by contrapositive : if an equilibrium without 
cross-group transfers does no t exist , it can be shown that an equilibrium with cross-group 
transfers must exist. The reason is very similar to that in the proof of existence in the 
homogenous altruism case. Intuitively, in order for the aggregate resource constraint to 
balance. an equilibrium with cross-group transfers requires more aggregate transfers sent 
than in a corresponding hypothetical single-group equilibrium. but less aggregate t ransfers 
sent than the maximum that can be incent ive-compatibly sustained. The aggregate resource 
and incentive compat ibility constraints on allocations arising from any strategy profile that 
are necessary and sufficient for that strategy profile to constitute an equilibrium with cross-
group transfers collapse into a single equation in one variable. It can be shown that both 
sides of the equation are continuous functions whose derivatives have opposite signs and 
whose ranges overlap over the relevant domain. Hence. a solution exists. 
Lemma 3.5.2 guarantees the existence of equilibrium of the two-group game for any 
ini t ial income distribution. Moreover. since every equilibrium with cross-group transfers 
takes the form described in Lemma 3.5.1. they all give rise to the same set of allocations. 
Proposition 2 gives the main result of this section . The proof. which relies on the preceding 
results. is contained in Section 3.8. 
Proposition 3.2. Consider a set of agents ·in a closed, symmetric network N , where I ff 
and 1 L are the levels of altruism within and across two groups, respectively, with 0 :S: 1 L :S: 
~fff < 1. Let liJ = Iff for all (i,j) in the same group, and liJ = IL fo r all (i,j) in 
different groups. Let the utility fun ction Ui ( u( ci) , { u( Cj) }) describe agents ' preferences over 
their own consumption and the consumption of other agents in the network as defined by 
(3.1) , with u(-) increasing and concave. Let F(y) : [}[_, y] ---7 [0, 1] denote the c. d.j. of the 
distribution of realized endowments Yi E y over all agents. An equilibrium of the transfer 
gc.n ,e r = [N(r), T(F) , {Ui}] exists. Moreover, the same set of allocations arises from every 
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equilibrium. 
T he implication of Proposition 2 is that the two-group case features t he same effective 
risk-sharing propert ies as homogeneous networks. If income inequality between groups is 
sufficient ly large. effective risk sharing occurs between groups as well as wit bin t hem. All 
parties sending and receiving t ransfers. regardless of group membership. effect ively pool 
their incomes. and group membership and sender / receiver status simply determine the 
sharing rule for pooled income conditional upon participat ion in the pool. 
3.5.2 Comparative statics 
By Lemma 3.5. 1. cross-group t ransfers flow only in one direct ion. ·wi thout loss of generali ty. 
let A denote the group of agents sending cross-group transfers. An equilibrium wit h cross-
group transfers from A to B can involve one of four within-group t ransfer patterns: (1) 
no within-group transfers ({AB}) ; (2) within-A t ransfers only ({AA.AB}) : (3) wit hin-
B t ransfers only ({AB , BB} ); (4) wit hin-A and within-B t ransfers ({AA , AB, BB}). An 
immediate implication of the uniqueness of equilibrium allocations is that every equilibrium 
vvit h cross-group transfers involves the same transfer pattern. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates a two-group version of the aggregate resource constraint in an 
equilibrium involving transfer pattern {AA , AB}. The t~A(c~) line represents transfers 
sent to receivers within A . and t~ ( c~) represents overall t ransfers sent. The difference 
between t he two. t~ 8 ( c~) . represents t ransfers sent from A to B for a given c~. The 
' ' 
equilibrium values c~ and c~ depicted in Figure 3.4 satisfy the incentive-compatibili ty 
condition u'(c~ ) = /'H 'u'(c~). In a variant (not shown ) of Figure 3.2 meant to depict t he 
equilibrium within A. the c~c ( CR )-curve would be shifted to the southwest. consistent with 
a lower values of c~ fo r every given c~. 
T he responses of transfers and allocations to changes in alt ruism or the distribution of 
income in the two-group case mirror those in the single group case. Within a group , equi-
librium is more likely to involve transfers as the level of within-group inequali ty or alt ruism 
increases. T he same intuition governs cross-group transfers as the level of cross-group in-
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
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Figure 3.4: Aggregate t ransfer functions with cross- and wi t hin-group t ransfers 
equali ty or altruism increases . Additionally. changes in inequality or alt ruism across groups 
relative to within groups can produce changes in the equi librium pattern of t ransfers. For 
example. t ake any equil ibrium involving the t ransfer pattern { AA, A B} . As inequali ty 
across groups increases (and group A gets relatively richer). the aggregate resource con-
stra int in Figure 3. 2 shifts to t he sout hwest. If cross-group inequali ty becomes suffic ient ly 
large. the equilibrium value of c~ may be below Yk = u'- 1['-yHu' (k'_A)] . In this case . there is 
no incent ive-compatible value of c~ > 'l!..A; within-A t ransfers a re supplanted by cross-group 
t ransfers. 100 
3 .5.3 Further generalizations 
T he results of this section help shed light on the behavior of the model in more general 
sett ings. First. in some settings it may be more appropriate to think of alt ruism as asym-
metric (i.e. "!ij #- "!ji) . For example. parents may feel more altruistic toward their children 
than vice-versa. Consider a nuclear family consisting of a parent and two children. Suppose 
I .· \ 
100 A sufficient condi t ion for within-A to be part of t he equi librium is "/\ > JJ..... 
u y_ ')If 
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the children feel the same level of altruism toward one another as toward their parent . and 
the parent feels a different (higher) level of alt ruism toward both children. The intuition 
and results of the single-group case apply direct ly if the pa rent is richer than both children. 
or if both children are richer t han their parent . But if one child is richer than both of her 
other two family members. the two-group case becomes informative. The rich child can be 
thought of as constituting one group. while the parent and relatively poor child constitute 
another. The parent may make (within-group) transfers to t he poor child given sufficient 
inequality between them . and the rich child in may make (cross-group) transfers to the poor 
child or even both parent and poor child. Since the level of altruism between the children 
is lower than between t he parent and the child. more (cross-group) inequality between rich 
and poor child is necessary to generate sibling-to-sibling t ransfers than is (within-group) 
inequality between parent and poor child. 
Next. while a more extensive treatment is saved for future work. it seems reasonable 
to conj ecture that the intuit ion behind interactions of cross- and within-group transfers 
developed in this section extends to more general network st ructures. such as networks 
involving three or more groups. A generalization of BBV's Theorem 2 could demonstrate 
t he existence of an equilibrium for any income dist ribution . Such an extension would provide 
a basis for analyzing t ransfer patterns and the extent of risk sharing in more general network 
structures and empirical sett ings. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper analyzed a model of private t ransfers underpinned by ex post altruism. The 
results demonstrate that such transfers can provide effect ive risk-sharing in networks of 
arbitrary size. However. t he shape of the transfer function depends upon the entire income 
dist ribution. Comparative statics analysis shows that redist ributions of initial endowments 
can produce changes in t ransfer patterns and inequality. This intuition extends to the 
case where the network consists of two interdependent groups. such as two nuclear families 
that are part of the same extended family, and it was shown how within- and cross-group 
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t ransfers can supplant one another as t he levels of altruism and inequality vary. 
These resul ts provide predictions capable of dist inguishing t ransfers motivated by e1: post 
alt ruism from other motives. such as insurance with limi ted commitment. This should pro-
vide a basis for more precise empirical assessments of transfer motives than have previously 
been conducted. T his is not to suggest that limited commitment. moral hazard. or hidden 
income are irrelevant to priva te t ransfers . T he results presented here simply demonstrate 
that alt ruistic t ransfers in large networks can facili tate effective risk-sharing. and that such 
risk-sharing is incomplete even in the absence of commitment constraints. hidden actions. 
and incomplete informat ion . 
A fruitful path for future research is to study transfer patterns and risk-sharing in more 
general network structures. The work of Bramoulle. et a l. (2011) snggests there are hopeful 
prospects for concrete steps in this direction. These authors study the class of games with 
linear best-response functions in which each individual in a network chooses a single act ion. 
They are able to provide clean and sharp predictions for the existence. form. and stability 
of equilibria based on the lowest eigenvalue of the network. for networks of quite general 
form and size. 101 If an extension of t heir results to games in which individuals take multiple 
act ions proves tractable. it could provide a basis for characterizing the extent of effective 
risk-sharing. transfer patterns. and stabili ty across a rich variety of networks. 
101 Proposit ion 2 of Bramoulle. et al. (2011) a ppli es directly to the bilatera l case where N = 6( J 2- h) , 
where 5 E [0, 1], J " is an nxn-matri x of ones , and I is t he n -dimensional identity matrix. In t his case , the 
lowest eigenvalue of N is -5 , and the proposit ion demonstrates t hat there is a unique equilibrium for a ll 
5 < l. 
3. 7 Proofs: Homogeneous networks 
3.7.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1 
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Uniqueness of equilibr-ium allocations The following results will be used to in Lemma 3.7.3 
below to show that the same set of allocations arises from every equilibrium wit h t ransfers: 
Claim 3.3. In any equ'ilibr-ium with tr-ansfer-s, al l sender-s have the same consumpt·ion. 
Pr-oof. Take any two players i and j for whom tij > 0. and take any other player k =f. i. j 
for whom t kt > 0 for some l. Note that if l = j. then u'(q) = ru'(cj) since tij and tkt are 
part of an equilibrium. T hen u' (q.) = u' (ci) and hence q = ci · Now assume l # j. Assume 
furt her that ci < Ck· On the one hand. tij > 0 implies u' (c;) = ~tu' (cj)· On t he other hand . 
Ci < q implies u' (ci) > u'(ck). Hence we have u' (q.) < r u'(cj) . and k could do better by 
making some transfers to j. Hence Ci < ck cannot be part of an equilibrium in which t ij > 0 
for some j. Similarly. Ci > q cannot be par t of an equilibrium in which tkt > 0. Hence we 
must have Ci = ck · Since t he choices of senders i and k and receiver l were arbit rary. all 
senders must have t he same consumpt ion. D 
Claim 3.4. In any eq·uil-ibr-ium with tr-ansf er-s, all r-eceiver-s have the same consumption. 
Pr-oof. Let cs denote the consumption common to all senders . Now take any two receivers 
j and l . Since both are receivers from senders who have t he same consumpt ion. we have 
both u ' (cs) = ru' (cj) anclu'(cs) = r u '(q). Hence Cj = Ct . Since the choices of receivers j 
and l were arbitrary. a ll receivers must have the same consumpt ion . D 
Her-eaft er-, in an equilibrium with tr-ansf er-s , let cs and CR denote the common consumption 
levels of sender-s and r-eceiver-s, r-espect-ively. 
Claim 3.5. In any equilibr-ium with tr-ansf er-s, all r-eceiver-s have str-ictly positive consump-
tion. 
Pr-oof. Note t hat if Cj = 0 for some j . then u ' ( Cj) = oo. Take any other player i =f. j with 
Ci > 0. T hen u' ( ci) < /U1 ( Cj) . Player i could raise his payoff by setting tij = E and have 
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ci = ci - tiJ and hence u'(ci) -:=; l'u'(cj) < f'U' (cj) · for some E > 0. Hence. CJ = 0 for any j 
where tiJ > 0 for some i cannot arise from an equilibrium . 0 
Claim 3 .6. In any equihbrium with transfers, all senders have strictly posdive consumpt·ion. 
Proof. Note that if Ci = 0 fo r some i. t hen u' (ci) = oo. Take any player j fo r whom tij > 0. 
T hen we must have oo = u' ( ci) > f'U 1 ( Cj). Player i could raise his payoff by lowering tij to 
iij = tij - E and have Ci and hence oo = u'(ci) > u' (ci) = u' (yi - iij) ;::: f'u'(cj) · for some 
E > 0. Hence. Ci = 0 for any i where tij > 0 for some .7 cannot arise from an equilibrium. 0 
Lemma 3. 7.1. Given a pmfile of strategies t f or some ind'ial income distribut·ion F such 
that u' (y) < f'U 1 (Jj_) , define tR = L j L i tij and ts = L i L j tij as aggregate transfers Teceived 
and sent, respectively. t const'it1des an equilibrium with transfers if and only if the following 
resource constraint and incentive compatibil'ity conditions, respectively, are satisfied: 
(3. 11 ) 
(3 .12) 
Proof. First assume t constit u tes an equilibrium with transfers. Note t hat by Lemma 3.3. 1. 
all senders s have incomes Ys > cs and all receivers have incomes y,. < CR. Given the 
resource constraint (3.3) . t he consumpt ions of receivers (r ). senders (s) can be wri tten as 
follows: 
c,. = CR = Yr + L tir for all r s.t. Yr < CR 
Cs = cs = Ys - L tsj for all s s.t . Ys > cs 
j 
(3 .1 3a) 
(3 .1 3b) 
Let nR and ns denote t he number of receivers and senders. respect ively. Combining (3 .1 3a) 
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and (3.13b) yields: 
y; >cs s:y, > cs j 
= 2: Yi + t R + 2: Yi - ts (3. 14) 
By defini t ion . nRCR + n 8 cs = Ly;<cn Yi + Ly;>cs Yi · Re-writing t his using (3.14) . we have: 
nncn - "L Yi = "L Yi- nscs (3. 15) 
y;<cn Y·;>cs 
Now consider the incentive compatibility of transfers in equilibrium. Note that if u' ( cs) > 
!u'(cn). then any sender could do better by lower her transfers to any receiver. and if 
u'(cs) < /tt'(cR)· then any sender could do better by raising her transfers to any receiver. 
Hence t he incentive compatibility of transfers being sent requires u' ( cs) = --;u' (en). Equa-
tion (3. 12) follows dir ct ly from this condition. Hence. condi t ions (3. 11 ) and (3. 12 ) are 
necessary for an equilibrium with transfers. 
Now take any candidate equilibrium t in which (3 .11) and (3.12) are satisfied. Given 
the t ransfers made by other players (and hence the allocations that arise from this equilib-
rium) . no player could have done better by changing her transfers: for any player. simply 
reallocating transfers already being made does not change consumption and may contradict 
the assumed satisfaction of (3 .1 2); increasing or decreasing t ransfers reduces or increases 
consumption , respectively. contradicting the satisfaction of (3 .12) . Ivioreover. the transfers 
made by all players in this equilibrium must have been feasible since. by the form that any 
equilibrium with transfers must take, all players make non-negative transfers (since only 
players with income greater than cs make strictly positive transfers) and no player transfers 
more than her income (since. by Claim 3.6. all senders have strictly positive consumption). 
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Hence. condi tions (3.11) and (3.12) are sufficient for an equilibrium with t ransfers. 0 
Lemma 3. 7.2. Given an init'ial income distribution, the same set of allocations arises fro m 
every equilibrium with transf ers. 
Proof. Since the conditions of Lemma 3.7. 1 are necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium 
>vi t h transfers. it follows that if the set of equilibrium allocations satisfying these conditions 
is unique. then the same set of allocations arises from every equilibrium with t ransfers. 
Since every equilibrium wit h transfers takes the same form (see Lemma 3.3 .1) . we need 
only show that t here is a unique set of allocations satisfying (3 .11 ) and (3.12) that arises 
from every equilibrium with transfers of t his form. 
First . I show t hat the resource constraint (3.11) can be used to define the consumpt ion 
of senders as a monotonically-decreasing function c~c ( cR) of the consumption of receivers. 
T he intersection point of t his "RC" function with the monotonically-increasing incentive 
constraint or "I C" function (3 .12) - assuming such a point exists - characterizes a set 
of allocations CR and cs that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.7.1. Since the "RC" 
and "I C" functions are monotonically decreasing and increasing . respectively. t hey have a 
unique point of intersection assuming they do intersect. Thus. the set of allocations that 
simultaneously satisfies (3. 11 ) and (3. 12) is unique. 
First consider condition (3. 11) . Given the particular form of equilibrium being consid-
ered , only t hose players with ini t ial incomes richer than cs send t ransfers. and only those 
players wit h initial incomes poorer t han CR receive transfers. Aggregating t he budget con-
straint 3.3. it is clear that tR = nncR - L y;<cR Yi and ts = Ly;>cs Yi - nscs. Given 
an initial income dist ribution. note that nn and ns are st rictly increasing and decreasing 
functions of CR and cs. respectively. Let Y = Li Yi · 
Define the functions tR( cR) and ts(cs). These functions are depicted in Figure 3.1. The 
domains of tR and t s relevant to equilibria of t he form described in Lemma 3.3.1 is the 
interval [1!_,y]. Note that tR(CJ'l) and ts(cs) are continuous on this interval. 102 
102 1 use t he te rm cont inuous to describe a fun ction with an unbroken graph . 
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Aggregate transfers received approach zero as the consumption of receivers approaches 
the income of the poorest player: tR(cR) -----* 0 as CR -----* '!!_ · Also . tR(cR) -----* Ny - Y = 
N(Y- yPc) > 0 as CR -----* y. where yPc = * Y is per-capita income of t he ent ire network : 
as t he number of receivers approaches n , aggregate t ransfers received approach n times 
the difference between t he income of the richest player and the per-capita income of the 
net·work. Finally. tR(cR) is strictly increasing: 
If n~(cR) = 0 then 0~R L yJ<cR YJ = 0 since either n~(cR) = 0 or n~(cR) = 1. If n;.(cR) = 1 
then a~R L yJ<cR YJ = CR . Hence we have t~(cR) = n,.(cR) > 0. Thus tR(cR) is st rictly 
increasing over the range [0, n(Y - yPc) ] on the interval ['!j_, y]. 
On t he other hand , t s(cs) -----* n(yPc - '!j_) > 0 as cs -----* '!j_: aggregate t ransfers sent 
approach n t imes the difference between the network 's per-capita income and the income 
of the poorest player as the number of senders approaches n. Also . t s(cs) -----* 0 as cs -----* '[}: 
as the number of senders approaches zero , aggregate transfers sent approach zero . Finally. 
note that t he function ts ( cs) is st rictly decreasing: 
t~(cs) = :;.,[) L YJ- n~(cs)cs- ns(cs) 
ucs YJ>cs 
where (since either n~.(cs) = 0 or n~(cs) = -1) 0~8 L yJ>cs YJ = 0 (if n~(cs) = 0) and 
0~8 L y1>cs YJ = - cs (if n~(cs) = -1). Hence we have t~(cs) = - n 5 (cs) < 0. Thus ts(cs) 
is strict ly decreasing over the range [0, n(yPc - '!j_] on the interval ['!j_, Y]. 
Equilibria of the form described in Lemma 3.3.1 require CR:::; cs . If CR = cs . satisfaction 
of (3 .1 5) requires cs = yPc. 103 Otherwise. sat isfaction of (3. 15) requires cs > yPc and hence 
Since t R (-) and ts (-) a re continuous , monotonically increasing and decreasing functions , 
103 T his can be verified by substitu t ion of CR = cs into (3. 15) and not ing that nR(cs ) + ns(cs ) = n. 
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respectively, with crossing point tR(eR) = ts(es) at yPc. (3 .1 5) implicit ly defines a contin-
uous, monotonically decreasing funct ion e~c ( eR) on the interval [1!_, yPc]. with e~c (1!_) = y 
and e~c (yPc) = yPc. 
JC' Now consider condition (3. 12). which defines the continuous fun ction c5 (cR)· Note 
that e~~ (eR) ---+ Yk = u'- 1 [rn'(u)J < y as CR ---+ 1L· since we assumed that u'(Y ) < 1u'(u) . 
Furthermore. c!sc(cR) ---+ y as CR ---+ eff where eke = u'- 1 (~u'(Y) ) . Finally. c:SC' C) is 
I 
increasing since u"(-) < 0. Hence . on the interval [y , cjf]. t he function c!sc (cR) is increasing 
over [yk , Y]. 
Thus. we have on t he one hand c:Sc ( cR ) increasing over the range [Yk : Y] on the interval 
[1!_ , c~C' J (where Yk = u'- 1 (Ju' [u]) < y). and on the other hand c~c ( cR) decreasing over t he 
range [yPc, y] on the interva l [1!_ , yPc] . Since c:Sc ( cR) and c~c (en) are continuous functions. 
if there exists a point (e'R ,c5 ) such that e!sc(c'R) = c~c(c'R) = c5. then it is unique. An 
example of such a point is depicted in Figure 3.2 . D 
Lemma 3. 7 .3. If u' (y) < f'LL' (1!_) , then theTe aTe tmnsfers 'in equ'il'ibr'ium and the same set 
of allocations arises fmm every equilibrium. 
Pmof. By Claim 3.1. there are transfers in equi librium . By Lemma 3.7.2. the same set 
of allocations arises from every equilibrium with transfers . Hence . given an initial income 
distribution satisfying the stated condition , every equilibrium gives rise to the same set of 
allocations. D 
Claim 3.1 and Lemma 3.7.3 are exhaustive in establishing that the same set of allocations 
arises from every equilibrium. This completes the proof of uniqueness for Proposition 3.1. 
Existence of equilibTium 
The following claim wi ll be useful in proving the existence of equilibrium for Proposition 
3.1. 
Claim 3. 7. For any initial income distTibution in which u' (y) < 1 u' (1!_) , there exists a pair 
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of allocations (cR. , c5) such that: 
nR(cR.)cR.- L Yi = L Yi- ns(c5)c5 (3.16) 
y;<c'R y;>c:S 
(3.1 7) 
PToof. Recall from Lemma 3.7.2 that condition (3. 16) implicitly defines a function c~c(cR)· 
and condition (3.17) defines a function c~c ( cR). In order to prove the claim. it suffices to 
show that for any ini tial income distribution in which u' (Y) < -yu' (]!_). there exists a pair 
(cR.,c5) in the interval [y_, yPc] such t hat c~c(cR.) = c~c(cR.) = c5.104 
Since c~c ( cR) and c~c ( CR) are continuous. monotonically decreasing and increasing func-
tions. respectively (see Lemma 3.7.2). it suffices to show that for any ini tial income dist ri-
bution in which u' (y) < ru'(y_). it must be the case that (i) c~c(J!..) 2: c~c(]j_) and (ii ) 
c~c(YL)::; y. where Yl = {y: c~c(y) = y}. 
Recall from Lemma 3.7.2 that c~c(]j_) = y. In addition . u'(y) < ru'(y_) by assumption. 
and hence y > u'- 1[ru'(y_)] = c~c(y_). Thus. (i) is satisfied. 
Now consider whether (ii ) is satisfied. From the definition of Yl above . we have Yl = 
u'- 1 [~u'(Y)], and hence u'(Y) = ru'(yL). By assumption. u'(y) < ru'(y). Hence 1u'(y1) < 
I -
ru'(y). and thus Yl > y. Since c~c(·) is monotonically decreasing with c~c(y) = y. YL > y 
- - - -
implies that (ii ) is satisfied. D 
Lemma 3. 7.4. An equilibTium exis ts joT any initial income distribution. 
Proof. If u'(y) 2: ru'(y_). then by Claim 3.1 t ij = 0 for all i,j is the unique equilibrium and 
it trivially exists. It remains to be shown that an equilibrium exists if u'(y) < ru'(y_) . By 
Claim 3. 1, such an equilibrium would involve transfers. Lemma 3.7. 1 gives necessary and 
sufficient condit ions for an equilibrium with t ransfers. Thus . to prove t he lemma it suffices 
to show that for any ini tial income distribution in which u'(y) < r u'(y_) . there exists a set 
10
'
1Recall from Lemma 3.7.2 that in order for CR ::::; cs (required by the form taken by every equilibrium 
with t ransfers as shown in Lemma 3.3.1) and for condition (3.16) to be satis fied, we must have CR ::::; ypc and 
CS 2 yPC. 
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of allocations for senders and receivers that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3. 7 .1. Claim 
3.7 shows exactly th is. D 
This completes the proof of existence for Proposition 3.1. 
3.7.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3.1 
Claims 3.3 and 3.4 establish that all senders have the same consumption and all receivers 
have the same consumption. In addition : 
1. In an equilibrium with transfers. the consumption of every sender is strict ly larger 
than t hat of all receivers. To see this. note that since for any pair (i , j) such that 
tij > 0 vve have u' ( ci) = "(1l1 ( Cj) . and since i is a sender and j is a receiver we have 
Ci = cs and Cj =CR. we have u'(cs) = "('tt'(cR)· Since"(< 1. we have cs >CR. 
2. If Player i is a sender. then any player with income greater t hau i is also a sender. To 
see this. let t1.:1 = 0 for all l. Since Yk > Yi· we must have u'(yk) < u'(yi) < u'(ci) = 
u' ( cs) = "f1l1 ( cR). Hence k could increase his payoff by making a positive transfer to 
any receiver (in part icular to player j). 
3. If Player i is not a sender. then any player with income less than i is not a sender. 
That is. if tij = 0 for some i. for all j . t hen for any k such that Yk < Yi· we must have 
tkj = 0 for all .7. To see this. note simply that if k were a sender and Yi > Yk . then i 
would also have to be a sender by the argument above. a contradiction. 
4. If P layer j is a receiver . then any player within income less than j is also a receiver. 
That is. if t ij > 0 for any pair ( i , j). then for any player l with income Yt < YJ. we 
must have tkl > 0 for at least one k . To see this. let tkl = 0 for all k. Since YJ > Yl· 
we must have u'(Ci) = u'(cs) = "(tt'( cj) = "(tt'(cR) < "(1i1(yj) < "(1i1(y,). Hence i could 
increase his payoff by making a positive transfer to l. 
5. If Player j is not a receiver. then any player with income greater than j is not a 
receiver . T hat is. if tij = 0 for some j, for all i. then for any l such that Yt > YJ· 
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we must have tkl = 0 for all k. To see this , note simply that if l were a receiver and 
YJ < YL· then j would also have to be a receiver by the argument above. which is a 
cont radict ion. 
6. Player 'i does not send transfers in an equilibrium -vvith t ransfers if and only if her 
income is less than cs. To see this. first take a player a for whom Ya < cs . If a were a 
sender. then we would have Ya > Ca. But since all senders have the same consumption. 
we would also have Ca = cs. This implies Ya > cs. a cont radiction . Hence Ya < cs 
implies that a is not a sender. In the other direction. take a player a who is not a 
sender. If Ya > cs. then we would have Ca. = Ya > cs . But since u'(cs) = J'1i1(cR), we 
would have u'(ca) < / '1i1 (cR) and a could do better by making a positive t ransfer to 
some receiver. 
7. Player j does not receive transfers in an equilibrium with transfers if and only if her 
income is greater than CR . To see this, first take a player a for whom Ya > CR . If a 
were a receiver. t hen we would have Ca. > Ya· But since all receivers have the same 
consumption. we would also have Ca = CR . This implies Ya < CR- a contradiction. 
Hence Ya > CR implies that a is not a receiver. In the other direction. take a player 
a who is not a receiver. If Ya < CR, then we would have Ca = Ya < CR . But since 
u'(cs) = J'1i1(cR)· we would have u'(cs) < J'U1(ca) and any sender could do better by 
making a positive transfer to a. 
The latter two points together mean that players are in autarky in equilibrium with t ransfers 
if and only if their ex ante income lies within the interval [cR , cs]. Thus. t he preceding results 
imply that every equilibrium with transfers takes the same form: t he richest players send 
transfers to the poorest players. and players at intermediate income levels are in autarky. 
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.3. 1. 
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3. 7.3 Example equilibrium strategy profile 
Lemma 3. 7.5 below gives a part icular strategy profile that constitutes an equilibrium with 
t ransfers fo r income distribut ions satisfying u' (Y) < J'U1 ('!!_) in a closed network characterized 
by a single alt ruism parameter . T he following two claims will be useful in proving this. 
Claim 3.8. Every stmtegy in the stmtegy profile of (3 .20) is feasible. 
Proof. tij = 0 for all i is t rivially feasible since tij = 0 :S Yi· tij = . •• ~fy1 . [Y i - c5*.] nR cR y 1<c 'R Yl 
for all i , j such that Yi > c5 and Yj < c'R is feasible since. for all i such t hat Yi > Cs· · 
y1 <c'R 
~ tz·J· = ~ c'R- Yj [ * ]} L L * * "" Yi - cs 
nRcR - L-yl< c'n. Yt YJ<cn 
= Yi - c5 
D 
Now consider the allocations to which the strategy above gives rise. T he allocation 
ci = Yi for all i such t hat c'R ::; Yi :S c5 t rivially arises from t he st rategy tij = 0 for all i, j 
such t hat c'R ::; Yi ::; c5 or c'R ::; Yj :S c5 . T he fo llowing claims deal with the remaining 
cases. 
Claim 3.9. For all i such that Yi > c5, the stmtegy tij = N* • ~i,YJ [Yi - c5] for all j 
RCR y 1<cRYl 
such that Yj < c'R gives rise to the allocation ci = c5. 
Proof. Substit ut ing t he given strategy into the budget constraint fo r i given in P roblem 
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3.2. we have: 
L c"R - Yj * ci = Yi - [Yi - cs] n* c* - L 1 j:yj<cR R R Yi <cR Yl 
L c* - y · = Yi - [Yi - cs] * " R 1 n· c - L . 7Jt j:yj<cR R R Yt<cR, 
= Yi - [Yi - Cs·l 
= c.S 
D 
Claim 3.10. The strategy tij = . .• ~·i_Yj [Yi - c.SJ for all 'i . j such that Yi > c.S and 
nRcR Yt <cRYl 
Yj < c"R g-ives rise to the allocation Cj = c"R for all j such that YJ < c"R. 
Proof. Substit ut ing the given strategy into the budget constraint for j. we have: 
"" c"R - Yj [ *] Cj = Yi + L... * * Yi - cs 
nRcR - L y1<c';, Yl i:y;>c5 " 
(3.18) 
c"R - Yi L [ *] = . y· - c 
n * c* - L • 11 z s R R. Yt< cR Y i:y;>cs 
(3. 19) 
Note that L i:y;>c$ [Yi - c.SJ = L i:y;>c$ Y·i - n.Sc.S . Since c"R and c.S satisfy 3.22a. L i Yi> cs Yi -
n.Sc.S = n'Rc"R- L l:y1<cR Yl · Substitut ing this into equation (3 .1 9) . we have Cj = c'R. D 
Lemma 3 . 7.5 . If u' (y) < f'll1 (]!_) , the following set of strategies constitute an equilibTiurn 
of the tra.nsfeT game r= [N , T (F), {Ui}] : 
{ 
c* -yJ [ *] f ll . . " d " 
. _. - " _ Yi - c5· oT a ·t , J s.t. Yi > c5· an Yj < cR· nRcR L-y <c* Yl tij = l R 
0 otheTwise 
(3 .20) 
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with the following allocations: 
where (c'R , c5) satisfy: 
c5 for i s. t. Yi > c_5. 
Ci = c'R for i s. t . Yi < c'R 
Yi for all i s .t. c'R ::::; Yi ::::; c5 
cs = t/ - 1[tu'(cR)] 
nR(cR)cR - L Yl = L Yl- ns(cs)cs 
y,<cR y,>cs 
nR(cR) = L 1 
i: yi<CR 
ns(cs) = L 1 
i: yi>cs 
(3 .21 ) 
(3.22a) 
(3.22b) 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
Proof. By Lemma 3.7.1. conditions (3.22a) are necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium 
with transfers. By Claim 3.7. a pair (c'R, c:S) that satisfies these conditions exists . Thus. it 
suffices to show that the strategies in the st rategy profile (3 .20) are feasible and give rise to 
t he allocations ( c'R, c5). Claims 3.8 and 3.9 show exactly t his. 0 
3.8 Proofs : Heterogeneous networks 
3.8.1 Proof of Lemma 3 .5 .1 
Claim 3.11. In any equ-ilibrium with cross-group tmnsfers , all senders in the same group 
have the same consumption. 
Proof. Take any pair (i , j) such tha t t ij > 0, and any other pair (k , l ) such that k is in the 
same group as i and t~,;t > 0. ·without loss of generali ty. assume that Ci < c~,; . On the one 
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hand. t ij > 0 implies u' ( ci) = /G'U1 ( CJ ) (where G denotes the group to which j belongs). 
On the other hand. Ci < ck implies u' ( ck) < u' ( Ci). Hence u' ( q) < lett' ( Cj) and k could do 
better by making a posit ive t ransfer to j. Hence Ci < q cannot be part of an equilibrium 
in which tij > 0 for some j. Similarly. Ci > Ck cannot be part of an equilibrium in which 
tkt > 0 for some l. Finally. assume that ci = Ck and hence u' ( ck) = 1cu' ( Cj) and k could 
do no better by changing her transfers . Hence. in equilibrium. q = Ci . Since any two 
senders (in the same group) to any two receivers (regardless of group) must have the same 
consumption. all senders must have the same consumption. D 
Claim 3.12. In any equilibrium with cross-group transfers, all receivers in the same group 
have the same consumption. 
Proof. This result is implied by the fact that all senders in t he same group have the same 
consumpt ion. To see this. let c~ and c~ denote the consumpt ions common to all senders 
in A and B. respectively. Take any two receivers from B. If j and l both receive from 
A. then u'(c~) = /LtL'(cj) and u'(c~) = /Lu'(ct). Hence Cj = q . If j and l both receive 
from B. then u'(cn = 1Hu'(cj) and u'(c~) = / HtL'(ct)· Hence Cj = Ct. Now. without loss 
of generality. assume that j receives from A and l receives from B. and t hat Cj < Ct (the 
arguments for the other cases are ident ical). On the one hand. tkl > 0 for k E B implies 
u'(c~) = / I-f1/(q) . On the other hand , Cj < Ct implies u'(cj) > u'(c,). Hence we have 
u'(c~) = / Hu'(ct) < /Hu'(cj)· Any sender in B (Player k. for example) could do better by 
sending positive transfers to j. D 
Henceforth let c~ and c~ denote the consumption levels common to all senders and receivers. 
respect ively, in Group Q. 
Claim 3.13. In any equilibrium with cross-group transfers, cross-group transfers flow only 
in one direction: ei ther fran~ Group A to Group B or from Group B to Group A. 
Proof. Suppose t is an equilibrium with cross-group transfers in both directions. Take any 
{i , l} E A and {j , k} E B such that tij > 0 and tkl > 0. T hen u' (ci) = /Lu'(cj) and u'(ck) = 
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rycu'(c1). On the one hand. "fLu'( cj) < "fH1L1(cj)::; u'(ck) · This implies u'(ci) < u'(q.) . On 
the other hand. 'YL1L'( c1) < "fl-f1L1(ct) ::; u'(ci)· This implies u'(q.) < u'(ci). a contradict ion. 
Hence t cannot be an equilibrium. D 
Proof. Proof of Lemma 3.5.1 Claims 3.11 and 3.12 establish that all senders within the 
same group have the same consumption. and all receivers within the same group have the 
same consumption. Claim 3.13 establishes that cross-group transfers can only How in one 
direction. In addition: 
1. Within the same group. if there are both senders and receivers . then the consumption 
of every sender is strict ly larger than that of all receivers within the same group. To 
see this. let i be a sender and j be a receiver. bot h A. Then ci = ci and Cj = cj~. 
Note that in order for i to be a sender and j to be a receiver. it must be the case that 
j receives within-A transfers since, by Lemma 3.13. cross-group transfers only flow in 
one direction. Since in equilibrium within-A transfers implies u'(c~~) = "ff-f1l 1 ( c~). we 
must also have u' ( ci) = "fl-f1L' ( Cj) and the result follows from the fact that 'YH < 1. 
2. If Player i is a sender. then any player in the same group as i with income greater 
than i is also a sender. To see this, take any pair of players (i, j) such that t ij > 0. 
Denote the group to which i belongs by A. Since tij > 0. either 1L1 (ci) = 'YI-f1L'(cj) or 
u'(ci) = "fL1l1 (cj)· Now take any other player kEG such that Yk > Yi· Assume tu = 0 
for alll . Then ck = Yk and hence u'(ck) < u'(ci) . Then either u'(ck) < "(H1i1(cj) or 
u'(ck) < "fLtL'(cj) · Hence k could do better by making a positive transfer to j. Novv 
instea.d assume tik > 0. Then ck = ci = c~ and since either u' ( c~) = ry H u' ( c~) or 
u'(c~) = 'YLu' (c~) (or both). k could do no better by lowering her transfers to zero. 
Hence k must be a sender in equilibrium. 
3. If Player i is not a sender. then any player in the same group as i with income less 
than i is not a sender . That is. if t ij = 0 for some i E G. for all j. then for any k E G 
such that Yk < Yi. we must have tkj = 0 for all j. To see this. note simply that if 
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k were a sender. then i would also have to be a sender by the argument above since 
Yi > Yk· a contradiction. 
4. If Player j is a receiver. then any player in the same group as j wit h income less than 
j is also a receiver. That is . if tij > 0 for any pair (i , j) with j E G. then for any 
player l E G with Yl < YJ . we must have t~;:1 > 0 for at least one k. To see this. let 
tkl = 0 for all k. Since Y.i > Yl· we must have u'(ci) = u'(c~) = 1Hti1 ( c~) = r Hu'(cj) if 
i E G or u'( ci) = u'(c5G) = rLu'(c~ ) = / L'1t1(cj ) if it/:- G. Since Yl < YJ < Cj. we must 
have u'(ci) < / H1L1(c,) if i E G or u'(ci) < r Lu'(c,) if it/:- G. In either case. Player i 
could do better by making a positive transfer to Player l. 
5. If Player j is not a receiver. then any player in the same group as j with income 
greater than j is not a receiver. That is. if tij = 0 for some .J E G. for all i. t hen for 
any l such that Yl > '!Jj· we must have tkl = 0 for all k. to see this. note simply that if 
l were a receiver. then j would also have to be a receiver by the argument above since 
YJ < Yl · a contradiction. 
6. If t here is at least one sender in 9. then any player ·i in g does not send transfers in 
equilibrium if and only if her income is less than c~ . To see this. first take a player 
a for whom Ya < cf If a were a sender , then we would have Ya > Ca . But since 
all senders within the same group have the same consumption . we would also have 
Ca = cf This implies that Ya > cf a cont radiction. Hence Ya < c~ implies that a is 
not a sender. In the other direction. take a player a who is not a sender. If Ya > cf 
then we would have Ca = Ya > cf But since either u'( c~) = /J-! 'U1 ( c~) (if there are 
within-A t ransfers) or u'(c~') = r Lu'( cR_G') (if there are cross-group transfers from A 
to B) . or both. we would have either u'(ca) < /J-!1/(c~) or u'( ca ) < rLu'(c~ ). or both. 
Player a could do bet ter by making a positive t ransfer to some receiver. 
7. If there is at least one receiver in 9. then any player j in g is not a receiver if and 
only if her income is greater than c~ . To see this. first take a player a for whom 
Ya > c~ . If a were a receiver. then we would have Ca > Ya· But since all receivers 
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have the same consumpt ion. we would also have Ca = c~ . This implies Yo < c~. a 
contradict ion . Hence Yo > c~ implies that a is not a receiver . In the other direction . 
take a player a who is not a receiver. If Ya < c~ . then we would have Ca = Yo < c~. 
But since eit her u'(c~) = "(HU1 ( c~) or u'(c5°) = '""YLu'(c~). or both . we would have 
either u'(c~') < "!I-f1/(c0 ) or u'(c:S0 ) < "fLU' (c~). or both. At least one sender could 
do better by making a positive t ransfer to a. 
D 
3.8.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2 
Claim 3.14. A strategy profile t constitutes an equilibrium with cross-gmup transfer-s fmm 
Group A to Gmup B if and only if the following conditions on the allocations arising from 
t ar-e satisfied: 
for- G =A, B , with: 
c~ if Yi > c~· 
{
t/(ci) = "(Hu'(c~) if c~ > l/_A 
u' (ci) > "!Hu'(c~) if c~ = lf_A 
CG < -YG 5 -
YG < CG < CG _ - R- S 
(3 .25a) 
(3 .25b) 
(3.25c) 
(3.25cl ) 
(3.25e) 
(3.25f) 
and 
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{ u'(c~) = /'H 1L1 (c~) if c~ < y8 u'(c~) > /'H 1L'(c~) if c~ = y8 (3.25g) 
and t~' and t~ are, Tespectively, aggregate transfers sent from and Teceived by agents in 
Gmup G. 
PToof. First assume t constitutes an equilibrium with cross-group transfers from A to B. 
Note that by Lemma 3.5. 1. the resource constraints (3.3) of individual senders and receivers 
within each group can be combined as in t he proof of Lemma 3.7.1 to show: 
for G = A ,B. where n~(c~) and n~(c~') denote the number of receivers and senders. 
respectively. given c~ and cf Hence (3. 25e) is satisfied . Now consider the incentive-
compatibility condi t ion (3.25d). Analogous to the argument in the proof of Lemma 3. 7.1. 
if condit ion (3 .25d) were not satisfied t hen any sender of cross-group t ransfers in A could 
do better by deviating from her st rategy in t . Simila rly. if any of the other incent ive-
compatibility condit ions did not hold then some sender would have a profi table deviat ion 
from her strategy in t . Hence. the condi t ions above are necessary for t to consti t ute an 
equilibrium wi th cross-group t ransfers from A to B. 
Now take any candidate equilibrium with cross-group t ransfers from A to B. t . t hat gives 
rise to allocations satisfying t he condi t ions above. Given the t ransfers made by other players 
(and hence the allocations t hat arise from this equilibrium). no player could have done 
better by changing her transfers: for any player, simply reallocating transfers already being 
made does not change consumpt ion and may cont radict the assumed satisfaction of one of 
the conditions above; increasing or decreasing t ransfers reduces or increases consumpt ion. 
respectively. cont radict ing the satisfaction of t he condi t ions above. rvroreovcr. the transfers 
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made by all players under t must have been feasible since. by Lemma 3 .5.1. a ll players make 
non-negative transfers (since only players with income greater than c~i make st rict ly positive 
transfers) and no player transfers more than her income (since . by the same argument as in 
the proof of Claim 3.6. a ll senders have st rict ly positive consumption). Hence. t he condi t ions 
above a re sufficient for an equilibrium with t ransfers . D 
Lemma 3.8.1. ff an equil'ibr-ium without cr-oss-gr-oup tmnsjer-s does not exist. then an equi-
l'ibr-iwn with cmss-gm1tp tmnsfer-s exists . 
Pmof. Assume an equilibrium without cross-group transfers does not exist. I show that this 
implies the existence of a set of allocations sat isfying the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a llocations arising from an equilibrium with cross-group transfers. Hence any feasible 
strategy profile that gives rise to this set of a llocations const it utes an equilibrium with cross-
group transfers. The remainder of the proof is divided into 4 exhaustive cases . one for each 
possible pattern of within-group t ransfers. Take any hypothetical single-group equilibrium 
t. Let c~ , c~ for G = A , B denote the allocations arising from t. Note that we must have 
u'(c~) < "(Lv/(c~) since tis not an equilibrium without cross-group transfers. 
Case 1: Suppose t involves transfers within neither A nor B (Transfer pattern { AB}). 
First let c~ = yA. Now reduce c~ until c~ = { c~: u'(c~) = '"YLu'(y_8 )}. At this point , we 
must have t~(c~)+t~(y8 ) > t~(y_A)+t~(y_8 ) since t~(-) is strict ly decreasing. Now increase 
c~ and c~ in tandem until c~ = yA . maintaining u'(c~) = "(Lu'(c~) . At this point. we must 
have t~(c~) + t~(Y8 ) < t~(y_A) + t~(c~) since c~ > y_8 . By continui ty. there must exist a 
pair c~. c~ such that t~ ( c~) + t~ (y8 ) = t~(y_A) + t~ ( c~). At this set of allocations. every 
condition in C laim 3.14 is satisfi ed. Note that every equilibr-ium with cross-gmup tmnsfer-s 
invo lves tmnsfer- pattem {AB} only. 
Case 2: Suppose t involves transfers within A only (Transfer pattern {AA , AB} ). First 
let c~ = c~ and c~ = c~ . Now reduce c~ and c~ in tandem until c~ = { c~ : u'(c~) = 
I 4 " 
'"YLu'(y_8 )}. Note that if~~~~ > ~~ , then c~ > y_A , and hence every equilibrium with cmss-
gr-oup tmnsfers involves tmnsfer pattem {A , AB} . Other-wise, the tmnsfer- pattem may be 
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either { AA , AB} or { AB}. At th is point. we must have t~ ( c~) + tf ('y8 ) > tj~(c~) + t~(I!_8 ) 
since t~(c~) = t~(c~) by t he definition of a hypothetical single-group equilibrium and t~(-) 
and t~~(-) are str ict ly decreasing and increasing. respectively. Now increase c~ and c~ in 
tandem (and. if necessary. c~ to maintain u'(c~) = 'ff-fli 1 (c~)). until~~ = c~ . maintaining 
tt'(c~) = '/L1 t 1 (c~). At this point. we must have t~(c~) + tf(y8 ) < t~(c~) + t~(c~) since 
t~(c~) = t~(c~) and t~(c~) > 0 (since c~ > ]!_8 ). By cont inui ty. there must exist a triple 
c{ c~ . and c~ such that t~(c~) + tf(Y8 ) = t~(c~) + t~(c~) . At t his set of allocations. 
every condition in Claim 3.14 is satisfied. 
Case 3: Suppose t involves transfers within l3 only (Transfer pattern {AB, BB}). First 
let c~ = yA. c~ = c~, and c~ = cf . Now reduce c~~ until c~ = {c~ : u'(c~) = '/Lu'(c~)}. 
At this point. we must have tA(cA) + t 8 (cB) > tA(yA) + t 8 (c 8 ) since t 8 (cB) - t 8 (c 8 ) 
· · S S S S ' R _ R R S S - R R 
and t~ ( c~) > 0. Now increase c~, cl and c~ in tandem until c~ = yA . maintaining 
" "' "' "" t-4. " 
u'(cA) = '/Lu'(c8 ) and u'(c8 ) = "YI-fU1(c8 ). Note that if u ~· > IL. then c8 < -Y B and hence S R S 1 R u'yB IH · S ' 
every equilibrium with cross-group transfers involves tr·ansfer patter-n {AB , BB}. Otherwise, 
the transfer patter-n may be either { AB, BB} or { AB}. At this point. we must have t~( c~) + 
tf(c~) < t~(]!_A) + t~(c~) since t~(YA) = 0, and tf(c~) < tf(cf,) and t~(c~) > t~(c~) 
(since c~ > cf and c~ > c~). By continuity, there must exist a triple c{ cl and c~ such 
that t~ ( c~) + tf ( c~) = t~(yA) + t~ ( c~). At this set of allocations. every condi t ion in Claim 
3. 14 is satisfied. 
Case 4: Suppose t involves transfers within both A and l3 (Transfer pattern {AA , AB, BB} ). 
First let c~ = c~ . ~~ = c~. c~ = c~. and c~ = cf.. Now reduce c~ and c~ in tandem un-
t il c,5A = {cA : u'(cA) = "Y£U1(c8 )}. Note that if u'l!.A > R th en cA > ]!_A , and hence s s I ~ R U'l!_B IH ' R 
every equilibrium with cross-grmtp transfers involves within-A transfers. Otherwise, the 
transfer patter-n may or may not involve within-A transfers . At t his point. we must have 
tA(c/1) + t 8 (cB) > tA(cA) + t 8 (cB) since tA(cA) - tA( cA) and t 8 (cB) - t 8 (cB) Now S S ' S S R R R R S S - ' R R . S S - R ' R · 
increase c~ and c~ in tandem (and , if necessary. c~ to maintain u' ( c~) = 'I I-f1i1 ( c~)) until 
' ' ' 1-4 ' c~ = c~. maintaining u'(c~) = 'fLu'( c~) . Note that if~~~~ > ~~, then cf. < y 8 , and 
hence every eq·uilibrium with cross-group transfers involves within-!3 transfers. Otherwise, 
113 
the tmnsfer pattem may or may not involve within-B tmnsfers. At this point. we must 
have t A(cA ) + t 8 (cB) < t 11 (c~4 ) + t8 (cD ) since tA(;11 )- t11 (c/1) and t 8 (cB) < t 8 (cB) (since S S S S R R "R R S S - R R 8 S ·R R 
c~ > c~ and c~ > c~). By continui ty. there must exist a quadruple c{ c;~. cl and c~ 
such t hat t 11 (c~4 ) + t 8 (cB)- tA(c/1) + t 8 (cB) At t his set of a llocations . every· condition in S S 'S S - R R R R · 
Cla im 3.14 is satisfied. 0 
Claim 3.15. Th e allocations of senders and receiver-s in any eq'Uihbrium with cross-gmup 
tmnsfers are smaller and larger·, respectively, than their allocations in ever-y hypothetical 
single-gmup equilibrium. 
Pmoj. Note that since every hypot hetical single-group equilibrium gives rise to t he same 
set of allocations . they also give rise to the same set of (within-group) t ransfer patterns . 
Take any hypothetical single-group equilibrium t . t can involve within-group transfers in: 
1. Neither A nor B (Transfer pattern { ·}) 
2. A only (Transfer pattern { AA}) 
3. B only (Transfer pattern {BB}) 
4. Both A and B (Transfer pattern { AA, BB}) 
Suppose t involves pat tern{·}. Then we have u'('!/) 2: '"YHu'(J!... 11 ). u'(y8 ) 2: "fHU1 (J!... 8 ). Now 
consider the corresponding two-group game with '"YL > 0. The replacement of zero with 
'"YL leaves the within-group incentive and resource constra ints unchanged. Hence if t does 
not constit ute an equilibrium without cross-group transfers. it must be because 1L'(Y11 ) < 
"f LU1 (J!... 8 ). Any equilibrium with cross-group t ra nsfers must involve u'(c~) = "fLH'(c~) . 
where c~ < yA and c~ > y8. since if either c~ = yA or c~ = y8. the within-group resource 
constraints would require c~ < y8 or c~ > y11 . respectively, which would violate the within-
group incentive constraint. Applicat ion of this same argument to any hypothetical single-
group equilibrium involving one of the other transfer patterns completes t he proof. 0 
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Pmof. Proof of Lemma 3.5.2. Suppose an equilibrium without cross-group t ransfers 
exists . Let t 1 be any such equilibrium , and let t 2 denote a candidate quilibrium with 
cross-group transfers. Since by Lemma 3. 13 cross-group t ransfers can only Bow in one 
direction in equilibrium . assume wi thout loss of genera lity that t 2 involves tra nsfers from 
Group A to Group B. Let c~i and c~i denote t he consumpt ion of senders aud receivers 
in Group G under equilibrium ti for G = {A , B} , ·i = {1 , 2} . Note that we must have 
1 cu' ( c~ 1) ~ u' ( ct: 1) . 
First consider the case in which t 1 involves wi thin-group transfers for both Group A and 
Group B. Under t 2 . we must have 'YL 1l ' (c~2 ) = u' (ct:2). Suppose ct:2 2 ci1. T hen total 
transfers origina ting from senders in A are t he same or lower under t 2 . Since cross-group 
t ransfers are assumed to be higher under t 2 . within-A t ransfers must be lower under t 2 . This 
implies c~2 < c~1 . Hence we would have u '(ci2) < u' (c~~ 1 ) = I'H li' (c~1 ) < 'YI-f li 1 (c~2 ) . which 
violates incent ive-compatibility within A. Hence we must have ci2 < ci1. This implies 
u' (ct: 1) < u' (ci2). ·which in turn implies I'Lli' (c~ 1 ) < u ' (ci2) . Since )'LH' (c~2 ) = u' (ci2) . 
we have ~nu' (c~ 1 ) < )'Lli' (c~ 2 ) and hence c~l > cW. But c~2 < c~ 1 combined wit h higher 
A-to-B t ransfers under t 2 implies that within-B t ransfers must be lower. which implies 
c~2 > c~ 1 . Hence we would have u' (c~2 ) < u' (c~ 1 ) = 'YH 1L' (c~ 1 ) < 'YH 1L ' (c~2 ) . which 
viola tes incentive-compatibility within B. Hence t 2 cannot be an equilibrium if t 1 involves 
within-group t ransfers for both Group A and Group B. 
Note that in the case where t 1 involves no wi thin-A t ransfers. the resul t that ct:2 < ci 1 
follows immediately from the fact that within-A transfers cannot be lower under t 2 . Hence 
we must have ci2 < ct:1. Hence we must also have c~ 1 > c~2 . and t 2 cannot be an 
equilibrium by exactly the same argument as above. In the case where t 1 involves no 
within-B transfers. we clearly cannot have c~2 > c~ 1 and hence . by the argument above. t 2 
cannot be an equilibrium . 
Now suppose t hat an equilibrium wi t h cross-group t ransfers does not exists. By the 
cont rapositive of Lemma 3.8. 1. an equilibrium without cross-group t ransfers exists . D 
Pmof. Proof of Proposition 2 . By Lemma 3.8.1. an equilibrium exists for every m-
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come dist ribution. If there exists one equilibrium without cross-gronp transfers . then every 
equilibrium is an equilibrium without cross-group transfers . By Proposit io11 1. every equi-
librium wit hout cross-group t ransfers gives rise to t he same set of allocations. If t here exists 
one equilibrium wit h cross-group t ransfers. t hen every equilibrium is an equilibrinm with 
cross-group t ransfers . Lemma 3.14 gives necessary a nd sufficient condi t ions 011 a llocations 
arising from any st rategy profile in order for t hat st ra tegy profile to constit ute a n equilib-
rium with cross-group transfers . One of those condi t io11s is ti + t~ = t/~ + t~. The other 
conditions are incentive-compatibility constra ints. As demonstrated in t he proof to Lemma 
3.8 .1. t hese condi t ions form strictly monotone functions that collapse into a single equation 
in one vari able. By t he strict monotonicity of u ' (-) . tf a nd t~ . G =A, B. t he solution to 
ti + t~ = t~ + t~ is unique. Hence. every equilibrium with cross-group transfers gives rise 
to t he same set of a llocations. 0 
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Chapter 4 
Ex Post Altruism vs. Insurance Motives for 
Exchanging Transfers 
4 .1 Introduction 
Insight into transfer motives has the potent ial to improve our understanding of sources 
of risk. coping st rategies. and the intergenerational t ransmission of poverty. 105 From a 
policy standpoint . understanding t ransfer motives can shed light on the channels through 
which financial markets work. and on the efficacy of public insurance schemes. T he recent 
economics literature approaches private t ransfers from the perspective of insurance . But 
are t ransfers motivated pmely by insurance? 
In t he absence of aggregate uncertainty. an insurance model in competit ive equilib-
rium predicts that ex ante expected t ransfers contracted over idiosyncratic income shocks 
equal zero . Hence. transfers should change directions qu ite frequently in response to un-
forecastable income shocks. Moreover , forecast able income differences between parties 
should have no effect on the direction of transfers. 
T his paper documents patterns in panel data on intra-family t ransfers in Indonesia that 
are inconsistent with these basic predictions of insurance. First . I present descriptive statis-
t ics indicating a tendency for transfers to persistent ly flow persistence in one direct ion . The 
implication is that average net t ransfers over t ime are nonzero. Second. in a regression 
framework. I reject the null hypothesis that transfers are unrelated to forecastable income. 
Int ra-family transfers in Indonesia tend to flow from rich to poor households. Hence . trans-
fe rs appear to be inconsistent wit h a pure insurance motive. Furthermore. it seems unlikely 
that these patterns are a unique feature of t he data used in t he present study. According to 
105 In Karner (2011 ), I find evidence t hat private t ransfers may be linked to human ca pi ta l invest ment . 
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Cox. et a l. 's (2006) survey of 11 developing countries. "Nowhere ... do private t ransfers seem 
to flow from the very poor to the very rich. " 
Ex post altruism is an alternat ive transfer motive with the potent ial to explain these 
patterns. In contrast to pure insurance. altruistic transfers should flow from predictably 
rich senders to poor recipients. To the extent that differences in income are permanent. 
altruistic transfers should tend to persistent ly flow in one direction. 
In addition . a more general model of altruistic t ransfers predicts that the shape of t he 
transfer function is dist inguishable from that of insurance-based transfers (see Karner. 
2012). The altruism model delivers predictions about the relationship between patterns 
of transfers on the one hand. and income redistribut ions and inequality on the other. that 
previous studies have not assessed empirically. In a variant of the approach of Cox. et al. 
(2004). I attempt to estimate nonlinear transfer functions in order to directly test altruism 
as a t ransfer motive. Unfortunately this test is inconclusive . and for a good reason. The 
alt ruistic model dictates that the shape of transfer fun ction depends upon informat ion that 
is not available from most existing surveys . Thus. a definitive test of altruism remains an 
important topic for future research. 
4.2 Related Literature 
A number of previous studies either direct ly or indirectly examine transfer mot ives. As 
noted above. many of t hese studies approach transfers from an insurance standpoint. ei-
ther by testing for P areto-effi cient risk pooling or testing whether departures from Pareto 
effi ciency are consistent with particular models of insurance with commitment constraints 
or non-verifiabilities. 106 Nonlinearities of alt ruistic transfer functions are rarely taken seri-
ously in the existing literature. Among studies that explicitly test for altruism. most (e .g. 
Altonji. et al.. 1997) employ tests of altruism based on derivative conditions that are valid 
106Townsend (1994), Ligon , eta!. (2002) , and Kinnan (2010) test empirical predictions of insurance in the 
context of village economies. vVitoelar (2005) does so using two waves of IFLS data, the Indonesian panel 
data set used in the present study. Yang and Choi (2007) ask whether international remittances ex hibit 
insura nce properties . 
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only under the assumpt ion t hat non-negativity constraints do not bind .107 
T here is some evidence of alt ruist ic motives among studies that are either not based 
on derivative tests . or do not assume a linear t ransfer function. For example. Lucas and 
Stark (1985) est imate the response of t ransfers to an increase in the recipient 's income and 
cannot reject the hypothesis t hat the response is negative . In addi tion. their resul ts suggest 
that t ransfer receipts may increase convexly with the absentee sender 's wage. 108 Cox. et al. 
(2004) estimate nonlinear transfer functions using a cross-section of data from households 
in the Philippines and report estimated transfer-income derivatives more consistent with 
altruism. 109 Such evidence suggests t hat inferences about t he strength of the alt ruistic 
motive in t ransfers warrant reexaminat ion. T he primary cont ribution of t he present study 
is to employ new tests of insurance based on t he persistence of t ransfers in one direction 
and the role of forecastable income. I also demonstrate that at tempts to estimate a single 
t ransfer function across multiple networks alt ruist ic networks are misguided . 
Finally. the literature does not uniformly characterize alt ruism and insurance as substi-
t utes . For example. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001 ) analyze potent ial interactions between 
altruism and insurance with limi ted commit ment. T hey demonstrate that the presence of 
altruism can serve as a commitment device, potent ially expanding t he set of implementable 
cont racts in the presence of commitment constraints. Hence. altruism and insurance may 
be complementary. The present study contrasts alt ruism with insurance motives . provid-
ing evidence of patterns in t ransfers that are inconsistent with the limited commit ment 
insurance model but consistent with alt ruism . It is wort h noting , however . that alt ruism is 
perfectly consistent with risk-sharing. 
107 See, e.g . Cox (1987) and Alto nji , eta!. (1997). Park (2003) tests for alt ruism in t he IFLS data using 
deri vat ive conditions. See Bergstrom (1997, Section 5) for a survey of a lt ruism-based t heories of t he family. 
On transfer moti ves in developing count ries , see Kazianga (2006) 's study of households in Burkina faso. 
108 See Lucas and Stark (1985) , Ta ble l. 
109 Gibson, eta!. (2011 ) use t he same approach in a survey of t ransfer motives in fo ur developing count ries 
and report evidence less clearly consistent wit h a lt ruism. 
4.3 Conceptual framework 
4.3.1 Insurance 
119 
I begin by developing a conceptua.l fr arnework to guide expectations a bout insurance-based 
transfers versus transfers motivated by altruism . ·while quite simplistic. this framework 
contrasts two important predictions coming out of models of insurance with those of altru-
ism. In part icular. insurance models predict t hat forecastable income should have no effect 
on t ransfers. while altruism suggests that forecastable and un-forecastable income should 
affect t ransfers in exact ly the same way. 
Income generation process 
Consider the fo llowing decomposition of individual i's income at time t: 
Wit = /i + T)it + ~it ( 4. 1) 
Total income. Wit · is t he sum of a permanent component ri and time-varying components 
1Jit and ~it· Assume that both {i and 'TJit are forecastable. For example. 'TJit can cap-
ture seasonality in income or borrowing. Assume further t hat ~it is un-forecastable. with 
Et-d~it I Iit- d = 0 (where It denotes i's information set a t t ime t). 
Insurance in a competi tive equilibrium 
Consider a two-period model of an economy with a single good. Assurne t he existence of 
markets, which open before the resolution of uncertainty. for a complete set of contingent 
commodities representing commitments to exchange the good in a given state of the world . 
Let Ps denote the price of the cont ingent commodity corresponding to state s E S. where S 
denotes t he state space over possible realizations of~. Assume that information is symmetric 
across individuals, and let -i denote the set of all individuals other t han ·i. At timet = 0, a 
given individual i seeks maxirnize her expected utility in t = 1 by choosing her consumption 
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Ci ts in each states E S. subject to the following budget constraint: 
(4.2) 
s s 
where Wit s = {i + 1]it + ~ils is 'i 's t = 1 income in state s. Let Ril s denote the net amount 
of the good received by 'i in t = 1 if the state is s. 
Under the family of resource constraints { C.i!s Wiis + Ri!s}sES· the equat ion above 
becomes: 
s s 
::::} ~ PsRils = 0 ( 4.3) 
s 
In the absence of aggregate risk. state-contingent prices {Ps }s in a competitive equilib-
rium are proportional to state probabilities {!-Ls} 5 . 110 Hence. (4.3) can be re-written as: 
0: ~ 1-LsRils = 0 
s 
where o: = Ps for all sand E 5 [·] denotes expectations in t = 0 taken overs E S. J.ls 
(4.4) 
Equation ( 4.4) represents a key implication of the insurance model: ex ante expected 
transfers contracted over idiosyncratic shocks equal zero . The corresponding empirical pre-
diction is that actual transfers between a given pair of agents should. on average over time. 
equal zero . Two immediate implications are that actual transfers should frequently reverse 
in direction , and that forecastable income differences play no role in determining the aver-
age amount of transfers in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. 
Aggregate risk 
110 Proportionality between state-contingent prices and state probabilities a lso requires restrictions on the 
utility function are also required. The CARA and CRRA utility fun ctions satisfy t hese restrictions. 
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The presence of aggregate risk can give rise to wealth effects in the insurance model. If 
aggregate income varies across states, then state-cont ingent competit ive equilibrium prices 
will reflect this aggregate risk. and will not be proportional to state probabilities . In this 
case . ex ante expected transfers will not equal zero . The reason is that aggregate risk implies 
an asymmetry of incomes between agents. across states of the world . This asymmetry 
means that agents differ in their tolerance for risk. and heuce demand for insurance. In th is 
setting. differences in forecastable incomes between agents change their relat ive demands for 
insurance: agents with higher forecastable incomes will be willing to bear more risk. Hence. 
forecastable income differences between agents will affect the average amount of transfers. 
In the empirical sect ion below. one test of insurance is based on the effect of forecastable 
income on transfers. I'viy results reject the null hypothesis that average transfers are un-
affected by forecastable income differences. Yet it is not impossible. in t he presence of 
aggregate uncertainty. for wealt h effects to cause interactions between forecastable income 
differences and even the direction of transfers. Hence. it is important to verify that any as-
sociation between forecast able income and the direction of transfers is not being generated 
solely by wealth effects. I do so by (i) controlling for possible common year- or region-
by-year shocks in all transfer regressions below; and (ii) testing for significant interactions 
between an explicit measure of aggregate risk - rainfall variability - and the estimated effect 
of forecastable income on t he direction of transfers. 
4.3.2 Altruism 
Bilateral transfers 
Now consider a simple model of transfers motivated by ex post altruism. Suppose there 
are two agents - a parent (P) and child (C) . The utility function of k = P, Cis: 
The parameter 6 E (0 , 1) governs the amount of mutual alt ruism between the two parties. 
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In each period. after the (public) realization of their endowments { w~,; t} k=i,j. each party 
maximizes her utility by choosing an amount Tk ,-k ,t to transfer to the other party subj ect 
to the following constraints : 
Tk.-k ,t >= 0 
In a Nash equilibrium of this game, each player chooses their level of transfers optimally. 
taking as given the transfers made by the other player. The optimal value of Tk ,-k.t is 
characterized by the following inequality: 
(4.6) 
If the non-negativity constraint on Tk,-k ,t is slack, then ( 4.6) holds with equality. and with 
st rict inequality otherwise. Hence. for any (wp1. wet) such t hat ~:i~~:l < o. the parent 
makes a transfer to t he child (i. e. Tpet > 0). Similarly, the child would like to choose TePt 
u' (c ) ·u'(w ) 1 
such that ,--( ct.) = o. and hence for any (wp 1, wet) such that ----,--------( Pt) > -:c:- the child makes U Cpt ' ' 1t WCt u 
a transfer to the parent . If relative endowments are such that o S ~::i~~:l S t. then both 
parent and child wish to receive a transfer from the other. but the non-negativity constraint 
on transfers binds for both agents. Hence, in equilibrium . st rictly positive t ransfers between 
players occur when the level of ex ante inequality is sufficient ly large (for a given level of 
altruism) that the richer player has a strict incentive to send a transfer to the poorer 
player. T he size of the transfer is then just sufficient to equate the marginal ut ility that the 
sender derives from her own consumption to the marginal ut ility that she derives from the 
consumption of the receiver. By contrast , for relatively small amounts of inequality. both 
players would prefer to receive transfers from each other (and hence equilibrium t ransfers 
are zero) since each player cares about the other strictly less than herself ( o < 1). 
Since only one player, if any. sends transfers in equilibrium. the level of transfers can be 
123 
summarized by redefining transfers from P to C as n et t ransfers: 
TPct for TPc t > 0 and Tc Pt. = 0 
for Tpn = 0 and Tc Pt > 0 
0 otherwise 
For simplicity. I henceforth refer to net transfers from P to C as TPC't · 
Given t he income generation process above, I nmv characterize t ransfers between two 
part ies i and j in each state at a given point in t ime. For simplicity. assume a common 
CARA ut ili ty fun ction u(c) = 1- e-ac _ T hen transfers Tij s from Par ty ito Party j in State 
s are given as follows: 
:f- ln5 + A(wis - w1s) _ (I L. f ' 1 l -0 1 Wis - Wjs > - a n 0 
for Wis - Wjs < i ln t5 
0 for l ln 5 < w - w · < _1_ ln 5 a u JS a 
Empir-ical predictions: The ro le of f orecastable income 
( 4.7) 
Consider the effect of forecastable income on altruistic transfers. From ( 4. 7) it is apparent 
that t ransfers are only operative at relatively high levels of inequality. At low levels of in-
equality. no transfers are exchanged. and (small ) changes in parties' permanent/forecastable 
incomes have no effect upon transfers. By cont rast. when transfers are operative. they de-
pend upon forecastable income. An increase in i's forecastable income tends to increase 
t ransfers he sends or decrease the t ransfers he receives . vvhile an increase in j's forecastable 
income tends to decrease t he transfers i sends or increase t he t ransfers he receives . In fac t. 
unlike insurance. there is no distinction between the roles of forecast able and un-forecastable 
income: alt ruism-based t ransfers depend upon forecastable and un-forecastable income in 
exactly the same way. 
In Karner (2012). I show t hat the int ui t ion from this basic two-player model extends 
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to transfers among members of particular kinds of alt ruistic networks. of arbitrary size. 
In particular. in networks characterized by one level of altmism among all players . every 
equilibrium takes the same form. Given an income distribut ion. players with intermediate 
incomes neither send nor receive transfers. If income is sufficiently unequal for a given level 
of altruism. relatively rich players send transfers to relat ively poor players. Such transfers 
are determined by total income. so differences in forecastab le income affect transfers in 
exac tly the same way as differences in un-forecastable income. 
Empirical pr·edi ctions: Shape of the transf er-income fun ction 
An additional set of implications of t ransfers based on ex post alt ruism stems from the 
predicted shape of the t ransfer-income function. T he determination of this shape. and 
comparative statics of t he model. are discussed in Karner (2012). The basic insight is 
the follow ing. The a ltruistic model has corner solut ions that make the predicted pattern 
of transfers nonlinear in the income differences among members of t he alt ruistic network. 
Given an income distribu t ion. parties whose income is below some threshold k1 (determined 
by the parties ' marginal ut ilit ies. levels of altruism . network structure. and the income 
distribution over the network) receive transfers from parties whose income is above some 
threshold k2 2: k1 . The total amount of transfers received by those with incomes below k1 
decreases linearly with income. holding fixed the dist ribut ion of income. At k1. the transfer-
income function becomes fiat and remains so over the entire interval [k1, k2]. Among part ies 
whose income is above k2 . net t ransfers received are negative and again decrease linearly 
with income. 
In contrast. transfers based on insurance (with full commitment) are expected to have 
a constant income derivative. Commitment constraints (see. e.g .. the model of Ligon. et 
al.. 2002) can give rise to nonlinearities in the t ransfer-income function. but the pattern of 
nonlineari t ies is quite different from that predicted by alt ruism: t ransfers change in constant 
proportion to income for relatively small income differences between contracting parties. but 
this proportionali ty breaks down for larger income differences as commitment constraints 
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bind. 
4.3.3 Summary of empirical predictions 
A model of insurance contracted over un-forecastable. idiosyncratic income shocks gives rise 
to the following predict ions: (i) t ransfers should regularly alternate in direct ion : and (ii) the 
direct ion of transfers is invariant to differences in forecastable income between exchanging 
parties. By contrast. altruism suggests that transfers should persistent ly flow from rich to 
poor. and differences in forecast able income between exchanging parties should have t he 
same effect on the direction of transfers as un-forecastable income differences . In addition. 
the predicted shape of the t ransfer-income function differs between insurance and alt ruism . 
In the rest of the paper. I use these contrast ing predict ions to test the null hypothesis that 
intra-family transfers among Indonesian households are motivated purely by insurance . 
·where appropriate. I also assess the extent to which any divergence of transfers from the 
predict ions of pure insurance may be consistent with alt ruism. 
4.4 Data description and samples 
Database 
The dat abase used for this study draws upon individual- and household-level informa-
t ion from four successive waves of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). a nat ionally-
representative longitudinal household survey. The IFLS was first fi elded in 1993 in 13 of 
the 27 provinces Indonesia had at the time. Individuals in these provinces constituted over 
80 percent of Indonesia 's populat ion in 1993. Three subsequent waves were fielded in 1997. 
2000, and 2007. 111 In addition to containing very detailed individual- and household-level 
data, a relat ively unique feature of the IFLS is that it contains information on respondents ' 
nonresident family members - parents , siblings, and children who live apart from respon-
dents. These data include the ages. education , occupations. and locations of individual 
nonresident family members. along with the total amount of fin ancial and in-kind transfers 
111 A follow-up survey based on a 25 percent sub-sample of t he 1993 survey frame was administered in the 
ini tial wake of the crisis in 1998. T he data from that survey were not publicly available as of th is wri ting. 
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sent and received over the year preceding each survey round. 
Analytical samples 
The remainder of the paper uses data from the 1993. 1997. 2000. and 2007 IFLS waves on 
individual earnings . education. transfers exchanged with nonresident parents. siblings. and 
children. other characterist ics of these nonresident family members mentioned above. In 
addition. an important part of the empirical work below relies upon decomposing earnings 
into forecastable and un-forecastable components - a technique that requires making use 
of the panel dimension of the data. In light of this requirement. I restr ict my sample to 
households for which earnings are observed in all four survey rounds. Throughout the 
paper. I define household earnings as the sum of annualized labor earnings and profits from 
self-employment for the household head and spouse. Transfers are defined as net transfers 
sent by the household head and spouse to their nonresident parents . siblings. and children 
over the previous year. I converted nominal earnings and transfers to 2005 rupiah using 
the consumer price index provided in \Vorld Bank (2012). My primary sample consists of 
a balanced panel of 1.922 households for t=1993, 1997. 2000. and 2007. Table 4.1 reports 
basic descriptive statistics for the sample over the four survey waves. Table 4.1 contains 
sumrnary data on transfers exchanged between households and their nonresident family 
members. 
4.5 Empirical Tests of Insurance 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics on the direction of transfers 
Exactly how frequently insurance-based transfers are expected to reverse in direction de-
pends upon the distribution of the shocks over which they are contracted. If the shocks 
are iid and relatively short-lived. then the insurance model presented above suggests that 
transfers should frequent ly reverse in direct ion. The panel dimension of the IFLS data can 
provide insight into whether this prediction is borne out in the data on intra-family transfers 
in Indonesia. 
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of sample households 
1993 1997 2000 2007 
N 
Size (mean) 
Age of head (mean) 
Rural 
Expenditures per capita 
Median 
Mean 
sci 
Nonresident family members 
Parents 
Siblings 
Children 
Note: 
1.922 
4.7 
39.6 
0.62 
213.0 
288.9 
310.0 
1.9 
7.3 
0.6 
4.8 
43.6 
0.62 
279 .2 
442.4 
1503.5 
1.8 
7.5 
1.0 
4.7 
46.5 
0.62 
286.3 
393 .8 
426.0 
1.6 
7. 5 
1.3 
Expenditures per capita a re in tens of thousands of 2005 rupiah. 
Nonres ident fam ily members are parents, siblings , and children 
of the household head and spouse . 
Source: IFLS 
4.3 
53. 1 
0.56 
387.1 
513.9 
438.1 
1.1 
7.5 
1.5 
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Table 4.2: Net transfers sent to nonresident family. 1993-2007 
1993 1997 2000 2007 
Median 0.8 4.1 3.9 0.0 
Among net senders 25.0 31.3 31.3 39.6 
Among net receivers -18.8 -23.6 -23 .4 -30.4 
Mean 29.1 27.5 30 .2 38.1 
sd 150 .3 146.0 155.9 307.5 
Share of expenditures 
Among net senders 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Among net receivers 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Note: 
Net transfers sent to nonresident. parents, siblings , and 
children of t he household head and spouse, in tens of t housands of 
2005 rupiah. Smallest and largest 1% in each yea r excl uded . Share 
of expenditures is media n of share of net remittances sen t in total 
househo ld ex penditures . 
Source: IFLS 
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Table 4.3: Direct ion of net transfers is persistent 
Timet 
Net sender Net receiver Net zero 
Time t-3 
Net sender 0.68 0.25 0.08 
Net receiver 0.42 0.49 0.09 
Net zero 0.42 0.35 0.23 
Time t-7 
N et sender 0.63 0.30 0.07 
N et receiver 0.38 0.53 0.09 
Net zero 0.44 0.36 0.20 
Note: 
Table reports t he fract ion of households in each cell. N=1 ,922 
households. Observations in "t-3" are drawn from t= 1997 and 2000 
(t-3=1993 and 1997. respect ively) . Observations in '·t-7" are drawn from 
t=2000 and 2007 ( t-7 = 1993 and 2000 , respectively ). Cells based on net 
t ransfers exchanged wit h t he nonresident parents, s iblings, and 
ch ildren of t he household head and spouse. 
In contrast to the predictions of pure insurance . transfers between family members in 
the IFLS data appear to be somewhat persistent . In Table 4.3. I construct two sub-samples 
of individuals by pooling together observations on individuals in (1) 1993, 1997. and 2000; 
and (2) 1993. 2000. and 2007. This allows me to construct transition matrices in which t he 
"state" is the direction of net transfers sent , where the transition probabilities are calculated 
using t he state (roughly) three and seven years prior . 
In the bottom panel of Table 4.3 . one can see that 63 percent of households that were 
net senders in a given year (either 1993 or 2000) were net senders again seven years later. 
These ini t ial net senders were more than twice as likely to be net senders again than they 
were to become net receivers. Similarly. households that were initially net receivers were 
nearly 40 percent more likely to again be net receivers seven years later than to become net 
senders. The top panel of Table 4.3 displays a similar pattern. 
vVhat can we infer from these results? This pattern of persistence 1s not necessarily 
inconsistent with pure insurance if. for example, the shocks over which transfers are con-
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tracted also exhibit persistence. On this count , however. it is interest ing to note how similar 
the patterns of persistence are across the two different lag lengths in Table 4.3. It is also 
possible that households may be spreading across multiple years t ransfers arising from par-
ticularly large shocks. The evidence in Table 4.3 indicates that if transfers are motivated 
purely by insurance. then the shocks over which they are contracted are quite persistent 
and / or severe. 
Alternatively. Table 4.3 may suggest a role for persistent. forecastable income differences 
in determining the direct ion of transfers. As discussed below. such a role is consistent with 
t ransfers motivated by altruism . 
4.5.2 Tests of the role of forecastable income 
Empirica l strategy 
I now turn to the question of whether the direct ion of transfers is affected by fore-
castable income differences between exchanging parties . To do so . I adopt two closely-
related approaches. First . I present a series of two-by-two tables. Each table categorizes 
household-year observations by both the direct ion of their net transfers and direction of 
their un-forecastable income shock in that year , conditional upon being in different quan-
tiles of forecastable income. If forecastable income plays no role in determining the direction 
of transfers , then all of the tables should be similar. In particular , moving across tables 
to households with different forecastable incomes should have no effect on the fraction of 
households sending or receiving transfers. On the other hand. if predictably richer house-
holds tend to send more transfers (perhaps to predictably poorer households). then. moving 
from a table of low forecastable income-households to a table of high forecastable income-
households. we should expect to see a larger fract ion of households sending net transfers and 
a smaller fr act ion of households receiving net transfers. In that case . the stronger of these 
two effects will determine the cross- table difference in the share of households exchanging 
zero transfers. Categorizing observations by t he direction of their un-forecastable shocks , 
in addition to the direction of their net intra-family transfers. enables us to see the role 
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un-forecastable income shocks play in determining the direct ion of transfers. 
Two issues that arise when drawing inferences from the two-by-two tables are (i) whether 
any association between forecastable income and t he direction of transfers is statist ically 
significant. and (ii) whether differences in forecastable income are actually capturing the 
influence of other correlated factors associated wi th the direction of t ransfers. l\ Iy second 
approach addresses these issues by testing. in a regression framework . the null hypothesis 
dictated by the pure insurance model that transfers are unrelated to forecastable income. 
My strategy is to estimate the following equation: 
(4.8) 
where T is the net amount of intra-family transfers sent by household i at time t . yF and 
yu are. respect ively. measures of forecastable and un-forecastable income. X is a vector of 
controls. Pt and Prt. are common year and region-by-year effects . and E:i 1 t is a zero-mean error. 
Equation ( 4.8) may be thought of as a reduced-form version a st ructural transfer function 
coming out of the conceptual framework for insurance above. 112 The reduced-form version 
of the transfer function has the advantage of facili tating a test of the essent ial predictions 
of the pure insurance model without imposing overly-rest rictive assumpt ions on the utility 
function. Assuming the existence of suitable measures of individuals' forecastable and un-
forecastable incomes in each year. Equation ( 4.8) can be used to est imate the associa t ion 
between transfers and forecastable income. If transfers are motivated purely by insurance 
(and are not generated by wealth effects arising from aggregate risk). then fJ 1 should equal 
zero. On the other hand. a possible explanation for /3 1 > 0 is that altruism is an important 
motive behind t ransfers . 
Before discussing how I obtain measures of yF and yu. one identification issue that arises 
when estimating ( 4.8) is noteworthy. If Eirt contains determinants ofT that are correlated 
with the measures of yF and yu. then my estimate of (31 will be biased . In particular. the 
11 2 For example, suppose there a re two pa rties, two states of the world , and that utility is of CA RA form. 
Suppose further that t here is no aggregate uncertainty. Then the structural transfer equa t ion dictates that 
t ransfers a re proportiona l to difference between the two parties ' idiosyncratic shocks. 
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msurance model (as well as the altruism model) dictates that the part ner 's income also 
determines transfers. If the incomes of diflerent parties to an insurance contract are corre-
lated. then it is important to include a measure of counterparty income as a control when 
est imating ( 4.8). 
Decompos-ition of income 
I assume that the forecastable income y~7. of household i in region r can be expressed as 
follows: 113 
F F F W F F 
Yirt = ri + I t + lrt + irt + f-l irt ( 4.9a) 
where ri is a household fixed effect capturing the influence of time invari ant . household-
specific factors that influence forecastable income such as individual abili ty or location 
advantages; rf is a common year effect; rft is a region-by-year effect capturing the influence 
of t ime-varying. region-specific factors such as improvements in local infrast ructure: wr;l 
represents t ime-varying. household-specific determinants of forecastable income: and J.-L [-1 is 
a mean-zero random error. 
I further assume that un-forecastable income YEt can be expressed as follows: 
T _ ,..,,T T W T T 
Ytrl - It + frl + !7'l + ~Lu·t (4.9b) 
where rT is a common year effect; r'ft is a region-by-year effect capturing t he influence 
of region-specific shocks such as abnormal weather conditions ; W frt represents household-
specific shocks; and J.-LT7~ 1 is a mean-zero random error. By definition. yfr1 contains no t ime-
invariant components. Combining the equations for forecastable and un-forecastable income 
1 13 T his formula t ion adapts the ap proach of Paxson (1992) to account for t he availability of panel data in 
this study. 
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yields the following equat ion for total income Yirt: 
W F W T Yirt = /i + It + /1·t + irt + irt + !Li1·t (4.10) 
where / 't = !{ + 1[; /rt = 1ft + 1'ft; and f..lirt = f..l~t + ftfr. 1. 
Equat ion (4.10) can be est imated using the longitudinal sample of individuals or house-
holds constructed for this study. I use the logarithm of eamings. defined above, as the 
dependent variable. 114 I replaced log eamings in these household-year observations with 
zero. and included a dummy variable for these observations in all eamings and transfer 
specifications in this paper. I obtained results very similar to those below by restrict ing my 
sample to households that reported positive earnings in all four years . I discuss the robust-
ness and interpretation of my results to alternat ive ways of dealing with these observations 
below. 
I use as measures of yF and yu. respectively, the fitted values and residuals of different 
specifications of Equation ( 4. 10). Since fjF and fju depend upon specification. one must 
consider carefully exactly which regressors to include when est imat ing ( 4.10) . Including 
additional regressors that are determinants of forecastable income. such as elements of W~1 . 
reduces the likelihood that the residuals (which become fj~ 1 ) will contain forecastable income 
components. However, if addi t ional regressors are included that are in fact determinants of 
un-forecastable income, then fJt1 will contain un-forecastable components of income. 
It is important to consider what the possibility of cross-contamination between fj~ 1 and 
fj~1 implies for my empirical st rategy. Recall that under the null hypothesis that transfers 
are pure insurance, un-forecastable income is what drives transfers and forecastable income 
has no effect on t ransfers. First. suppose that the measure of un-forecastable income used 
in est imating ( 4.8) contains forecastable components of income. To the extent that fj~ 1 
contains forecastable components. I will be less likely to find f3J > 0. It is interest ing to 
contrast this with a key concern in the li terature on the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) 
114 Earnings were zero in 243 (approximately three percent of) household-year observations, for 216 (ap-
proximately ll percent of) households , in my sam ple. 
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(Friedman and Kuznets. 1954; Friedman. 1957). which commonly est imates the permanent 
and un-forecastable components of income. Tests of t he PIH are invalid if estimates of 
un-forecastable income are contaminated by permanent components. T his is an important 
reason why Paxson (1992) 's use of rainfall fluctuations to instrument for un-forecastable 
income was a major contribu tion. ·whereas studies in the PIH literature typically estimate 
savings equations. t he concern of the present paper is with determinants of the direction 
of transfers. Under the null hypothesis of a simple model of insurance. forecastable income 
has no effect . so leakage of forecastable into un-forecastable income will tend to cause the 
role of un-forecastable income to be overstated (raise ~2) . while reducing t he likelihood of 
reject ing the null hypothesis of f3 t = 0. By contrast. if my est imates of forecastable income 
are contaminated with un-forec<:LStable components. then I risk incorrect ly reject ing the null 
hypothesis. 
A related issue is how to deal with the likely presence of common forecastable and un-
forcastable shocks. There is good reason to suspect the presence of important aggregate 
year and time-varying regional components of forecastable income over the nearly fifteen 
year period under study. For example, most households probably experienced significant 
developments in their local infrast ructure and structural changes in their regional economies. 
And a host of forecastable earnings changes surely occurred as the Indonesian economy 
recovered from the 1997-8 finan cial crisis . On the other hand. natural disasters such as 
earthquakes and tsunamis likely had un-forecastable effects. Hence. including year and 
region-by-year dummies as regressors runs t he risk of contaminat ing rneasured forecastable 
income wit h any common year and region-by-year determinants of un-forecast able income 
that may be present . 
In light of this tradeoff. I include as regressors in my benchmark specification of ( 4.10) 
dummies for t he age of the household head in 1997. dummies for each of 10 occupations. a 
quadratic for the number of grades of schooling completed by the household head. and con-
tro is for household composition. 11 5 These variables are likely to be strongly associated with 
115 The household composit ion cont rols a re the number of ind ividua ls of each gender in each of lhe fo llowing 
age groups: < 1 year , 1-7 yea rs , 8-1 5 yea rs , and over 15 years . 
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forecastable income. The age dummies are intended to capture life-cycle effects in earnings. 
Measures of household composition and schooling are commonly used as determinants of 
forecastable income (see. e.g .. Paxson. 1992). 
This specification forces into the error (and hence into rF) t he entire term "Yi + "Yt + 
"Yrt + WL + J-L irt· '' 6 Later in the paper . I gauge the robustness of my results to alternative 
specifications of (4.10) and to controlling for aggregate risk. The fact t hat I obtain very 
similar estimates of the effect of forecastable income across these alternative specifications 
makes it unlikely that my results are driven by the contamination of measured forecastable 
income with un-forecastable components. 
My baseline est imates of Y~t and Y~t are t he fi tted values and residuals. respectively. of 
the following est imating equat ion: 
Yirt = ex~ + Miri ( 4. 11 ) 
where Mirt = "Yi + "Yt + "Yrt + W frt +J-tirt is a composite error term. Table 4.4 presents summary 
statistics of y{;.t and yf,. 1. Average forecastable income is apparently larger for households 
in the urban relat ive to rural sector . This seems sensible in light of the fact that average 
education levels and household expenditures per capita are higher in t he urban sector. Also 
unsurprisingly, there is greater dispersion in both forecastable and un-forecastable incomes 
in rural relative to urban areas. 
2x2 tables 
Table 4.5 contains three two-by-two tables. each of which categorizes household-year 
observations by quintile (lowest. middle, highest) of their net transfers sent and quintile 
(lowest or highest) of their measured un-forecastable income shock in that year. I use 
quintiles of net transfer amounts as my classification of the direction of net transfers sent 
in order to reduce the potential impact of measurement error . All net transfer amounts in 
116The term Mirt = Y irt - y[. 1 - f)[. 1 , which Paxson ( 1992) calls '· unex plained income", defini te ly contains 
both forecastable and un-forecastable components . In a pplications designed to test t he PIH , t his again tends 
to bias inference against rejecting t he PIH . But in the present a pplication , it will reduce t he likelihood t hat 
measured forecasta ble income a ffects the d irection of t ransfers . 
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Table 4.4: Summary of income variables 
Forecastable income variables 
Forecastable log income 
Baseline A lternative 
Overall Urban Rural Overall Urban 
Mean 14.8 15.6 14.4 14.8 15.7 
stdev 2.8 1.6 3.2 2.9 1.8 
20th 14.6 15.2 14.4 14.4 15. 1 
Median 15.3 15.7 14.9 15.3 15.9 
80th 15.9 16.3 15.6 16.2 16.5 
Education gap (Own - Nonresident family) 
Mean 
stdev 
20th 
Median 
80th 
Mean 
stdev 
20th 
Median 
80th 
Overall Siblings 
-0.3 -0.2 
3.3 3.1 
-2.9 
-0. 5 
2.2 
-2.8 
0.0 
2.1 
Un-forecastable log income 
Baseline A lternative 
Overall Urban Rural Overall Urban 
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 
-0. 5 -0.4 -0.6 -0 .. 5 -0.4 
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Rural 
14.3 
3.3 
14.0 
14.9 
15.8 
Rural 
0.0 
0.8 
-0 .6 
0.0 
0.6 
Note: Baseline forecastable a nd un-forecastable incomes a re t he fi tted values and 
res idua ls, respect ively, o f an OLS regress ion of (log) earnings of the household head 
a nd spouse (in 200.5 rupiah) on du mmies for age cohort and occupat ion, a quadratic 
in head 's educat ion , a nd t he number of household members in each of eight gender-
age groups. Alternative forecastable a nd un-forecasta ble incomes a re t he fi tted 
values and res idua ls , respect ive ly, o f a n OLS regress ion of (log) earnings on 
household fixed effects. "Education gap" is t he difference between number o f 
grades completed by t he household head a nd t he average of t he number of grades 
completed by each nonres ident fa mi ly member of t he head and spouse in 1997. 
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the lowest and highest quintiles are, respectively, negative and positive. Furthermore. since 
i)~L is distributed roughly symmetrically about zero. all measured un-forecastable shocks in 
the highest quinti le are strict ly positive and all in the lowest quintile are st rictly negative. 
The sample in Panel A is rest ricted to observations with measured forecastable income i)F 
in the lowest quintile. whi le the sample in Panel B only includes observations with i)F m 
the highest quint ile. The sample in Panel C is unrest ricted. 
'vVe would expect Panels A. B. and C to be very similar if forecastable income plays no 
role in determining the direct ion of transfers. The top two panels of Table 4A paint a very 
different picture. Out of all observations in Panel B (high forecastable income) . the total 
fraction with net transfers in the highest quintile is 63 percent. This compares to only 15 
percent of observations in Panel A (low forecast able income). Out of all observations in 
Panel A. the total fraction with net transfers in the lowest quintile is 55 percent. compared 
to 26 percent in Panel B. It seems that households with high forecastable income are much 
more likely to send transfers . and much less likely to receive transfers. than households 'vvith 
low forecastable income. P anels A and B st rongly suggest a positive association between 
forecastable income and the propensity to send transfers . 
Table 4.5 also indicates that un-forecastable income shocks are associated with the di-
rection of transfers. In all cases. household-year observations in the highest quint ile of net 
transfers sent are more likely to have had a high un-forecastable shock than a low one. while 
those in the lowest quintile are more likely to have had a low un-forecastable shock than a 
high one. This is an indicat ion of some extent of risk-sharing. Whether that risk-sharing 
arises from pure insurance , altruism , or a mixture of the two motives. remains an open 
question. 
As anticipated above. one concern about inferring from Table 4.5 that forecastable in-
come affects the direction of transfers stems from the likely correlat ion between measured 
forecastable income of households in my sample and the forecastable income of their non-
resident family members. Such a correlation could cause Table 4.5 to under- or overstate 
the extent to which forecastable income is associated with the direction of transfers. To 
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Table 4.5: Net transfers sent increase with forecastable income 
Panel A 
Forecastable income: Lowest quintile 
Net transfurs sent to 
nonresident family 
Panel B 
( quintile) 
Lowest 
I'viiddle 
Highest 
Un-forecastable income 
( quintile) 
Lowest 
0.28 
0.14 
0.06 
Highest 
0.27 0.55 
0.16 0. 30 
0.09 0.1 5 
Forecastable income: Highest quintile 
Net transfers sent to 
nonresident family 
( quintile) 
Lowest 
l'l'liddle 
Highest 
Panel C 
Overall 
Net transfers sent to 
nonresident family 
( quintile) 
Lowest 
Middle 
Highest 
Un-forecastable income 
( quintile) 
Lowest 
0.18 
0.08 
0. 24 
Highest 
0.08 
0.03 
0.39 
Un-forecastable income 
( quintile) 
Lowest 
0.21 
0.14 
0.13 
Highest 
0.18 
0.11 
0.23 
0.26 
0.11 
0.63 
0.40 
0.25 
0.35 
Note : Table reports the sha re of a ll observat ions in each cell. Observat ions 
are at the household-yea r level for t = 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2007. N= l ,538 
(Panel A); 1,537 (Panel B); 7,688 (Panel C). Forecastable and un-forecastable 
income are t he fitted values and residua ls, respect ively, of an OLS regression 
of (log) earnings on dummies for age cohort and occupation, a quadrat ic in 
head 's educat ion , and t he number of household members in each of eight 
gend er-age groups. Nonresident family includes pa rents, s iblings, and 
children. 
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account for this. and as a robustness check on my baseline measure of forecastable income. 
I construct a measure of relative forecastable income that explicit ly accounts for the gap 
between the forecastable income of households in my sample and their nonresident family 
members. I refer to this measure of relative fo recastable income as t he "education gap". 
calculated as the difference in the number of grades of school completed by the heads of 
households in my sample and the simple average of the number of grades of school completed 
by each member of t he head and spouses ' nonresident family. 
The resul ts of t his exercise are reported in Table 4.6. and are quali tat ively very similar 
to those of Table 4.5. In particular , half of all observations in Panel A (which restricts 
the sample to households with an education gap in the lowest quintile) are in the lowest 
quint ile of net t ransfers sent. compared to only 32 percent in Panel B (which is restricted 
to the sub-sample of households with an education gap in the highest quint ile) . Similarly. 
t he total fraction of observat ions in the highest quintile of net transfers sent is 26 percent in 
Panel A. compared to 51 percent in Panel B. Hence. the education gap approach suggests a 
posit ive association between relative forecast able income and t he propensity to send trans-
fers, confi rming t he inference from absolute forecastable income and providing a robustness 
check on the construct ion of measured forecastable income. 
Regression results 
Table 4. 7 reports the results of OLS est imates of Equat ion ( 4.8) on the panel of house-
holds in my sample. T he dependent variable is t he amount of net transfers sent by the 
household head and spouse to their nonresident family. in tens of t housands of 2005 rupiah. 
Standard errors are clustered at the household-level. 
In Column 1 of Table 4. 7. the regressors are gF and gu. 117 Both coefficient estimates are 
positive and highly significant. indicating that households with higher forecastable incomes 
send more net t ransfers. condi t ional upon their un-forecastable shock. and households with 
higher uu-forecastable incomes send more net transfers. conditional upou t heir forecastable 
mcome. 
11 7 As noted above, a ll specificat ions also include a dummy for whether or not the household reported zero 
earnings in a given year. 
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Table 4.6: Net transfers sent increase with relative forecastable income 
Panel A 
Education gap: Lowest quintile 
Un-forecastable income 
( quintile) 
N et transfers sent to 
nonresident family 
( quintile) 
Lowest 
Middle 
Highest 
Lowest 
0.21 
0.14 
0.08 
Highest 
0.29 
0.10 
0.18 
0.50 
0. 24 
0. 26 
Panel B 
Education gap: Highest quintile 
Net transfers sent to 
nonresident family 
(quintile) 
Lowest 
Middle 
Highest 
U n-forecastable income 
(quintile) 
Lowest Highest 
0.20 0.11 
0.12 0.06 
0.22 0.29 
0. 32 
0.18 
0.51 
Note: Tab le reports the sha re of a ll observations in each cell. Observat ions 
are at the household-yea r level for t = l993, 1997, 2000 , and 2007. N= l ,538 
(Panel A); 1,535 (Panel B). "Education gap" is t he difference 
between number of grades completed by the household head and the 
average of t he number of grades completed by each nonresident 
family member of the head and spouse in 1997. Un-forecastable 
income is the residua ls of an OLS regression of (log) earnings 
on dummies for age cohort and occupation , a quadratic in head's 
education , and the number of household members in each of eight 
gender-age groups. Nonresident fa mily includes parents , siblings, and 
chi ldren. 
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Table 4.7: J\,Iain results on association between t ransfers and forecastable income 
Forecastable income variables 
Forecastable income 
Education 
NR.F's education 
O ther variables 
U n-forecastable income 
Constant 
Observations 
Households 
1 
51.77*** 
(4 .40) 
15.01 *** 
(3 .31) 
-761. 12*** 
(66.23) 
7,688 
1,922 
2 
47.83*** 
(5.28) 
1.59 
( 1.15) 
14. 78*** 
(3 .30) 
-709.95*** 
(76.81) 
7,688 
1,922 
3 
26.21 *** 
(5.96) 
7.82*** 
(1.23) 
-2.61 ** 
( 1.17) 
14.61 *** 
(3.30) 
-394.55*** 
(86. 18) 
7,688 
1,922 
Note: Estima ted by OLS. Dependent var iable is net t ransfers sent to nonresident family of 
head and spouse. Standard errors in pa rentheses, clustered at t he household-level. 
"Ed ucation" is t he number of grades completed by t he household head. "N RF 's 
ed ucation" is t he average of t he number of grades completed by each nonresident fa mily 
member in 1997. Nonresident fam ily includes parents. siblings. a nd children . 
Forecastable a nd un-forecastable income are the fitted va lues and resid ua ls. 
respectively. of an O LS regress ion of (log) earnings on dummies for age cohort and 
occupation , a quadrat ic in head "s education , a nd the number of household members in 
each of eight gender-age groups. 
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Interest ingly, t he estimated effect of forecastable income in Column 1 is more than t hree 
t imes larger than that of un-forecastable income. 118 (The est imated eff'ects of fF are sta-
tistically indist inguishable across all specifications in Table 4. 7.) A possible explanation 
is that measured forecastable income is positively correlated with omit ted determinants 
of the direction of t ransfers. A strong candidate for such a determinant is the nonresi-
dent family 's forecastable income. To test this hypothesis. I use the simple average of the 
number of grades of schooling completed by each nonresident family member as a measure 
of the nonresident family 's forecastable income. The estimates in Column 2 demonstrate 
that this measure of the nonresident family 's forecastable income is weakly posit ively asso-
ciated with the propensity to send t ransfers, condit ional upon measured forecastable and 
un-forecastable income of the household. while the effect of mea~ured forecastable income 
is only slight ly smaller and st ill highly significant. 
The specification in Column 3 uses fjF , the head of household 's education . and the non-
resident family's educa tion as regressors . In comparison to the est imates in Column 1. the 
coefficient on Ytrt is nearly identical. while the est imated effect of the nonresident family's 
education is negative and significant. As expected , the est imated impact of forecastable 
income on net t ransfers sent is much smaller (though it remains highly statist ically sig-
nificant) after condi t ioning upon the head of household 's education . Finally. it is worth 
noting t hat the magnitude of the coefficient estimate on nonresident family's education is 
less than half t hat of own education. and t he hypothesis that the two estimates are equal 
in magnitude is easily rejected. This argues against est imating specifications combining the 
two measures into a single measure of t he "education gap" constructed for Table 4.6. 
The magnitudes of the est imated effects of forecastable and un-forecastable income on 
transfers reported in Table 4. 7 are large . A one standard deviation increase in forecastable 
income is associated with an increase in net transfers sent of roughly 4.5 times mean transfers 
sent by net senders, and 6 times mean transfers received by net receivers. Meanwhile. a 
one standard deviation increase in un-forecastable income is associated with an increase in 
118T he hypothesis t hat t he coefficients on f)F and f) u in Column 1 a re equal is easily rejected. 
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net transfers sent of roughly 40 percent and 50 percent of mean net transfers of net senders 
and net receivers, respectively. 
I conclude from Table 4 . 7 that own forecastable income is strongly. positively assoCI-
atecl with net transfers sent -- much more so than un-forecastable income - and there is no 
indication that this difference arises from a failure to control for the nonresident family 's 
forecastable income. Since t here is no evidence of significant bias in the est imated effect 
of forecastable income clue to t he omission of a measure of the nonresident family's fore-
castable income, I adopt the specification in Column 1 of Table 4.7 as my benchmark. 
Rob'Ustness to aggregate risk 
The specifications in Table 4.8 explore the possibility t hat aggregate ri sk is driving the 
apparently significant association between forecastable income and t ransfers . In Columns 
1 and 3. I sweep out year and region-by-year effects . The es timated effects of forecast able 
and un-forecastable income on net transfers sent are virtually unchanged from Table 4 .7 . 
Column 1. Apparently time-varying. region-specific common shocks a re not a significant 
source of bias in the estimated associat ion between transfers and the income variables. 
I a lso test explicitly for the possibility that the apparently strong association between 
forecastable income and the direct ion of transfers in the data is driven by the presence of 
aggregate risk. To do this, I constructed a measure of variability in annual rainfa ll over 
time, within a given region. Annual variation in ra infa ll is likely to be a significaut macro 
risk to income in Indonesia given the relative importance of agriculture to the economy. 119 
Levine and Yang (2006) document t hat rainfall variation induces variation in agricultural 
output. It should be noted. however. that this is not conclusive evidence that ra infa ll shocks 
cause income shocks due to possible general equilibrium effects on prices. 
I construct a measure of rainfall variability using data on historical rainfall measurements 
collected by hundreds of weather stations across Indonesia . reported in GHCN (2012). 120 
119 0 ver two-thirds of the total population lived in the rura l sector in 1992. By 2007, t he number had fa llen 
to approximately 50 percent (World Bank. 2012) . 
120 The data a re the same and the methods of construction a re very simila r to t hose used by Levine and 
Yang (2006). 
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Table 4.8: Results on aggregate risk 
1 2 3 4 
Forecastable income variables 
Forecasta ble income 51.73*** 50.44*** 53 .10*** 46. 05*** 
( 4.40) (11.16) (5.09) (11.26) 
Forecastable income 
*Rainfall va riability 3.87 24.72 
(39.86) (40.93) 
Other variables 
U n-forecastable income 15 .04*** 15.02*** 15.25*** 15.27*** 
(3 .33) (3 .32) (3.38) (:3.37) 
Ha infa ll va riability 72 .0 1 
(586 .23) 
Constant -760.00*** -777.49 -773.83*** -759. 13*** 
(66 . 78) (163. 12) (82.48) (78.41) 
0 bservations 7,688 7.688 7,688 7,688 
Households 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 
Year dummies? X X X X 
Region-by-year dummies? X X 
Note: Estimated by OLS. Dependent variable is net t ra ns fers sent to nonresident family of head and 
spouse. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at t he hou~eho ld-level. Nonres ident family 
includes parents. siblings. a nd children. Forecastable a nd un-forecastable income a re t he fi t ted 
va lues a nd residuals. respecti vely. of an OLS regression of (log) earnings on dummies for age cohort 
a nd occupation. a quadrat ic in head 's education. and the number of household members in each of 
eight gender-age grou ps. '·Rainfall va riabili ty" is t he coeffic ient of va riation of average rainfa ll in t he 
province between 1953 and 1991 (see text for deta ils). 
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Specifically, my measure of rainfall variabili ty is CJ,.. the coefficient of variation in annual 
rainfall within a given province T . over the period 1953-1 992. My estimate of the average 
amount of rainfall across regions over t his period is 2.138 millimeters. 1viy measure of 
rainfall variabili ty within a given region. CJ,. . has a mean of 0.28 and standard deviation of 
0.26 across regions. The Appendix contains further details on the construction of CJ ,.. 
To test whether geographic variation in aggregate risk is driving my main results. I add 
CJr and its interact ion wit h forecastable income to my main specification of the direction of 
transfers. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.8 report t he resul ts of this test . The direct effect 
of rainfall variabili ty on net transfers is insignificant. l\1oreover. while the est imated direct 
efl:'ect of forecastable income on the direction of t ransfers remains highly significant . the 
interact ion between forecastable income and CJ1. is statistically insignificant. T here is no 
evidence that transfers are more strongly associated with forecastable income in areas with 
more aggregate uncertainty.121 
Alternative income m easuTes 
A possible concern is that measured forecastable income is significant ly associated with 
transfers due to cross-contamination between forecastable and un-forecastable income com-
ponents in i)F and i)u . To explore this possibility, I gauge the sensitivity of my benchmark 
results to an alternative specificat ion of the earnings equation ( 4.11). Specifically. I con-
structed alternative measures of yF and yu , which I refer to as i)F -alt and i)u -alt. by 
estimating the following equat ion in place of ( 4.11 ): 
Yirt = 'Yi + fj irt (4 .12) 
I set i)F -alt and i)u -alt equal to the fi tted values and residuals. respectively. of an OLS 
regression of ( 4.12). I then re-est imate the previously-presented specifications using these 
121 0ne might suspect that ra in fall va riabili ty is a more important source of macro risk for households in 
the rural sector . I estimated t he speci fications in Columns 2 a nd 4 of Table 4.8 on t his sub-samp le. T he 
resul ts were quali tat ively very simila r. In addition , t he interaction between un-forecastable income and ar 
was statistically insignificant when included in this specification (as was t he effect of un-forecasta ble income 
itself). 
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Table 4.9: Alternative forecastable income 
Forecastable income variables 
Fe ll'<'( 'H,..; t ab ll' inc<JitH ' 
Ftll'<'('a:-; t abl<· iHcc,uH· 
* Hainfa ll nt ri abili t,· 
Othe r variables 
Uu- fcJI'< '('i:ISt"<tbh· iiH'< lllLl' 
Ha infall va riauilir.,· 
()lJ:-'<'rnttitHls 
Indi dlllwl,; 
Year dummies? 
R egion-by- yea r dummies? 
1.1 1.2 
Alternative 
forecastable 
B ase line income 
;jl.T~ *** 
(-1. -IIJ ) 
l"J.IJ.]*** 
(:U:l) 
-71iiJ .IHJ*** 
(lili .7x) 
7.(iXX 
I.'J 22 
X 
4:l.!Jl *** 
(2.!1: l} 
li .4 :,•• 
(2.XIJ ) 
-( i ~l 4 .G2 *** 
(-14.1i l } 
'J.l72 
2.2'J:l 
X 
2.1 2 .2 
Alte rnative 
forecastable 
Baseline incom e 
!)() .4~ *** .]:l.!)(i*** 
( ll. lli ) (!J.71i ) 
:l .X7 . IJ .. ](i 
(:l<J.Kii ) (:1:!.'1K) 
1'>.112*** li. -l'i ** 
(:U2 ) (2. /'J ) 
72.01 IIJ ii.K"l 
(c>XIi.2:l} (-!'J(J. '11 ) 
-771. 4'1 -( i7:l.!l :l*** 
( l li:l .l2) (J: l'J.71 ) 
7.1iKK '1.172 
1. '122 2.2!1:! 
X X 
3 .1 
Baseline 
41i.O:-, *** 
( 11.:21i) 
2-1.72 
( -lll.'1:l} 
[,-, _27*** 
(:U7 ) 
-l c>!1 . I:l*** 
(I X. -! I ) 
f.fiXX 
1.'122 
X 
X 
Notl': E:-: tiuwtl'd 1,_,. O L S. Dc' IW!Idc· ut \'i.ll'iilhlc• is 111'1 tn.msft •rs st•ut to lloJm•s idc·nt falllily of lu•ac l <I IHI spnHSt'. Standa rd 
<'rrors ill pan·uth<'S<'S . d u:-:tc•n·d at the houst •hold-lt•\'l' l. N mlH'sidc•ut family iududPs pan•tlt s. si hliug;s. <.111 d l"hild n·n . 
8asi'Jim• fort'ntstabll' and 1111-ftm•castahl(' iut·ouw:-: an· tiH' fittl'd ,·,thu·s a wl n·siduab . rP:-<p<Tt in-1,\'. tlf au OLS n ·~n ·~s iou 
of ( lop,) t•amiu~s ou duJHIHies for <1).!,(' <"ohort <1 11d tl('t' llpatioH . a quad mti<' ill i ll'ad's ('d lln.lt ion . and tlw unudH·r of 
housPhold IIH'Illii<'I'S in f'<l<"h tlf t'ig"ht ~<' lltl t'r-agp ).!; l'llllp:->. Alt£'rll<lti vc• ftm•t·astal)l<· c111d 111 1-ftm•<·astahll' iunmws aw tit< · 
fitt('d qdw•s and re:-> idlwls. n'SJH'cli\'Pl.\'. of au OLS rq!,n•ssiun of ( lo:.!, ) Pamiugs o11 housl'hold l'ixt•d f'fft•t·ts. "l\a iJJ !'idl 
\'<triahilit<" is tlw cocttit'i<'lll of \·ariatiou of m·c·ragc• rai nf<tll ill the provill('(' h(•twt'1 '11 l ~)!'"d aud l~H il (s<'1' t<•xt fur dt•l ;.li ls) . 
3 .2 
Alte rnat ive 
for e castable 
incotne 
-IIU2 *** 
('!.'1'1 ) 
I:U-1 
(:F; .o :l} 
(i.!""J-l ** 
(2.W> ) 
-l i: l:l.21i *** 
(:i2.21i) 
!).172 
2.2!J:l 
X 
X 
alternative measures of forecastable and un-forecastable income. The results are reported 
in Table 4.9. 122 Using the alternative income measures. the results are qualitatively very 
similar. although t he coeffi cient estimate on forecastable income is somewhat smaller and 
t he est imated effect of un-forecastable income is much smaller. The hypothesis that t he 
coefficients est imates on forecastable and un-forecastable income are equal is st ill easily 
rejected. In addit ion , even under the alterna t ive income measures. t here is no evidence that 
the extent of aggregate risk is an important driver of the significant association between 
forecastable income and net transfers sent. 
I conclude that Table 4.7 provides evidence of a strong association between forecastable 
income and the amount of net transfers sent. This result is inconsistent with a pure in-
122 All specificat ions in Table 4.9 a lso include year dummies . T he sample size is somew hat la rger in specifi-
cations using the a lterna tive measures of forecastable and un-forecastable income since t he data requirements 
are less stringent . Estimates of t hese specificat ions using the benchmark sample yield very simi la r resul ts. 
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surance mot ive. One alternat ive explanat ion that provides a role for forecastable income 
differences is e:r post altruism. However . the relatively larger impact of forecastable versus 
un-forecastable income on t ransfers is inconsistent with a ltrism. 
Results on the direction of transfers 
In Table 4.10. I explore specifications involving the direct ion. rather than amount. of 
transfers. The dependeut variable. which summarizes the direction of net t ransfers sent 
by the household in a given year . equals -1 if net t ransfers sent are negative (i.e. if the 
household is a net receiver): 0 if net t ransfers are zero: and 1 if net transfers sent are 
positive. Ordered logit coefficient estimates are reported. and all specifications include year 
dummies . 
Table 4. 10: Direction of t ransfers 
1 2 3 4 
Alternative Alternative 
forecastable forecastable 
Baseline income Baseline income 
Forecastable income 0.630*** 0.532*** 0.653*** 0. 539*** 
(0.040) (0 .027) (0.045) (0.029) 
Un-forecastable income 0.243*** 0.1 53*** 0.265*** 0.171 *** 
(0 .030) (0 .027) (0.031) (0.027) 
Observations 7,688 9,172 7,688 9,172 
Individuals 1,922 2,293 1,922 2,293 
Region-by-year dummies? X X 
Note: Table reports ordered logit coefficient estimates. Dependent varia ble equa ls 1 if net 
t ransfers sent to t he nonresident fam ily a re posit ive; 0 if net t ransfers set equa l zero ; a nd -1 if 
net t ransfers sent are negat ive. All specificat ions include yea r dummies. Alternative 
forecastable and un-forecasta.ble incomes are t he fitted values and residuals , respect ively, of 
an OLS regression of (log) earnings on household fi xed effects . 
T he results in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 4.10 are qualitat ively the same as those in 
Column 1 of Table 5. In particular , both forecastable and un-forecastable income are 
significant ly and positively associated with the propensity to send net transfers. and t he 
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relat ive effect of forecastable income is much larger. This is t rue even when region-by-year 
dummies are included. 
Column 2 reports ordered logit est imates of specifications of the direct ion of transfers. 
using the alternative measures of forecastable and un-forecastable income described above. 
As was the case in the OLS results of Table 4.9. t he magnitudes of the coeffi cients are 
smaller under the alternat ive income measures. The results of Column 4 indicate that the 
positive and significant associat ion of the direct ion of transfers with forecastable income is 
robust to controls for common region-by-year shocks. 
I also est imated orderedlogit specifications of the direction of transfers involving rainfall 
variability. analogous to the OLS results of transfer amounts in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 
4.8. The results were qualitatively very similar to those in Table 4.8. In part icular. there is 
no indication that the extent of aggregate risk in a given region is an important driver of 
the significant association between forecastable income and the direction of transfers. 
I conclude that t he ordered logit estimates of the direction of transfers largely confirm 
the OLS est imates of the amount of net transfers sent . 
Additional robustness checks 
A variety of robustness checks yielded results very similar to those above. First. the 
theory of insurance suggests that forecastable income should not affect transfers regardless 
of which transform of income one takes. As a robustness check on my main results, and in 
particular to test the sensitivi ty of the relative effects of forecast able versus un-forecastable 
income on transfers, I re-estimated all specifications using earnings in levels rather than log-
arit hms. While forecastab le income was positively and significantly (at the 5 percent level) 
associated with net transfers sent. un-forecastable income was not significantly associated 
with transfer amounts. Nioreover. t he point est imate of the effect of forecastable income 
was much larger than that of un-forecastable income. 123 
I also re-est imated all specifications using net transfers sent as a share of household 
123 T his was t rue regardless of whether a. dummy for zero earnings was included in t he earnings and /or 
t ransfer specificat ions. 
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expenditures . rather than the absolute amount . as the dependent variable. The resul ts were 
quali tatively very similar to t hose reported for specifications of absolute t ransfer amounts. 
Finally. I estimated all specifications using average t ransfers by the household over t he 
four observat ions in the period 1993-2007 as the dependent variable. T he theory of pure 
insurance predicts that both current and average transfer amounts. in addit ion to the direc-
tion of t ransfers. should be unaffected by forecastable income. Cont radicting th is prediction. 
the results for specifications of average transfers were very similar to those reported above. 
The one way in which the results reported above appear somewhat sensitive to specifica-
t ion is in the treatment of observations with zero earnings. As noted above. I set the natural 
logarithm of earnings for this small number of observations equal to zero and included a 
dummy variable for these cases in all specifications. 124 Resul ts obtained from re-est imating 
all specifications on t he sub-sample that excludes the small number of observat ions with 
zero earnings were virtually identical to those reported above. Results were also quali ta-
tively similar when I set earnings equal to one rupiah for observations with zero earnings. 
regardless of whether I included the dummy for zero earnings. 
However. if the dummy variable for observations with zero earnings is excluded from my 
benchmark specifications, the relat ive magnit udes of the estimated effects of forecastable 
versus un-forecastable incomes change (although forecastable income is always positively 
and highly significantly associated with transfers). The zero-earnings observations have the 
effect of substantially reducing the magnit ude of t he measured income variable in which 
they are included. So when the zero earnings dummy is included in t he earnings specifi-
cation (which effectively categorizes zero earnings as a forecastable shock). the magnitude 
of the estimated effect of forecastable income on t ransfers drops substantially and actually 
becomes smaller than that for un-forecastable income. When the dummy for zero earnings 
is excluded from both the t ransfer and earnings specifications (which effectively catego-
rizes zero earnings as an un-forecastable shock), the magni tude of the est imated effect of 
un-forecastable income on transfers drops substantially. 
124 Households with at least one year of zero earnings a re disproportiona tely concent rated in agricul t ure, 
relat ive to the overall sample. 
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Hence. it seems that spells in which earnings drop to zero have an important. but signifi-
cantly different. relationship with transfers than do other earnings changes. It is not a priori 
clear whether such changes are appropriately classified as forecastable or tm-forecastable. 
The important points for t he present study are that: (i) forecastable income is positively 
and significantly associated wit h net transfers sent. regardless of how observations with zero 
earnings are treated ; and (ii ) in the range of earnings associated with the vast majori ty of 
observations in my sample. the magnitude of the estimated effect of forecastable income on 
transfers is much larger t han t hat of un-forecastable income. 
4.5.3 Summary and discussion 
Table 4.3 indicates that int ra-family t ransfers have a tendency to flow in t he same di rection 
over time. This points to a potentially important role for forecastable income determinants 
- a role that is largely inconsistent with insurance motives. The tabulations in Tables 4.5 
and 4.6 suggest . and regression results confirm. that a strong association exists between 
forecastable income and net t ransfer amounts. 
These resul ts are collectively inconsistent with the pure insurance motive . In the next 
section. I explore the extent to which ex post altruism could explain t hese patterns. 
4.6 Transfers as Ex Post Altruism 
Persis tence and forecastable income 
Is a model of altruistic t ransfers capable of explaining t he patterns observed in the data 
on intra-family transfers in Indonesia? Foreca.stable income differences among members of 
an alt ruistic network can cause transfers to persistently flow from rich to poor individuals. 
Thus, altruism can explain not only the significance of forecas table income in the results of 
Table 5, but also the sign of its estimated effect. 
In a model of altruism. since the amount of transfers depends upon total income. the 
effects of forecastable and un-forecastable income changes should be identical. On this 
count . the evidence is inconsistent with altru ism. Most of the evidence presented above 
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indicates that the estimated effect of forecastable income on transfers is significantly larger 
than that of un-forecastable income. 
Additional tests based on the shape of the transfer fun ction 
As discussed above. Cox. et al. (2004) estimate t ransfer functions on data from the 
Philippines using a linea r spline function. Using a linear spline estimator with a single 
endogenous kno t . they find evidence that such a knot is present in the transfer function: 
they statist ically reject both the linear model and higher-order polynomials in favor of their 
linear spline model. IVIoreover. the pattern of slopes at income levels below and above 
their estimated knot somewhat consistent with t he alt ruistic model: net transfers received 
decrease less-strongly with income for income levels above the knot. 
Cox. et al. (2004) interpret this pattern of nonlinearity in the data as evidence of 
alt ruism. However. this interpretation warrants caut ion for several reasons. First. t he 
patterns they document are only consistent with the predicted shape of the first half of the 
altruistic transfer function . In fact (and although t heir t heory does not call for a second 
knot). they statistically reject a linear spline model with two knots against the single-knot 
alterna tive. However. it is also unclear whether t he econometric assumpt ions needed to 
produce consistent estimates of t heir two-knot model are the same as t hose required for t he 
single-knot model. 125 
Second. they do not observe donors' incomes in their data. so they are unable to disen-
tangle the roles of donor and recipient income in determining t ransfers. 
Perhaps most important ly. Cox. et al. (2004) 's tests of the altruistic motive are based 
on a theoretical model involving only two parties. As ment ioned above. the more general 
model predicts that t he location of the income thresholds (i.e. knot points) in the transfer 
function among members of an alt ruist ic network of arbitrary size depends upon the income 
distribut ion over the ent ire network. Hence, attempt ing to estimate a. single transfer func-
tion across multiple networks is misguided . Thus. Cox. et al. 's (2004. p . 221 5) statement 
that. "The altruism model predicts that t he threshold point at which alt ruistic t ransfers 
125 See Chan and T say (1998) 
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[received] cease would increase with donor income." need not hold true. At a minimum. 
determining the predicted location of the knot points requires much more information than 
is commonly available in household surveys . 
Nevertheless. I attempted to apply a variant of Cox. et al. (2004)'s methodology to 
the IFLS data on int ra-family transfers. In particular. for different quanti les of measures 
of nonresident family income. I est imated one- and two-knot linear spline models on the 
1997 cross-sections of transfers received from the nonresident fami ly. T he measures of 
nonresident family income that I used are (i) the av rage of the number of grades of schooling 
completed by each nonresident family member; and (ii ) a proxy for nonresident fami ly 
income constructed using information on their genders. occupations. levels of education. 
and location relat ive to the sample household in combination with Indonesian Nat ional 
Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) data. 126 
Iviy approach intended to test whether the location of the estimated knot point(s) varied 
with the proxy for the donor 's income in ways potentially consistent with the more general 
altruistic model. This approach is surely not definitive. and unfortunately the estimates 
were fairly erratic. Looking across my estimated transfer functions. their shapes were often 
inconsistent with that predicted by t he altruistic model. and there was no indication that t he 
position of t he estimated knot points varied systematically with my measures nonresident 
family income. 
I interpret the results of this exercise as inconclusive. 'While there are a number of po-
tential explanations. the most important for future research would seem to be that the data 
required to test the predictions of the general altruistic model about the shape of transfer 
functions are quite demanding. In the absence of data on altruist ic network membership 
and the distribution of income over members of the networks. a definitive test of the general 
altruistic model remains elusive. 
126See Karner (2011) for detai ls on the construction of t he latter measure. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
Descript ive statistics on the persistence of t ransfers in one direction. and tes ts of forecastable 
income as a determinant of the direct ion of transfers. provide evidence against pure insur-
ance as t he sole mot ive for int ra-family transfers. An alternative motive. ex post altruism. 
is potentially capable of explaining these patterns. Yet the apparent ly stronger association 
between transfers and forecastable income. versus un-forecastable income. casts doubt on 
altruism as the sole motive behind intra-family t ransfers. 
In reali ty. it seems likely that intra-fami ly t ransfers involve a mixture of insurance, 
altruism. and exchange motives. A more defini t ive test of the altruistic motive. based on 
the shape of transfer functions. requires more detailed data on the structure of alt ruistic 
networks and the dist ribution of income over t hese networks. The collection of such data . 
along with more comprehensive assessments of the implications of interactions between 
different t ransfer motives. represent frui tful paths for future research. 
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4.8 Appendix 
JVIy approach to constructing a measure of rainfall variability follows that of Levine and 
Yang (2006). GHCN (201 2) contains monthly historical rainfall data collected by hundreds 
of weather stations placed throughout Indonesia. To construct t he measure of rainfall 
variability. 0"1·• an est imate of average annual rainfall in each region . for each year. {Lrt · is 
needed. As noted in the text. regions correspond to Indonesian provinces in the present 
version of this paper. I estimated {trt. by first matching weather stations to regions . To each 
region. I matched all stations that fell within a square. with sides 250km in length . centered 
on the capi tal city. For each station s , I then totaled the monthly rainfall measurements 
reported in the data for each year. This yields r f srt · the total annual rainfall collected by 
station s in region r in year t. I then calculated {trt as the simple average of r'fsrt across all 
stations in a given region . in a given year. 127 Given an estimate for ~Lrt for each region-year. 
I defined O"r as the coefficient of variation in annual rainfall for region r. 
Let {tr = ~ Lt {trt denote average rainfall over the period 1953-1992 in region r. where 
T = 40 in this case. l'v1y measure of rainfall variability in region r is given as: 
(4 .1 3) 
127T he size and composition of the set of stations matched to a given region varies by year. 
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